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Abstract 
This dissertation will analyse the history of the Russian Archaeological Institute 
in Constantinople, which operated between 1895 and 1914. Established under the 
administrative structure of the Russian Embassy in Constantinople, the institute 
occupied a place at the intersection of science and politics. Focusing nearly exclusively 
on Byzantine and Slavic antiquities in the Ottoman Empire, the activities of the institute 
reflected the imperial identity of Russia at the turn of the century. As was explicitly 
expressed by Russian diplomats, bureaucrats, and scholars, the establishment of an 
archaeological institution in the Ottoman capital was regarded as a foreign policy tool to 
extend Russia’s influence in the Near East, a tool of “soft power” in modern parlance. 
On the Ottoman side, foreign archaeological activities were regarded with 
suspicion especially in the later part of the 19th century. In an attempt to preserve its 
vulnerable sovereignty, Ottoman Empire closely monitored foreign archaeological 
activities on its territories. For the Ottoman Empire, archaeology was also a way of 
projecting its image as a modern, Westernised empire. For both Russian and Ottoman 
archaeologists, European scholarship was regarded as an example that should be 
followed, and a rival at the same time. 
Russian archaeologists had to close down their office with the outbreak of World 
War I. The complications that arose with the disintegration of the institute were solved 
only in the late 1920s between the Soviet Union and Republican Turkey, under 
completely different political circumstances. 
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Introduction 
An ancient site, a monument, and an object of archaeological interest may have multiple 
histories and multiple meanings, depending on the position of the interpreter. An ancient 
monument is not only a reminder of a bygone past, but it is also a medium for the 
(re)construction and (re)making of identity through a particular interpretation of history. 
After all, remembering and interpreting the history of an ancient monument in a specific 
way, while ignoring other possible readings, is a political choice. 
Ancient monuments, especially those with a controversial history, may be 
claimed by different ideological, social, ethnic groups within a society, or may be the 
object of international competition. This statement was also true for the antiquities 
found in the Ottoman Empire, especially in Constantinople in the late 19th century, 
where not only the ancient heritage, but the very territory was an object of political 
rivalry. In other words, the competition over antiquities may be correlated with political 
competition between different groups. Multiple actors with opposed world-views may 
promote their conflicting interests through the symbolism of historical monuments. The 
past, especially distant past, can be read and interpreted in a variety of ways, which 
often compete with each other for legitimacy. In the same vein, a particular ethnic, 
religious, social group’s acquisition of a historical monument may signify a symbolic 
victory over assumed opponents. Ancient history is a useful terrain for states, which try 
to cultivate national identity and legitimise their contemporary political agendas by 
making references to a distant past. In this regard, items of cultural capital are 
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transformed into markers of contemporary identity.1 The meaning of monuments may be 
manipulated by state authorities in a fashion that would suit official historiography. 
Historical artefacts are particularly instrumental in the creation of nationalist discourses. 
Broadly, the underlying question that motivated this dissertation is the 
interaction between archaeological scholarship and imperial identity, specifically the 
imperial identities of the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th 
century. Of course, identity is a very vague and open-ended concept and needs further 
elaboration. In both Russia and the Ottoman Empire, archaeology was nearly 
exclusively an elitist preoccupation in the period under examination. In addition, 
governments, not private institutions, were the most active promoters of archaeological 
activity. Therefore, the identity as revealed by archaeology mostly reflected the identity 
promoted by statesmen, bureaucrats, and to a certain extent, intellectuals and academics 
influential enough to inspire governmental activities. In other words, despite the 
broadness suggested by the term imperial identity, this dissertation is interested in 
understanding the identity embraced and promoted by a narrow segment of the society, 
as reflected by archaeological activities. 
In the case of the Russian Archaeological Institute in Constantinople (RAIK), the 
relationship between Russian foreign policy priorities, imperial identity and 
archaeological projects was quite clear, as it was often emphasised both by Russian 
diplomats and archaeologists who encouraged the establishment of the institute. The 
projects of RAIK reflected Russian imperial identity and underlying ideological tenets 
                                                        
1 David C. Harvey, “National Identities and the Politics of Ancient Heritage: Continuity and Change at 
Ancient Monuments in Britain and Ireland, c. 1675-1850,” Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers, New Series, Vol. 28, No. 4 (December 2013), p. 473. 
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of Russian foreign policy at the turn of the century. At the same time, the shortcomings 
and failures of RAIK shed light on the limits of Russia’s political influence abroad. 
RAIK came into existence at a time when there was increasing international 
political competition over the Balkans and rest of the Ottoman territories. There was 
pressure both from above and from below: on the one hand, nationalist movements 
swept through Ottoman territories. On the other hand, European powers worked hard to 
preserve the international status quo in the face of Ottoman decline. Russia’s inevitable 
rivalry with European powers, and the necessity to catch up with them in every sphere, 
including science, appeared frequently as a theme in the discourse of Russian 
archaeologists and diplomats. In the late 19th century, overseas archaeological institutes 
were the visual expressions of the political influence of European empires over a given 
region. The people behind the establishment of RAIK argued that if other European 
empires invested in archaeology, then Russia should follow the same path. 
Archaeological scholarship was regarded as a sign of prestige and civilisation, and a tool 
for extending political influence at the same time. 
In addition to highlighting Russian imperial identity, RAIK’s contacts with the 
Ottoman Empire and Balkan nations give insight about the identities promoted by these 
governments and Russia’s relationship with them. Neither the Ottoman Empire nor 
Balkan states were merely passive actors in this process. The development of legal 
frameworks to monitor foreign archaeologists and sensitivity about ownership rights 
over ancient objects imply that monuments were regarded as symbols of sovereignty by 
the countries that hosted antiquities. Particularly for the Ottoman Empire, archaeology 
was a means of asserting its place among European empires. By sponsoring 
10 
 
archaeological studies of its own and compelling foreign archaeologists to obey certain 
regulations, the Ottoman government was in fact indicating that it was on an equal 
footing with Europeans. As two multi-ethnic and multi-religious empires, the 
“diplomacy of archaeology” between the Russian and Ottoman Empires defy easy 
categorisations such as nationalist, imperialist or colonialist archaeology; rather require 
a multi-faceted analysis. 
This dissertation is based on official correspondence between RAIK and Russian 
diplomats, various ministries, government bodies, and the Ottoman government, as well 
as personal letters of RAIK members, especially those belonging to the director of the 
institute, Fyodor Ivanovich Uspenskii. Reports submitted to the Ministry of Public 
Education, excavation and expedition reports also constitute an important source-base 
for the study. These materials were gathered mainly from the St. Petersburg branch of 
the Archive of the Russian Academy of Sciences (PFA RAN), Russian State Historical 
Archives (RGIA) in Russia, Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives (BOA) in Turkey, and 
from the Bulletin of the Russian Archaeological Institute in Constantinople (IRAIK). 
The Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives is the major depository of official 
documents pertaining to the history of the Ottoman Empire. The holdings at the Prime 
Ministry Ottoman Archives included correspondence between the Russian Embassy and 
the Ottoman government offices, most notably Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Ministry of Education. The Ottoman Imperial Museum was bureaucratically under the 
auspices of the Ministry of Education, therefore archival documents about the Imperial 
Museum are located under the Ministry of Education files. In this dissertation, there are 
several references to the documents of the Chief Secretary of the Ministry of Education 
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(Maarif Mektubî Kalemi, MF. MKT.). The activities of Russian archaeologists were 
overseen by local officials appointed by the Ministry of the Interior, in addition to the 
Ottoman Imperial Museum. The documents of various Ministry of the Interior offices 
are categorised into sub-groups under the files of the Dahiliye Nezâreti (The sub-groups 
used in this dissertation include DH. HMŞ., DH. İD., DH. MKT., DH. EUM. MTK.). 
Because of RAIK’s diplomatic links, the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs was an 
active participant in the dialogue between Russian archaeologists and the Ottoman 
government. The references to the documents of the Chief Secretary of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (Hariciye Mektubî Kalemi, HR. MKT.) highlight the exchange between 
Russian archaeologists and the Ministry. The decrees sanctioned by the Sultan are 
referred to as İrade, and the various sub-groups used in this dissertation include İ. HUS., 
İ. MMS., İ. MSM., İ. ŞD., İ. TAL. Under the Hamidian regime, there was an extensive 
network of government officials and spies reporting every incident across the Ottoman 
Empire directly to the Sultan himself. The documents collected at the personal palace of 
Abdülhamid II are accessible under the title Yıldız Evrâkı. The archival documents cited 
as Y. A. HUS., Y. PRK. ASK., and Y. PRK. BŞK. are parts of this file. Finally, the 
documents from the office of the Grand Vizier (Sadaret Mektubî Kalemi, A. MKT.) and 
documents from the Archive of the Sublime Porte (Bab-ı Âli Evrak Odası, BEO) are 
widely used in this research. 
Different from the Ottoman archives, where documents are categorised 
according to administrative units, Russian archives are classified thematically, which 
makes it easier for researchers to find an entire set of documents under a single title. The 
bulk of materials concerning the history of RAIK is located at the St. Petersburg Branch 
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of the Archive of the Russian Academy of Sciences (PFA RAN).2 This archive hosts the 
diplomatic correspondence between RAIK and the Russian Embassy in Constantinople 
and various Russian consulates across the Ottoman Empire, yearly reports of RAIK 
submitted to the Ministry of Public Education, personal papers of archaeologists 
affiliated with the Institute, and visual materials. Specifically, I looked into three fonds:3 
Fond no. 116 holds documents pertaining to the director of RAIK, Fyodor Ivanovich 
Uspenskii (1845-1928). Uspenskii’s correspondence with diplomats, bureaucrats, 
Russian and foreign archaeologists, as well as his personal notes can be found within 
this fond. Fond no. 127 is entitled “Russian Archaeological Institute in Constantinople” 
and holds documents about the establishment of the Institute, its bureaucratic structure, 
personnel profile, scientific expeditions, and the final dissolution. This fond also deals 
with relations of Russian archaeologists with the Ottoman government. The last fond I 
investigated at PFA RAN is fond no. 169, which holds materials about RAIK’s Trabzon4 
expedition in 1916-1917. One of the most politically interesting expeditions of the 
Institute, the Trabzon expedition coincided with Russian occupation of the city, and 
gives insight about Russian military and political presence in occupied Ottoman towns 
during World War I. 
The second archive I visited in St. Petersburg was the Russian State Historical 
Archive (RGIA).5 At RGIA, I looked into files dealing specifically with the Russian 
Archaeological Institute, which were located under fond no. 757. Unfortunately, the 
                                                        
2 For further information, please visit http://www.ranar.spb.ru/eng/. 
3 Fond is an archival record group in Russian archival system. Fond refers to an entire set of documents 
from a particular individual or institution. Under fonds, there is opis, and under opis, there is delo. 
4 Trabzon is a large port city on the Eastern Black Sea. The city was also the seat of the Trebizond 
Empire, one of the successors of the Byzantine Empire, until its conquest by the Ottomans in the 15th 
century. 
5 For further information, please visit http://www.fgurgia.ru. 
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duration of this dissertation coincided with the closure of the Archive of Foreign Policy 
of the Russian Empire (AVPRI). Due to RAIK’s official links to the Russian Embassy 
in Constantinople, AVPRI holds documents concerning the Institute, although at a 
smaller scale compared to PFA RAN and RGIA.6 Looking at secondary sources, we can 
conclude that the documents at AVPRI are mostly correspondence between Russian 
diplomatic services in the Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman government, as well as 
exchange between Russian archaeologists and Russian diplomats. 
Although the initial research plan included a visit to AVPRI, the closure 
necessitated a change of plans. The original aim of the dissertation was to put a heavier 
emphasis on the diplomatic aspect of Russian archaeological activities in the Ottoman 
Empire, but the closure of AVPRI made this task impractical. Instead, I decided to 
analyse RAIK’s activities within the context of Russian imperial identity. Moreover, I 
tried to make up for AVPRI by using Ottoman sources, and keeping an eye on Ottoman 
imperial identity as manifested in Ottoman archaeological policies. This way, I tried to 
make a comparison between the two empires of the pre-1914 international order, both of 
which could not survive after the war. The project to create an archaeological institute 
was born at the Russian Embassy in Constantinople, therefore it would be interesting to 
look at the exchange of letters between Russian diplomats and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs to understand the conditions in which RAIK came into being. Luckily, the 
wealth of documents at PFA RAN and RGIA, both in terms of quantity and in terms of 
the value of information they provided, compensated for the loss of AVPRI. There were 
                                                        
6 I. P. Medvedev, Arkhivy Russkikh Vizantinistov v Sankt-Peterburge (Sankt-Peterburg: Izd-vo Dmitry 
Bulanin, 1995), p. 62. 
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a sufficient number of documents in both archives to examine the political and 
bureaucratic context in which RAIK was established and operated. 
In addition to these archival sources, I also made use of published primary 
sources. Without doubt, the most important published source about RAIK was the 
annual publication of the Institute. From 1896 to 1912 RAIK published an annual 
journal, Izvestiia Russkogo Arkheologicheskogo Instituta v Konstantinopole (Bulletin of 
the Russian Archaeological Institute in Constantinople) in a total of 16 volumes. Except 
for the first two volumes, Izvestiia was published in Sofia. In addition to academic 
articles, Izvestiia included yearly reports outlining RAIK’s scientific activities, 
communication with Russian and Ottoman government offices, and budgetary 
questions. Academic articles in the Izvestiia incorporated detailed archaeological 
information, but also provided interesting observations about local customs, topography, 
and political situation in the expedition area. The entire collection of the Izvestiia was 
available at the Library of the Istanbul Archaeological Museum – once known as the 
Ottoman Imperial Museum. 
Individual archaeologists affiliated with RAIK also produced academic works 
based on their research in Ottoman territories. Among the most important of them, we 
can count Uspenskii’s magnum opus Istoriia Vizantiiskoi Imperii (History of the 
Byzantine Empire), which was published in 1913 in three volumes, and his Ocherki iz 
Istorii Trapezuntskoy Imperii (Essays on the History of the Trebizond Empire), which 
was published posthumously. Russian academic journals, most importantly Vizantiiskii 
Vremennik (Byzantine Chronicle) and Izvestiia Akademii Nauk (Academy of Sciences 
15 
 
Gazette) contain articles relevant to my project. I had the chance to find these sources in 
the Library of the Academy of Sciences (BAN)7 in St. Petersburg. 
Throughout the dissertation, place names are indicated as they were officially 
used in the time period under examination. For instance, Manastır is preferred instead of 
Bitola, or Üsküp instead of Skopje. Selânik, the official name of the vilâyet, is preferred 
instead of the often used version Salonica. An exception was made only with regard to 
Istanbul. The Ottomans used a number of terms to indicate the imperial capital, such as 
Dersaadet and Konstantiniyye. Because the full name of the Russian Institute included 
the word Constantinople, I preferred to use Constantinople throughout the text for the 
sake of consistency. In the 20th century, many city and town names in Asia Minor and 
the Balkans were changed by the newly established nation-states. The contemporary 
names of cities and towns are given in brackets when they are first mentioned in the 
text. 
As for the transliteration of Russian words, the rules set out by the Library of 
Congress are followed. All the translations from Russian to English belong to myself. 
The first chapter of the dissertation will discuss the theoretical framework of this 
research and will analyse existing literature about the relationship between archaeology 
and politics, especially in the 19th century. Specifically, the focus will be on the role of 
archaeology in the construction of national or imperial identity. In parallel with this, 
there will be discussion about the implications of archaeology for Ottoman and Russian 
imperial identities. The literature about Ottoman and Russian imagination of ancient 
history, and how this imagination reflected their imperial politics in the late 19th century 
will be examined in detail. 
                                                        
7 For further information, please visit http://www.rasl.ru/. 
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Since RAIK focused primarily on Byzantine history and archaeology, this 
dissertation will give special importance to the political aspect of Byzantine studies. 
Both the Russian and the Ottoman Empires had historical and cultural connections to the 
Byzantine Empire, although in different ways. For this reason, academic interest in 
Byzantine antiquities in these two Empires in the late 19th century is a relevant 
discussion question. The second chapter will be comprised of sub-chapters dealing with 
the development of academic archaeology in the Russian Empire. The special place of 
Byzantinology within Russian historical / archaeological scholarship, and more broadly, 
the image of Byzantium in Russian thought will be outlined in this chapter. After 
examining Russian interest in Byzantine history, both at ideological and academic 
levels, this chapter will also deal with Ottoman appreciation of Byzantine monuments 
and Byzantine history. The establishment of RAIK can be more clearly understood as an 
outcome of these scholarly developments. 
After the theoretical discussions of the first two chapters, the third chapter will 
proceed with the outcomes of these intellectual developments in the practical realm. 
This chapter will explain the development of archaeology and archaeological 
preservation in the Ottoman Empire. The importance attributed to ancient objects in the 
late 19th century will be analysed within the context of Ottoman modernisation. The 
establishment of the Ottoman Imperial Museum and the antiquities regulations of 1869, 
1874, 1884, and 1906 will be explained in detail. Ottoman views of foreign 
archaeologists will be examined looking at official archival correspondence. The aim of 
the chapter is to understand Ottoman appreciation of ancient history, and its implications 
for Ottoman self-perception at the turn of the century. The development of archaeology 
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in the Ottoman Empire is important to understand as the context in which RAIK was 
established and operated. Examining Ottoman policies vis-à-vis foreign archaeologists is 
also necessary to compare Ottoman attitudes towards Russian archaeologists with other 
European scholars. 
The fourth chapter will explain the establishment of RAIK. Diplomatic and 
academic efforts for the establishment of an archaeological institute, alternative projects, 
and the ideas behind RAIK will be examined in detail based on the official exchange of 
letters between various government offices of the Russian Empire. The bureaucrats and 
diplomats who supported RAIK’s establishment and their justifications will be outlined. 
Most importantly, the positions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Public 
Education, Holy Synod, and the Tsar himself will be explained. Finally, the bureaucratic 
structure of RAIK, its links to the Russian Embassy in Constantinople and the Russian 
government will be described. The aim of this chapter is to understand the underlying 
reasons for the establishment of an overseas Russian archaeological institute. Did the 
RAIK project reflect the mind-set of only a handful of individuals responsible for its 
creation, or did it indicate the ideological orientation of the Russian government in 
general? This question will be kept in mind while explaining RAIK’s official links to the 
Russian government. 
The fifth chapter will continue with the scholarly activities of RAIK. The focus 
of RAIK’s scholarly interests, its studies on Byzantine and ancient Slavic history will be 
analysed, keeping in mind the political dimension of Russia’s interest in Byzantine and 
Slavic archaeology. The scientific expeditions of the institute, with a specific focus on 
expeditions to Bulgaria, the Black Sea littoral, Macedonia, and Constantinople will be 
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explained. There will be discussion about the interactions between RAIK and the 
Ottoman government, Ottoman perceptions of Russian archaeologists, international 
political background, and Russian archaeologists’ opinions on contemporary political 
developments. 
The sixth chapter takes on from where the previous chapter left off, and 
continues with RAIK’s archaeological studies in the Balkans right before the Balkan 
Wars. The archaeological activities will be explained in reference to the international 
political developments of the period. Special attention will be devoted to the Slavic 
Department established within RAIK in 1911, and what the Department meant for 
RAIK’s mission in the Balkans. 
The seventh and last chapter will highlight the fate of RAIK after 1914, and 
briefly explain the outcomes of the World War I. RAIK’s last archaeological expedition, 
the Trabzon expedition in 1916-1917 will be analysed in this chapter. Diplomatic 
complications, which emerged as a result of RAIK’s sudden evacuation of 
Constantinople were solved in 1929 by an agreement between the two new regimes in 
both countries, Republican Turkey and the Soviet Union. The developments between 
1914 and 1929, and Byzantinology’s fall from favour in the Soviet period will be 
explained in this chapter. The changing attitudes towards Byzantinology from the 
Russian Empire to the USSR implies that the activities of RAIK reflected Russian 
imperial identity, an identity that was deemed out of fashion in the Soviet period. 
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Chapter 1 
Regenerating Distant Past: 
Nationalist and Imperialist Uses of Ancient History in the 19th Century 
“But no physical object or trace is an autonomous guide to bygone times; they light up the past 
only when we already know they belong to it. Memory and history pin-point only certain things as relics; 
the rest of what lies around us seems simply present, suggesting nothing past.”8 
 
The 19th century was marked by the institutionalisation of archaeology as a scientific 
discipline. This was achieved by the establishment of university chairs and museums in 
the major capitals of Europe, as well as the projection of European influence with 
foreign archaeological institutes established in the periphery controlled by European 
powers.9 Academics from Great Britain, France, and later Germany and the United 
States organised archaeological institutes, societies, and schools in the major centres of 
the ancient world – primarily Rome, Athens, and Cairo.10 These historical cities became 
meeting points for archaeologists from different countries, who found the opportunity to 
share their projects with international academia. The study of the ancient world provided 
the archaeologists a window, through which they could look into the origins of 
                                                        
8 David Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 238 
9 Antiquarian interest in ancient monuments and systematic collection of such objects can be traced back 
to much earlier periods, even as far as Renaissance, but archaeology became a scientific discipline only in 
19th century, during the heyday of nationalism and imperial competition in Europe. For the beginnings of 
scientific archaeology first in Scandinavia, then in Britain and France, see Bruce G. Trigger, A History of 
Archaeological Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 73-103. 
10 There was also a significant interest in the ancient history of colonial possessions, as illustrated by 
British archaeological activities in British India. But the major focus of this dissertation is classical 
archaeology, so colonial archaeology will be left outside the scope of discussion. 
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European civilisation as they saw it. Modern European empires defined themselves as 
the spiritual heirs of the ancient civilisations that flourished in the Mediterranean basin 
and the Near East.11 On the political side, the creation of schools of archaeology in cities 
such as Cairo and Athens mirrored the political competition between major European 
powers. As a result of this competition, the success of archaeological activities was 
increasingly associated with national and imperial prestige.12 The political rivalry 
between Britain and France was replicated by the British Museum and the Louvre, and 
Prussia caught up with them after its political unification in 1871. National museums in 
the imperial capitals became the visual representations of the territories each empire 
held under its control, while overseas archaeological institutes became the physical 
embodiments of their imperial presence in the given territory. 
The Russian Empire joined the competition over the ancient world as a 
latecomer. In 1894, Russia established its first independent overseas archaeological 
institute. However, this independent Russian institute was neither in Rome nor in 
Athens – but in Istanbul, or Constantinople, or the Russian Tsargrad; the former capital 
of the Eastern Roman Empire and Orthodox Christianity, a capital for whose possession 
some Russians longed in the 19th century. The Russian Archaeological Institute (RAIK) 
was also the first foreign archaeological institute to be established in Constantinople. In 
the following years, the Russian Archaeological Institute contributed significantly to the 
development of Byzantinology with its numerous excavations and publications. 
                                                        
11 Magnus Bernhardsson, Reclaiming a Plundered Past: Archaeology and Nation Building in Modern Iraq 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), pp. 23-24. 
12 Margarita Díaz-Andreu García, A World History of Nineteenth-Century Archaeology: Nationalism, 
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With a specific focus on the history of RAIK, my study aims at highlighting the 
diplomacy of archaeology between the Russian and the Ottoman Empires, which later 
continued between their successor states. Even though there is literature on the 
politicisation of archaeology in various parts of the world, this topic has not been 
covered as it relates to Russo-Ottoman relations in the late 19th century. Actually, the 
cultural and intellectual dimension of Russo-Ottoman relations in 19th century has 
stayed in the shadow of diplomatic relations between the two Empires, and has not been 
covered thoroughly. With regard to the institute in question, there are only two 
monographs, one in Greek and the other in Russian. The first monograph, To Rosiko 
Arkheologiko Institouto Konstantinoupoleos (1894-1914) (Russian Archaeological 
Institute in Constantinople, 1894-1914) was written by Konstantinos Papoulidis as his 
doctoral dissertation and was submitted to the Faculty of Theology at the Aristotle 
University of Thessaloniki in 1984.13 The other monograph, entitled Russkii 
Arkheologicheskii Institut v Konstantinopole (Russian Archaeological Institute in 
Constantinople), was written by Ye. Yu. Basargina in 1999. Both monographs portray 
the institutional structure of RAIK in a descriptive manner without engaging in a 
theoretical discussion about archaeology’s links to political context. Probably as a result 
of the inaccessibility of Ottoman Turkish to researchers, these studies do not analyse the 
activities of RAIK within the context of Russo-Ottoman relations, looking at both sides 
of the story. Basargina particularly deals with the organisational structure of the 
Institute, its legal status, and relationship to the Russian Embassy in Constantinople.14 
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She also gives a detailed account of the biographies and academic achievements of 
individual archaeologists affiliated with the Institute. 
The diplomacy of archaeology between Russia and the Ottoman Empire is 
distinctive for a number of reasons. Bruce Trigger identified three main currents in 
archaeology in the 19th century; nationalist, imperialist, and colonialist. He associated 
imperialist archaeology with a small number of states that exert political, economic, and 
cultural influence over large areas of the world.15 Nevertheless, none of these categories 
seem to explain Russian or Ottoman archaeological activities with justice. Actually, the 
literature on the political aspects of archaeology generally focuses on either colonial 
archaeology, as was practiced by European archaeologists in European colonial 
possessions, or nationalist archaeology, as was practiced by native archaeologists in 
sovereign nation-states in an attempt to legitimise the nation-state rhetoric. However, 
Russia and the Ottoman Empire, as two cosmopolitan, traditional empires of the pre-
World War I period, do not fit in these categories. Russian archaeological activities in 
the Ottoman Empire and Ottoman reactions to them rather reflect their imperial 
identities, and how the political programs and imperial visions of the Ottoman Empire 
and Russia came into conflict with each other. 
The objectivity of archaeology as a scientific discipline has long been challenged 
from within the discipline.16 Neil Asher Silberman argues that archaeology is by its 
nature a political and scientific enterprise at the same time.17 The theoretical evolution 
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of archaeology is important to understand why objectivity became an issue in the last 
decades. From the late 19th century to the 1960s, the culture-historical approach, with a 
focus on the specificities of cultures and societies ancestral to modern nations, 
dominated archaeological scholarship.18 This approach legitimised nationalist claims to 
depict modern nations as direct descendants of ancient civilisations. This paradigm gave 
way to the positivist model of processual archaeology, or New Archaeology, especially 
in American academia in the 1960s.19 Instead of the qualitative and descriptive methods 
of the culture-historical approach, processual archaeologists applied the quantitative and 
explanatory methods of the natural sciences to archaeology. As a reaction to this 
positivist attitude, post-processual archaeology came on the scene in the mid-1980s. 
Post-processual archaeologists were more interested in the specificities of each culture, 
and argued that each case should be studied in its own context. They emphasised the 
subjectivity of archaeology and its inevitable links to politics and socio-economic 
background.20 
It should be noted that this dissertation does not intend to question the scientific 
legitimacy of archaeology or put forward epistemological questions about whether 
archaeological data can or cannot provide objective knowledge. The recreation of the 
past through archaeological or historical scholarship is not entirely a mental construction 
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but requires data, therefore, even when their analyses is coloured by particular social 
and political concerns, the scholarship is justifiable as long as it helps us understand the 
past.21 Nevertheless, as Trigger pointed out, ideologies influence the questions 
archaeologists ask or refrain from asking.22 This dissertation is concerned with questions 
that archaeologists preferred to ask, the motivations that prompted governments to 
support and fund certain archaeological projects, and the symbolic meaning of ancient 
history in the diplomatic relations between states. 
Benedict Anderson observed that along with maps and censuses, archaeology has 
been an important “institution of power” that reflected the way in which colonial states 
imagined the history of their colonial possessions.23 Archaeological activities and the 
establishment of national museums helped visualise and classify history into strictly 
delineated national, geographic and demographic units. Ancient monuments proved to 
be visible links between particular cultures and lands, stretching from immemorial past 
to present, providing legitimacy for existing states to rule over territories once inhabited 
by their assumed predecessors.24 In her study on the political uses of archaeology in 
Israel, Nadia Abu El-Haj claimed that archaeology created a rhetoric that shaped 
colonial, national, and cultural imagination. Ancient history became a platform where 
contested political and territorial designs of different actors and their struggles come to 
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the surface.25 In this sense, archaeology offers a framework to examine the dynamics of 
colonial, imperial, and national aspirations and territorial claims of different groups. 
The development of archaeology in the Near East was closely linked to the 
imperial rivalry between European powers. Napoleon’s expedition into Egypt in 1798, 
followed by his army of savants, resulted in the discovery of the Rosetta Stone. The 
subsequent British acquisition of the Rosetta Stone initiated the Franco-British rivalry 
over Near Eastern antiquities.26 At around the same time, French and British 
adventurists and antiquarians were also active in Mesopotamia. The congruence of 
archaeology and diplomacy was exemplified by the close links between diplomatic 
missions and archaeologists, as many diplomats, attachés, and consuls either engaged in 
archaeological activity themselves or privately funded excavations.27 After a period of 
stagnation in the years following the Crimean War (1853-1856), archaeological activity 
in the Near East resumed in the 1870s, with Americans and Germans joining the race.28 
Following its political unification in 1871, the German government started 
actively supporting archaeological expeditions in the Near East. The Franco-Prussian 
War of 1870 was mirrored by the “aggressive rivalries” between German and French 
archaeological institutes abroad.29 The acquisition of Pergamon antiquities from the 
Ottoman Empire in 1879 was the first ambitious archaeological “conquest” by the 
Germans. The strong connection between the academic and artistic interests of the 
archaeologists and the political motivations of the imperial bureaucracy was evident as 
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Bismarck personally participated in the negotiations with the Ottoman Empire over the 
transfer of archaeological findings.30 For sure, this was more a competition for status 
and prestige, a competition to be at the forefront of civilisation, than for political gains 
in any direct sense. Against the backdrop of imperial rivalry, the Pergamon antiquities 
aroused national pride. In particular, the Pergamon Altar was something to boast against 
the Parthenon marbles exposed in the British Museum.31 In the parliament, Heinrich von 
Sybel exclaimed: “By incorporating the Pergamon creations, our museum has instantly 
moved to the forefront of European collections.”32 In a way, the museums were 
showcases displaying the image German leaders wanted to create at home and abroad 
that Berlin would be the new cultural centre of the world. 
By the late 19th century, national museums became indispensable features of the 
European cityscape. Andrew McClellan argues that there were two main functions of 
public art museums in Europe. First, to create a sense of collective belonging in a space 
where there was equal access for all citizens, and second, through their objects and 
display strategies, to champion their sponsor nation-states as the heirs to, and leaders of, 
the Western civilisation.33 Different from private collections, public museums were 
manifestations of national pride and had an educative role to instruct visitors. History 
was made physical and tangible in the exhibition halls of a museum. Historical 
processes were also presented in a systematic, linear, and classified manner. Especially 
in Britain and France, museums reflected the ethnic, cultural, and geographical diversity 
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within the borders of these colonial empires and the achievements of each empire in the 
scramble for colonies. Just as economic and political rivalry intensified, this competition 
was reflected in the museums by the collection of antiquities flowing from Egypt and 
the Near East.34 
Classical archaeology developed as an extension of the popularity of 
philhellenism in European universities in the 19th century.35 Different from previous 
trends of classical revival, in the 19th century classical studies had a broader institutional 
and social basis, and “pursued the beauty of the Greek body not only in art but also in 
life as a national goal.”36 Ancient Greeks were believed to embody the perfect human 
form and European nations competed with each other to claim the heritage of classical 
civilisations. In the second half of the 19th century, classical archaeologists did not 
justify their discipline only on the basis of individual intellectual enrichment, but they 
especially “exalted the benefits of scholarship for the state.”37 
The prevalent archaeological approach of the 19th century, the culture-historical 
tradition, attributed unique characteristics and specific historical significance to certain 
cultures. Greeks, Romans, and peoples of the Bible were thought to possess a distinctive 
cultural development and some societies were seen to be more innovative than others, 
therefore it was assumed that cultural change occurred at different pace in different parts 
of the world.38 Swedish archaeologist Gustav Oscar Montelius (1843-1921) put forward 
the theory that cultural progress was spread across the world through diffusion and 
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colonisation from centres to the periphery. This idea found an audience in Europe, as 
cultural diffusion from the Near East to Europe both accorded with biblical accounts and 
politically legitimised European interventions in the Near East.39 
Intensive European archaeological involvement in other parts of the world 
implied that modern inhabitants of ancient lands either had lost the glamour of their past 
or were the descendants of “barbarians” who destroyed the ancient civilisations under 
examination. After a long period of ignorance and neglect, it was European 
archaeologists who were unearthing this glorious past, and were therefore the legitimate 
heirs to the heritage left by ancient civilisations.40 Therefore, a direct historical line was 
drawn from the ancient civilisations of the Near East to modern European nations, with 
European culture standing at the peak of human progress.41 In an 1853 issue of the 
Illustrated Magazine of Art, an anonymous author professed that “France and England 
divide the glory of having rescued from the underground darkness and oblivion of 
twenty-five centuries, some of the most magnificent remains of the old world.”42 As 
Díaz-Andreu Garcia argued, archaeological discourse was useful in legitimising the 
assumed inferiority of peoples inhabiting the regions under European political, 
economic, and cultural control.43 In fact, archaeology provided a narrative explaining 
the “inevitability of certain lands to be conquered and the right of certain people to 
rule.”44 Archaeology’s links to power politics became even more evident during World 
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War I, when many archaeologists put their knowledge of local languages, cultures, and 
topography to the service of the intelligence services of their states.45 
Díaz-Andreu Garcia divided archaeological activities in the 19th century into two 
main types: The activities undertaken by the imperial powers, and local archaeology that 
developed in reaction to it.46 This duality is oversimplified as archaeology in the 19th 
century did not simply reflect the imperialist motivations of the great powers and 
nationalist reaction in regions under European political influence. In many instances, 
nationalist and imperialist concerns overlapped with each other. It would be more 
accurate to say that official support for archaeology was influenced by a variety of 
regional, national, and supra-national identities. Philip Kohl referred to the Franco-
British archaeological rivalry in Egypt and Mesopotamia as examples of imperialist, 
colonialist, and nationalist archaeology at the same time.47 In his article on the political 
uses of the Celtic past in France, Michael Dietler showed that albeit paradoxical, the 
same ancient record was simultaneously used to foster regional allegiances against the 
hegemony of the nation-state, to champion the cause of the nation-state, and to promote 
a pan-European unity.48 
The overlap of identities also applied to the two cases of this dissertation; 
namely, the Russian and the Ottoman Empires. Especially in the later parts of the 19th 
century, there was an obvious power asymmetry between the two empires to the 
advantage of Russia. Despite the relative Ottoman political and military weakness vis-à-
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vis the Russian Empire, the Ottoman Empire was clearly not a dependency under 
Russian tutelage. Therefore, it would be misleading to analyse Russian archaeological 
activities in the Ottoman Empire within the framework of imperial archaeology. It was 
rather a relationship between two sovereign empires with conflicting territorial claims 
and political agendas. While Russian interest in Byzantine and Slavic antiquities within 
Ottoman borders was a manifestation of Russian religious, national, and imperial 
identity, Ottoman archaeological activities could be read as a reflection of Ottoman self-
perception after the modernisation reforms of the 19th century. 
Along with heightened imperial rivalry, the 19th century also saw the rise of 
nationalist ideology. In Western Europe, with class conflicts becoming the major issue 
after the 1880s, ancient history was used for contrasting purposes by different groups. 
While nationalist and anti-socialist groups referred to ancient history to foster national 
unity,49 reformists found inspiration for social change in the distant past. Göran Blix 
shows that in 19th century France, ancient history served as an inspiration for aesthetic, 
social, and political revival.50 In any case, European archaeologists tried to trace the 
history of their nations back to ancient times and glorify the specific achievements of 
their ancestors.51 In this period, the theories of the German archaeologist Gustav 
Kosinna (1858-1931) became attractive for the advocates of nation-states. Kosinna 
argued that culture was rooted in ethnicity, therefore he established a direct link between 
ethnic and cultural continuity.52 Archaeology was used to demonstrate the continuity, 
                                                        
49 Trigger, “Alternative Archaeologies: Nationalist, Colonialist, Imperialist”, p. 358. 
50 Göran Blix, From Paris to Pompeii: French Romanticism and the Cultural Politics of Archaeology 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), pp. 200-201. 
51 Trigger, “Romanticism, Nationalism, and Archaeology,” p. 269. 
52 Trigger, A History of Archaeological Thought, pp. 163-167. 
31 
 
organic and natural coherence of the nation from pre-historic to modern times; as well as 
to claim “unredeemed” territories by nation-states.53 
Influenced by the post-Napoleonic wave of romantic nationalism, Central and 
Eastern European nations living under Austrian, Prussian, Russian, and Ottoman rule 
resorted to archaeology as a means to glorify their national past and encourage 
resistance against imperial powers.54 For the newly emerging nation-states, ancient 
history provided legitimacy for freedom and national independence. Greece was a 
perfect example for such use of archaeological knowledge and practice. In Greece, 
ancient monuments were thought to link ancient past to present and future, while 
modern Greeks were seen as direct descendants of ancient Greeks and members of a 
distinctive Hellenic cultural community that existed continuously for more than a 
millennium.55 In this sense, archaeology offered an imagined linear history for nations, 
and archaeologists were thought to hold the key to discover the origins of their nations 
by unearthing their past. As Kohl and Fawcett stated, archaeology was essential for the 
construction of national identities and to legitimise the claims of nations-states to have 
existed from time immemorial.56 
Hamiliakis argued that the development of archaeology as an organised 
discipline and the emergence of the nation-state as the most legitimate form of 
government occurred simultaneously in the 19th century. Therefore, an analysis of the 
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link between nation-state and archaeology reflects how archaeology developed as a 
device of modernity, and in turn, served the most powerful ideology of modernity, that 
is, nationalism.57 Making reference to Hobsbawm, Kohl drew attention to archaeology’s 
role in “inventing traditions” and constructing collective memories and a shared past.58 
Especially in societies with ethnic and cultural diversity, nation-states used 
archaeological record to create a consciousness of togetherness as a nation. The strong 
link between official nationalism and archaeological research is not surprising, as often 
it was governments that funded research and therefore influenced the research agenda.59 
The political use of ancient history was not only a top-down process that was 
engineered by the state, but different segments of the society participated in the 
production of archaeological knowledge. Don Fowler focused on the generation, control 
and allocation of the past as a symbolic resource, both officially by bureaucrats and 
unofficially by nationalist citizens.60 Hamiliakis gave an account of the social meaning 
of ancient material culture in a modern context. His focus was not only on the nationalist 
use of archaeology by the state, but more broadly, on how antiquity is incorporated as a 
part of social life, daily practices, touristic activities, literature, and theatre plays.61 
Especially in the 19th century, touristic trips to ancient cities and museums became a part 
of leisure for European upper classes, who wanted to flee modernity into realms of 
alternative imagination. The first “Grand Tourists” of the 18th and early 19th centuries 
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were members of the European upper classes, but with the growth of mass tourism in the 
late 19th century, middle classes joined them.62 As a result of their visits to 
archaeological sites in Greece, Italy and the Near East, European travellers recorded 
their observations with the help of photographs, travel diaries and guidebooks and re-
created the ancient past through a Western lens. The preoccupation of different 
segments of the society with ancient history meant that re-creation of the past in a 
modern context was not only an official project initiated by the state, rather, it was 
simultaneously influenced both from above by the state and from below by individuals. 
As ancient history provided nationalist inspiration for intellectuals, at the same 
time, ancient monuments demarcated the boundaries of the nation. This territorial aspect 
is important, because the archaeological record can be read as testimony to the 
continuous existence of distinctly demarcated cultures and ethnic groups across a 
landscape.63 Ancient remains on a territory strongly linked nationalist claims to a 
specific piece of land. For example, in Greece, Hamiliakis pointed out that “antiquities 
possessed the ability to create a spatiality, to transform the timeless, homogenous, empty 
space of the nation into a concrete place.”64 Similarly in the Near East after World War 
I, different actors resorted to archaeology to expropriate land in a region with fluid and 
contested borders.65 In her study on the role of archaeology in the historical imagination 
of Israeli society, Nadia Abu El-Haj examined how ancient history was used as evidence 
to endorse territorial claims.66 In different cases across the globe, ancient history was 
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manipulated in such a way that it could fit into contemporary borders and justify 
irredentist arguments. 
Diffusionist views pointed to the Near East as the origin of European culture and 
claimed that Europeans inherited the heritage of Near Eastern civilisations. This vision 
conflicted with local nationalisms, which emphasised ethnic and cultural continuity on a 
given territory instead of cultural diffusion.67 The emergence of local nationalist ideas in 
the Near East produced a native challenge to European interpretations of ancient history. 
Donald Malcolm Reid showed how Egyptian intellectuals realised that archaeology 
could be turned to their advantage, and started training local archaeologists, most 
notably, Rifaa al-Tahtawi (1801-1873) who popularised ancient Egypt among his 
fellows.68 Similarly, Kamyar Abdi analysed the beginnings of archaeological interest 
among Iran’s ruling elite in the late 19th century, in the second half of the Qajar rule as a 
reaction to increasing foreign archaeological involvement.69 Gradually, ancient Iranian 
history was made a part of the nationalist discourse, with special interest in the 
Achaemenid and Sasanian periods. National pride was reflected with official buildings, 
rebuilt along the lines of traditional Persian architectural models.70 On a side note, 
Egypt’s and Iran’s discovery of ancient history opened eyes about the non-Islamic 
origins of these societies. 
Similar to Iran and Egypt, the development of archaeology in the Ottoman 
Empire was to a large extent a reaction to increasing European activity within its 
borders. Nevertheless, different from their Egyptian and Iranian counterparts, Ottoman 
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intellectuals or archaeologists never formulated a national mythology based on ancient 
monuments on their territory. Considering the fact that Greco-Roman antiquities 
constituted the main focus of Ottoman archaeological interest,71 neither could they claim 
ethnic and cultural continuity with the former residents of their lands. Although there 
was a small number of Ottoman intellectuals who argued that the Ottoman Empire 
inherited the Byzantine legacy, overall, Ottoman attitudes to Byzantine heritage were 
characterised by lack of interest, if not total rejection. For this reason, existing literature 
generally portrays Ottoman archaeology as if it were devoid of any political content. 
Mehmet Özdoğan and Tuğba Tanyeri-Erdemir argued that archaeology in the Ottoman 
Empire began as an elite occupation without a socio-political agenda. They argued that 
only in the Republican period archaeology acquired a political character.72 Ayşe 
Özdemir observed that Ottoman archaeology lacked a systematic research strategy for 
excavations or for the accumulation of antiquities. The main aim of Ottoman 
archaeologists, Özdemir claimed, was rather to enrich the museum collections, mostly 
with objects with aesthetic value from Hellenistic and Roman periods.73 
It is true that archaeology in the Ottoman Empire was imported from Europe, 
and therefore Ottoman archaeologists had a Euro-centric attitude in their assessment of 
the value of archaeological objects. As an extension of European influence, archaeology 
in the Ottoman Empire was oriented nearly exclusively to Hellenistic and Roman 
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antiquities and was not adapted to local conditions.74 Objects from Turkish-Islamic 
history were not regarded as antiquities for a long time, even though this attitude began 
to change with the rise of the Committee of Union and Progress after 1908.75 However, 
it would be too much of a simplification to argue that any archaeological activity before 
the Republican period was motivated only by aesthetic concerns and did not have any 
political dimension. For one thing, the development of archaeology was a reflection of 
Ottoman modernisation and Westernisation, as Wendy Shaw aptly illustrated in her 
detailed study of the development of museum-building practices in the Ottoman 
Empire.76 Even though Ottoman archaeology cannot be identified with a nationalist 
agenda, it was clearly an expression of Ottoman imperial identity in the 19th century. 
Archaeology, as a practice originating from Europe, implied the Ottoman Empire’s 
incorporation into the European cultural sphere.77 
Above all, archaeology was linked to the desire of the Ottomans to be accepted 
as part of the “civilised” realm. In addition, responding to foreign archaeological 
involvement with local archaeological projects implied a desire to protect the 
sovereignty of the Empire. Consequently, after the mid-19th century, ancient monuments 
within the borders of the Ottoman Empire were regarded as state property. Ottoman 
perception of foreign archaeologists, the intersection of archaeology, politics, and 
imperial identity in the Ottoman Empire started to attract scholarly attention in recent 
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years, which culminated in the publication of a valuable collection of essays, Scramble 
for the Past: A Story of Archaeology in the Ottoman Empire, 1753-1914.78 This study 
successfully brought together articles dealing with European archaeological activities in 
the Ottoman Empire and Ottoman responses to them in a time span that stretches from 
the establishment of the British Museum to World War I, but unfortunately left out 
Russian archaeologists among other European scholars. 
Selim Deringil defines Ottoman and Russian imperial identity in the 19th century 
with the term “borrowed imperialism.” He argued that Ottoman and Russian elites 
adopted European colonial discourse as regards the periphery of their respective 
Empires in their attempt to survive in a world where rules were made by the industrial 
empires of Western Europe.79 Therefore, both for the Ottoman Empire and for Russia, 
embracing the imperialist rhetoric borrowed from Europe was a way of establishing 
their precarious status as “European.” This imperial self-perception was reflected in the 
way Russia and the Ottoman Empire responded to the archaeological rivalry among 
imperial powers in the 19th century. Since archaeological discoveries became a marker 
of national and imperial prestige, promoting archaeological excavations and exhibiting 
the findings in the imperial museum was essential both for Russia and for the Ottoman 
Empire. In addition, establishing an overseas archaeological institute, as was 
exemplified by RAIK, supporting archaeological expeditions abroad, and proclaiming 
itself as the legitimate inheritor of classical antiquity strengthened Russia’s position, if 
the Russian Empire wanted to assert itself as a major European empire. 
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Archaeology offers a perfect example to show how Russia both was and was not 
European. On the one hand, Russia was a “latecomer” in science, arts, and other 
elements that defined the basis of European culture. Russians adopted museological and 
archaeological practices from Europe in the 19th century. In addition to its relatively late 
integration to the rest of Europe, Russian culture was also in some ways different. This 
difference was well illustrated by Russian archaeologists’ concentration on Byzantine 
archaeology more than classical Greece and Rome. Different from European empires 
that traced their histories back to the western part of the Roman Empire, Russia 
identified itself with Eastern Rome and archaeological interest in the Byzantine Empire 
reflected this imperial identity. 
Unfortunately, as Díaz-Andreu Garcia stated, there is nearly no comprehensive 
literature in English on the history of archaeology in Imperial Russia.80 Even in Russian, 
I was unable to find an extensive monograph situating the development of archaeology 
in the Russian Empire in a political context. There is brief information about imperial 
archaeology in monographs outlining the history of Russian archaeology, but these 
works focus primarily on the history of Soviet archaeology and refer to the imperial 
period only in passing.81 A study on the institutional structure of the Imperial 
Archaeological Commission seems to be the only comprehensive work on archaeology 
in the Russian Empire, but it was published in Russian and therefore available only to 
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Russian speakers.82 Nevertheless, in recent years, several works have been produced 
with regard to the involvement of scientists, particularly ethnologists, linguists, and 
archaeologists in Russian imperial politics. 
Since Russia experienced rapid territorial expansion throughout the 19th century, 
cooperation between imperial bureaucracy and experts was necessary to administer non-
Russian peoples in the newly conquered regions.83 In addition, scholars helped 
legitimise Russian territorial expansion with the help of the archaeological record. 
Certainly, the willingness of some scholars to cooperate with the imperial regime does 
not suggest an all-embracing pattern defining the mentality of scholars. Nathaniel 
Knight asserted that the ideas and behaviours of scholars, as independent individuals, 
were not necessarily determined by factors outside their control, therefore scholars 
might or might not form alliances with the state. The behaviours of scholars were 
shaped by a set of constraints and possibilities, but “not predetermined by a set 
Orientalist ‘script.’”84 The disagreements between scholars and imperial administration 
over policy questions verified the role of individual agency.85 Knight strongly argued 
against generalizing Edward Said’s correlation between imperial power and scholarly 
activity to every single scholar in the Russian Empire. He stated that the mechanism 
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through which knowledge was transformed into colonial power was even more 
complicated in the Russian case than in Western Europe.86 
Although the relationship between academics and bureaucrats was not free of 
contention, still, the close-knit nature of imperial and domestic politics often resulted in 
the convergence of interests between the two groups. In fact, in many cases, it is even 
difficult to talk about a precise distinction between the two. Kulikova referred to the 
dual character of Orientalist scholarship, both scientific and political, and these two 
characteristics often intermingled with each other.87 Adeeb Khalid remarked that even 
though scholars did not issue “marching orders to troops conquering regions of their 
expertise,” there was a complex network of relationship between experts and the state 
structure, and academic disciplines were not as autonomous as their image suggested.88 
Surely, French, British, and German scholarly institutes were also supported by their 
respective governments and diplomats, since it was easier to secure permits in a foreign 
country through diplomatic channels than it was for individual scholars. However, in an 
autocratic regime like Russia, where the autonomy and freedom of scholars were 
constrained by state authority, scientific projects that the imperial bureaucracy preferred 
to support indicated the priorities of imperial policy. Therefore, bureaucratic support for 
the establishment of an archaeological institute in Constantinople in 1894 should be 
examined in the light of these facts. 
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Even though Soviet scholars dated back the origins of archaeological interest in 
Russia to medieval times and marked Peter the Great’s reign as the begininning of 
serious scientific interest in antiquities,89 it would be more accurate to say that scientific 
archaeology was introduced to Russia in the mid-19th century. Two pioneering 
institutions, the Imperial Archaeological Society in St. Petersburg and the Imperial 
Archaeological Society in Moscow were established in 1851 and 1864 respectively, and 
the Imperial Archaeological Commission, which supervised all archaeological research 
in Russia, was founded in 1859. As Austin Jersild reminded, “If the Geographical 
Society proposed to make sense of the empire’s vast expanse, the Archaeological 
Commission promised to compose order out of the imperial past.”90 The Archaeological 
Commission issued calls to borderland communities to collect objects such as icons, 
musical instruments, and paintings. In the course of the 1870s-1880s, various local 
archaeological societies appeared in cities such as Tbilisi, Kazan, and Pskov.91 The 
initiative to create these societies generally came from within local communities though 
often it was encouraged by the government. The Black Sea coast, which was 
incorporated into the Russian Empire in the late 18th century, became the most preferred 
destination for archaeological expeditions with its ancient Greek sites and Schytian 
kurgans. Local museums were established in Crimea and Ukraine at very early dates. A 
museum was opened in Theodosia in 1811, in Odessa in 1825, and in Kerch in 1826.92 
The establishment of archaeological societies and museums in recently 
conquered regions with a substantial non-Russian population reflected a desire to export 
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Russia’s “civilising mission” to the periphery of the Russian Empire. Archaeology 
proved to be a useful instrument in creating a legitimate basis for imperial expansion in 
the newly incorporated regions. The basic tenets of imperial Russian archaeology in two 
Muslim-populated regions, Crimea and Caucasus, offer valuable insight to understand 
the possible motivations of Russian archaeologists in the Ottoman Empire. In the North 
Caucasus, imperial Russian archaeologists searched for traces of classical Greek and 
Christian past.93 Along with academic scholars, military officials participated in a series 
of archaeological conferences in Tbilisi, where the main focus was on Christian 
archaeology in the region.94 Georgian clergy expressed their support for the Imperial 
Archaeological Commission and underlined that secular and religious institutions had 
similar concerns. They argued that Islam stood as a problem and obstacle for the 
preservation of the authentic Christian past in the Caucasus.95 
One of the main goals of the Caucasus Archaeological Commission, which was 
established in 1864, was the collection of “folk” (narodnyi) objects, as well as ancient 
materials. Very shortly after the total expulsion of the Circassians and other local 
peoples, the Commission collected and displayed objects belonging to the native 
cultures of the Caucasus through archaeological excavations. In other words, scholarship 
legitimised the recent Russian conquest by portraying the Circassian past of the 
Caucasus as an ethnographical detail and locating “true” culture in more distant past. 
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Imperial archaeology legitimated the belief that a “glorious Christian past” was buried 
underneath the Caucasus waiting to be rescued by the Russian colonial rule.96 
In Crimea, another region that caused political and military conflict between 
Russia and the Ottoman Empire, archaeology assumed a religious character. In her 
detailed study of the Christianisation of Crimea from its annexation to the post-Soviet 
period, Mara Kozelsky focused mainly on the period of Nicholas I, when identity 
became coterminous with religion and the Orthodox Church became an intrumental tool 
in Russian domestic and foreign policy. Kozelsky focused on the intermingling of 
religion, politics, and ethnic tensions along the Black Sea border, which should be 
examined within the framework of Russo-Ottoman relations. She pointed out that 
Crimea was designated as a holy place, as the cradle of Russian Christianity, and was 
transformed into the “Russian Athos.”97 The Crimean War with the Ottomans further 
catalysed the Christianisation of Crimea at the expense of the peninsula’s Muslim-Tatar 
heritage. 
Crimea indeed had a remarkable number of ancient Greek and Byzantine 
monuments from the period before the Tatar conquest, and its history was closely linked 
to Constantinople since the Roman period. Through archaeology, Russian scholars 
emphasised the Christian heritage of the peninsula and downplayed the Tatar-Muslim 
past. As the denominators of Orthodox Christianity, Byzantine monuments in Crimea 
had a special importance for the religious - nationalist project of the Russian Empire. 
Sergey Uvarov, the President of the Academy of Sciences, suggested scholars to make 
archaeological and historical investigations to prove the authenticity of Crimea’s 
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Russianness and Christianity. To this end, secular and church scholars engaged in 
archaeological excavations to prove the legend of Vladimir, according to which the 
Kievan prince Vladimir was believed to have been baptised in Chersonessos, Crimea.98 
Later, Sergey Uvarov’s son, Aleksey Uvarov, the founder and the first director of the 
Imperial Archaeological Society in Moscow, personally undertook archaeological 
investigations in Crimea to determine the exact locations of places that were deemed 
important for the Christianisation of the Rus’ by Byzantium. 
One thing worthy of mention was the more frequent emphasis on Christian 
heritage, compared to ancient Greek heritage, especially after the mid-19th century. In a 
sense, especially in Crimea, Byzantine monuments were cleared of their Greek 
background, and their image was reconstructed only as markers of an Orthodox 
Christian past. Scholars from historical and archaeological societies based in Odessa and 
Crimea played important roles in the Christianisation campaign by designing plans for 
the preservation and restoration of Byzantine monuments.99 It should be noted that the 
Odessa Society for History and Antiquities, founded in 1839, was one of the earliest 
local archaeological societies in the Russian Empire. By the late 19th century, there was 
already a tradition of Byzantine studies in Odessa. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
many archaeologists affiliated with RAIK, including its director Fyodor Uspenskii, were 
professors from the Novorossiya University in Odessa. Along with secular experts, the 
Russian Church adopted modern methods of scientific inquiry for the study of Christian 
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archaeology in Crimea. Kozelsky emphasises that the boundary between secular and 
religious was blurry in the context of Russian imperial archaeology.100 
The emphasis on Christian archaeology reflected the religion-inspired politics 
the Russian Empire formulated as regards the Eastern Question.101 Since religion is an 
important part of national identity, we should take the relationship between religion and 
official ideology into account when we analyse the political aspect of archaeology.102 As 
Kohl and Fawcett reminded, “[S]tate-sponsored nationalistic-oriented events and 
processes are typically and intimately linked to religion, either directly or by a civil-
religion connection, to create an ambiance and semblance of sacredness in what 
otherwise could have been emotionless secular events and processes.”103 In the Russian 
example, the connection between religion and imperial / national identity clearly 
manifested itself in the politics of archaeology. 
The history of RAIK brings a new dimension to understand the nature of Russo-
Ottoman relations in the late 19th century. Imperial Russian archaeology around the 
Black Sea coast illustrated the connection between religion, national identity, and 
official policy. Throughout the second half of the 19th century, one of the key themes in 
European diplomacy was the Eastern Question, in other words, the diplomatic problems 
posed by the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, which was seen as imminent. The 
Russian Empire was one of the most active participants in the political rivalry among 
European powers for the control over Ottoman territories after the possible collapse of 
the Ottoman Empire. For strategic as well as historical reasons, the Russian Empire was 
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particularly concerned with the fate of Constantinople, the Straits, and the Balkans. 
Strengthening mutual relations with the Southern Slavs and other Orthodox peoples of 
the Ottoman Empire constituted one of the most important pillars of Russian foreign 
policy. In this sense, the academic study of Slavic antiquities and Eastern Christianity 
coincided with Russian political interests in the region. 
Similar to archaeological activities in Crimea, Russian archaeology in 
Constantinople primarily focused on Byzantine antiquities. Just like Western European 
empires viewed themselves as the spiritual heirs of ancient Hellenistic and Roman 
civilisations, the Russian version of philhellenism drew a direct lineage from the 
Byzantine Empire to contemporary Russia. By studying the history of the Byzantine 
Empire, Russian archaeologists stepped into a mystical world, a world from where 
Russia received Christianity, its alphabet, and the basis of its civilisation. 
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Chapter 2 
The Double-Headed Eagle: 
Interest in Byzantine Antiquities in Russia and the Ottoman Empire 
“To advance through a Crusade, 
To purify the Jordanian waters, 
To liberate the Holy Sepulchre, 
To return Athens to the Athenians, 
The city of Constantine – to Constantine 
And re-establish Japheth’s Holy Land.”104 
 
 
Both Russian and Ottoman Empires had historical and cultural connections to the 
Byzantine Empire, although Ottoman and Russian discourses were shaped under 
different contexts. In reality, the Ottoman Empire took over many cultural and political 
traits from their Byzantine predecessors, and inherited the very territories ruled by 
Byzantine emperors. Despite these obvious connections, Byzantine legacy remained 
invisible for most Ottoman intellectuals in the 19th century, not to mention bureaucrats 
and policy-makers. On the other hand, Russian tsars perceived of themselves as 
culturally linked to the Byzantine Empire, as the protector of Orthodox faith, and openly 
proclaimed this identity. Therefore, it is not surprising that from its earliest beginnings, 
Byzantine antiquities occupied an important place in the development of archaeological 
scholarship in the Russian Empire. To better situate RAIK’s activities in the proper 
context, it would be interesting to compare the academic or pseudo-academic interest in 
Byzantine antiquities in Russia and the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th century. Before 
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proceeding to this comparison, this chapter will first discuss the development of 
archaeology, especially Byzantine archaeology in the Russian Empire. 
 
2.1 Academic Archaeology in the Russian Empire 
Scholarly archaeological expeditions in Russia started as early as the mid-18th century, 
although these activities were quite amateur in terms of the quality of research.105 
Gerhard Friedrich Müller’s expedition to Siberia and Scythian barrows in Ukraine in the 
1730s was one of the first semi-professional archaeological expeditions.106 German 
scholars played an important role in the development of Russian historical scholarship in 
its early beginnings.107 Through these émigré scholars, German academic tradition 
penetrated into Russian educational institutions starting from the 18th century. 
In the first decades of the 19th century, some of the first museums in the Russian 
Empire for the exhibition of ancient artefacts were established in Crimea and across the 
Black Sea coast.108 The emergence of museums in this newly conquered region was a 
result of the region’s rich ancient heritage. At the same time, museums helped the 
Russian administration visualise its imperial rule in a territory recently incorporated into 
the Empire. A museum was established in Nikolaev in 1803, and later in Feodosiya in 
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1811.109 The first antiquity and coin collections in universities emerged in St. Petersburg 
(1822), Kazan (1810), Kharkov (1806), Kiev (1837), and a museum was established 
within St. Petersburg University in 1841.110 
In 1724, Peter the Great ordered the establishment of the Imperial Academy of 
Sciences, with a university as an integral part of it, which was reconstituted as the St. 
Petersburg University in 1819. In 1804, a chair for the Department of Fine Arts and 
Archaeology was established at this institution under the Faculty of History and 
Philology.111 The university Moscow (1755) also became an important centre for the 
development of archaeology especially after the 19th century. Archaeological 
terminology penetrated university curricula very early in the 19th century. However, at 
this early stage, the line between pre-history, classical history, and archaeology was 
blurry, and these subjects were taught in the same departments and regarded as the 
branches of the same discipline.112 By the mid-19th century, there was increasing interest 
in the scientific study of antiquities. In this period, universities assumed a more 
prominent role in preparing specialists, and more sophisticated excavation techniques 
were used.113 There were also increasing numbers of academic studies in the fields of 
classical and pre-historic archaeology.114 
Until the late 19th century, classical archaeology in Russia developed mainly in 
three centres, these being Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Odessa. While Moscow and St. 
Petersburg, as the two most important metropolitan centres of Imperial Russia, do not 
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come as a surprise, what made Odessa an attractive centre of archaeological research 
was its geographical proximity to classical Greek and Byzantine antiquities along the 
Black Sea coast. One of the most prominent archaeological societies, where scholars and 
antiquarians came together, was the Odessa Society of History and Antiquity, 
established in 1839. The Odessa Society was particularly important for the development 
of Black Sea and Byzantine studies in the Russian Empire, and it quickly became a 
centre of classical archaeological research in Novorossiya.115 
The institutions that shaped Russian archaeology in its early phases included 
museums, universities, and the Imperial Academy of Sciences. Compared to 
universities, which were more teaching-oriented, the Academy of Sciences focused 
more on research.116 Local archaeological societies, which were dependent on support 
from the nobility, local administrators, and the upper ranks of the clergy, also produced 
valuable archaeological research. An important centre of classical archaeology, the 
Russian Archaeological Society was established in St. Petersburg in 1846. The Russian 
Archaeological Society was divided into three branches, these being Russian-Slavic 
archaeology, Eastern archaeology, and classical and Byzantine archaeology.117 
The first centralised archaeological institution in the Russian Empire, the 
Imperial Archaeological Commission (IAK) was established in 1859 under the Ministry 
of the Imperial Court.118 IAK was responsible for overseeing all archaeological activities 
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within the Russian Empire.119 It is worth noting that not all scientific societies were 
under imperial tutelage. The Imperial Geographical Society, one of the most important 
scholarly institutions of the late imperial period, was not placed under the Ministry of 
the Imperial Court, although the Imperial Hermitage and IAK were attached directly to 
the Court. The royal support for archaeology might be yet another instance indicating 
that patronising art and archaeology was regarded as the insignia of imperial prestige in 
the 19th century. 
These institutions were followed by the establishment of the Moscow 
Archaeological Society in 1864 by Count Aleksey Sergeyevich Uvarov.120 Professor 
Mikhail Pogodin collaborated with Count Uvarov for the establishment of the Moscow 
Archaeological Society.121 On the initiative of Count Uvarov, the Moscow 
Archaeological Society initiated national archaeological congresses. These congresses 
produced lively debates and theoretical discussions about the importance of archaeology 
in Russian academia. The discussions particularly pointed to the political importance of 
Slavic and Orthodox antiquities along the Black Sea coast.122 In the 1st Russian 
Archaeological Congress, organised in Moscow in 1869, the main goal of Russian 
archaeology was designated as the preservation of ancient Slavic and Orthodox 
monuments, especially in remote and multi-cultural regions with a substantial Muslim 
population such as southern Russia, Transcaucasus, and the Volga valley.123 
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The founders of RAIK were academically most influenced by the educational 
programme of St. Petersburg University, the alma mater of most of its members. The 
institutionalisation of archaeological studies at St. Petersburg University can be dated 
back to the establishment of the Department of Art Theory and History in 1863.124 
Especially from the 1880s onwards Nikodim Pavlovich Kondakov and later his students 
Sergei Aleksandrovich Zhebelev, Iakov Ivanovich Smirnov, and Dmitry Vlasevich 
Ainalov gave lectures about classical Greek, Byzantine, and Slavic archaeology at this 
university.125 Therefore, from the early stages of their academic careers, the future 
director of RAIK, Fyodor Uspenskii and his colleagues at the Archaeological Institute in 
Constantinople received a solid background in the study of Slavic and Byzantine 
antiquities. 
Other prominent centres of archaeological research in the Russian Empire 
included the St. Petersburg Archaeological Institute, established in 1878, and the 
Moscow Archaeological Institute, established in 1907 with the intention of training 
professional archaeologists. Both of these institutes were established under the auspices 
of the Ministry of Public Education.126 
The second half of the 19th century was also marked by the beginnings of church 
archaeology in Russia. Church archaeology developed as a both cultural and scientific 
enterprise, and its particular importance lay in the parallel study of written and material 
artefacts regarding the history of Orthodoxy.127 In addition to universities and 
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archaeological societies, the Holy Synod had an interest in the advancement of church 
archaeology, and developed projects for the preservation and restoration of religious 
artefacts in collaboration with government bodies, the Imperial Archaeological 
Commission, and local archaeological societies.128 
In short, from the 18th century to the last decades of the 19th century, archaeology 
was in a process of institutionalisation as an academic discipline in Russian 
universities.129 Archaeological knowledge was shared through a number of academic 
journals. There was also a burgeoning number of archaeological societies and museums 
not only in St. Petersburg and Moscow, but also in the provinces, a reflection of 
increasing interest in ancient history across Russia. From the early years of the 20th 
century to the Bolshevik Revolution, there was further professionalisation, and we see 
the appearance of specialised courses and seminars fully dedicated to archaeology, and 
regular excavations attended by students.130 By the first two decades of the 20th century, 
the period right before the Bolshevik Revolution, Russian archaeology was already 
classified into different disciplines and areas of specialisation, like classical 
archaeology, Russo-Slavic archaeology, pre-historical archaeology, church archaeology, 
and Oriental archaeology.131 Eventually, this period was followed by World War I, the 
Bolshevik Revolution, and the Civil War, which meant the destruction and consequent 
reconstruction of the entire academic structure. 
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Unlike their colleagues in European nation-states, Russian archaeologists 
objected to Gustav Kosinna’s paradigm linking cultural continuity with ethnicity.132 The 
scholars who set the principles of Russian archaeology in the 19th century embraced a 
diffusionist approach and emphasised that multiple influences, primarily ancient Greek, 
Byzantine, Tatar, and Persian in addition to Slavic elements, shaped Russian culture. 
Russian archaeologists also differed from scholars of European empires – especially 
French and British archaeologists – in their approach to antiquities display. While 
European archaeologists transferred their discoveries from overseas excavation sites to 
museums in imperial capitals, Russian archaeologists preferred on-site display, which 
accounted for the increasing numbers of local museums in the Russian Empire. The 
major reason for this preference was financial, as Russian archaeologists had limited 
resources compared to Europeans, which restricted the possibility of antiquities transfer 
to the capital. 
 
2.2 Archaeology in the Black Sea Region 
From the start, the major focus of Russian archaeology included classical, Byzantine-
Orthodox, and ancient Slavic studies. Oriental studies were added to this list later in the 
19th century. Already in the late 18th century, the Greek, Scythian, and Sarmatian 
mounds around the Black Sea coasts attracted the attention of Russian antiquarians and 
historians.133 Not different from other imperial or national settings, archaeology in 
Russia developed with implicit or explicit ideological underpinnings in its early years as 
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a scientific discipline. A relationship was established between Scythian artefacts, which 
were abundant in the southern shores of Russia, and ancient Greeks. This distant and 
very indirect link to ancient Greece fostered imperial “pride” in classical archaeology.134 
The physical embodiment of this imperial pride was illustrated in the newly emerging 
museums and antiquity collections. There was yet another political aspect of 
archaeological activities in the region around the Black Sea coast. Southern Russia, 
including Ukraine and Crimea, was annexed only in the late 18th century, and the region 
was demographically highly multi-cultural and multi-religious. Therefore, proving the 
antiquity of Slavdom and Orthodoxy in this region, especially vis-à-vis Islam, was a 
precondition of proving the legitimacy of Russian expansion around the Black Sea 
coasts. 
As early as the last decades of the 18th century, scholars turned their attention to 
southern Russia, especially to Ukraine and Crimea. The first scientific expeditions to the 
Black Sea coast were undertaken by I. A. Tiul’denshtedt (1773-1775), V. F. Zuev 
(1781-1782), P. S. Pallas (1793-1794), and P. I. Sumarokov (1799, 1802) among 
others.135 The number of professional expeditions and archaeological research in this 
region gradually increased over the years. In addition to archaeologists, amateur 
antiquarians visited ancient sites and produced maps and plans, with descriptions of 
ancient monuments. However, most excavations in this period were motivated by 
amateur concerns, and the intention was the enrichment of collections rather than 
research. Unsurprisingly, excavations often resulted in the plundering of ancient sites.136 
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The first archaeological museum in the Russian Empire was a cabinet of 
curiosity, opened in 1803, in the Black Sea coastal city of Nikolaev. The idea to exhibit 
the collection of naval maps, plans of ships, naval instruments, and other interesting 
objects was put forward by the commander-in-chief of the Black Sea fleet, Jean Baptiste 
de Traversay (also known as Ivan Ivanovich Traverse in Russian).137 A few years later 
in 1811, one of the first antiquities collections was organised upon state initiative in 
Feodosiya. These early 19th century collections did not have systematic exhibition 
methods, rather they brought together different and unrelated materials in an 
unorganised manner. At the end of the first quarter of the 19th century, more specialised 
collections emerged, exemplified by the museums in Odessa, established in 1825, and in 
Kerch, established in 1826.138 
Already in the early 19th century, there was growing sensitivity among both 
academics and local administrators regarding the preservation of ancient monuments in 
southern Russia. In 1823, archaeologist and historian I. A. Stempkovskii, who made 
extensive research on the Black Sea coast,139 presented a note to the General-Governor 
of Novorossiya M. S. Vorontsov entitled “Ideas Regarding the Study of Antiquities in 
the Novorossiya Krai.”140 In this document, Stempkovskii outlined the urgent need to 
save monuments, which were evidence of the religious, cultural, and artistic 
achievements of ancient peoples. He pointed to the need to establish local museums and 
scientific societies for effective preservation of antiquities. 
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The establishment of the Odessa Society of History and Antiquities in 1839 was 
an important turning point for the study of antiquities in Russia’s southern shores.141 In a 
short time, the Odessa Society became the scientific and organisational centre for the 
archaeological study of the Black Sea littoral. The activities of the society included 
excavations in ancient settlements under the surveillance of the members of the society, 
drawing plans and maps of ancient settlements and monuments, and making descriptions 
of findings.142 The archaeological interests of the Odessa Society mostly concentrated 
on Byzantine and Orthodox antiquities in southern Russia, implying a philorthodox 
orientation.143 Restoring Byzantine monuments and reviving Orthodox imagery in a 
region with a substantial Muslim population was a political as well as an archaeological 
project. Through its archaeological studies on Byzantine antiquities, the Odessa Society 
helped to prove the antiquity of Orthodoxy vis-à-vis Islam in southern Russia. Starting 
in the 1830s, the Russian government provided financial support for excavations and 
archaeological projects in the Black Sea region, especially in Kerch, Chersonessos, and 
Taman.144 Dolukhanov argued that official support for classical archaeology in imperial 
Russia had ideological reasons, explained by Russia’s perception of itself as the heir to 
the Byzantine Empire.145 
The Imperial Archaeological Commission had a specific interest in strengthening 
research programs in southern Russia and the Black Sea coasts. Particularly, 
Chersonessos received special interest, because it was regarded as the place where 
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Prince Vladimir was baptised.146 Actually, in southern Russia, the study of ancient 
history symbolised the quest for the roots of Russia’s religious and imperial identity. 
Constructing a link between Prince Vladimir and the history of Crimea legitimised the 
recent Russian conquest of this region and proved the antiquity of Russian and Orthodox 
culture in a geography with a multi-cultural history. 
Apart from the ideological background that linked RAIK’s studies in the 
Ottoman Empire to the previous archaeological studies in southern Russia, especially in 
Crimea, RAIK’s studies were also practically interrelated with archaeological studies in 
Crimea and Ukraine. Members and secretaries of RAIK, Boris Vladimirovich 
Farmakovskii (1870-1928) and Roman Khristianovich Leper (1865-1918) worked with 
the Imperial Archaeological Commission to undertake studies in Chersonessos and in 
Crimea before joining RAIK.147 Farmakovskii was especially noted for his studies on 
artefacts from the Pontic Greek colony in Olbia, discovered in southern Ukraine.148 
These scholars used their expertise on both Ottoman and Russian coasts of the Black 
Sea to present a coherent picture of Pontic and Byzantine history. 
Archaeological expeditions in southern Russia were directed not only by secular 
institutions like universities or archaeological institutes. There was also a significant 
religious interest in ancient history. A letter written in 1908, from the Chief Procurator 
of the Holy Synod, P. P. Izvolskii to the Imperial Archaeological Commission revealed 
that ancient history had become an attractive subject among the bureaucrats of the Holy 
Synod and upper ranks of the clergy. In this letter, Izvolskii proposed to organise an 
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expedition to Chersonessos, led by the Tauride Diocese. Izvolskii asked the Imperial 
Archaeological Commission to make excavations for the benefit of the Orthodox 
Church, in addition to scientific purposes. For this reason, he requested the appointment 
of not only an academically competent archaeologist, but also an Orthodox believer to 
the proposed expedition to Chersonessos.149 
Among the clergymen who were interested in archaeology, Innokentii Borisov, 
the Archbishop of Kherson and Tauride (1848-1857) stood out. Innokentii had a devout 
interest in Byzantine archaeology in southern Russia, and his articles offer an excellent 
example of the intersection of religion, politics, and archaeology in Imperial Russia.150 
Innokentii developed a project to transform Crimea into a “Russian Athos.” His project 
found a ready audience. Especially after the mid-19th century, the Tauride Diocese 
supported the revival of ancient monasteries and the reconstruction of ancient Byzantine 
monuments in Crimea as part of this project with religious and political 
underpinnings.151 Innokentii outlined his opinions in “Note on the Restoration of 
Ancient Holy Sites in the Mountains of Crimea,” written in 1861. Innokentii’s project 
was published by the Kherson Diocesan Gazette, and was approved by the Holy Synod. 
The project described Byzantine monuments, monasteries, and churches around Crimea 
in detail and offered ways for their preservation. Innokentii suggested that financial 
resources for the reconstruction and restoration of monuments could be provided by 
private donors and benevolent societies.152 
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At the background of archaeological descriptions, Innokentii’s articles abound 
with comparisons between the Orthodox faith and Islam. He viewed the restoration of 
Byzantine churches and monasteries in Crimea as a final victory against the Tatars, and 
the symbol of the “resurrection” of Orthodoxy in the region.153 Marked by a religious 
and nationalist overtone, Innokentii’s discourse linked Russian conquest to the revival of 
Greco-Byzantine antiquity, and presented Russia as the saviour of the Byzantine 
heritage. In this sense, Crimean, and overall Black Sea archaeology offered a perfect 
example to the Orthodox Church’s active involvement in the production of scientific 
knowledge and the confluence of science, religion, and imperial identity in the Russian 
Empire.154 Russian archaeological endeavours in the Ottoman Balkans, Constantinople, 
and the Turkish Black Sea coasts can be analysed within the context of the same 
religious, imperial, and historical interest. 
 
2.3 Byzantine Studies in the Russian Empire 
For sure, it was not only Russians who showed interest in the history of the Eastern 
Roman Empire. British and French explorers were the first to record and investigate 
Byzantine monuments in Anatolia and Constantinople.155 In the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, art historians and archaeologists made systematic and comparative studies of 
Byzantine remains in the Ottoman Empire. Among such scholars, Charles Texier (1802-
1871), Gertrude L. Bell (1868-1926), Joseph Strzygowski (1862-1941), Karl 
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Krumbacher (1856-1909), Charles Diehl (1859-1944) and Sir William Ramsay (1851-
1939) produced some of the most comprehensive works on Byzantine monuments.156 
Even though Classical Greece received more attention, in the late 19th century Byzantine 
imagery appeared as an exotic theme for European intellectuals, as it combined elements 
of Greek civilisation, Christianity, and the Orient. European interest in Byzantine 
archaeology also stemmed from political and religious concerns and can be analysed 
within the context of the Eastern Question. The development of Byzantine archaeology 
reflected an attempt to portray Constantinople as a historical extension of the Christian, 
therefore European civilisation, and legitimised European claims over the imperial 
capital.157 
If European visitors were captivated by the charm of medieval Constantinople, 
the imperial centre of Orthodoxy was even more fascinating for Russians. As the cradle 
of Orthodox Christianity, the Byzantine Empire had everlasting influence on the 
evolution of Russian culture and identity. After the conversion of Vladimir of Kiev to 
Orthodoxy in 988, mutual interactions with the Byzantine Empire had a determining 
role on the evolution of Russian ecclesiastical, cultural, and political development.158 
Even the Cyrillic alphabet was invented by Greek monks in the 9th century to 
disseminate Christian teaching among the Slavs. The strong Byzantine imprint on 
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church dogmas and rituals was beyond dispute.159 On the other hand, different from the 
Balkan Peninsula, medieval Rus’ did not fall directly under Byzantine political 
jurisdiction.160 Russian subordination to Byzantine cultural, political leadership, and 
ecclesiastical hierarchy had a symbolic rather than a practical character.161 In the eyes of 
the medieval Rus’, which were geographically remote from the core of the Byzantine 
Empire, Byzantium represented not the earthly but the heavenly seat of the ecumenical 
church. Its holy capital Constantinople, or Tsargrad as the Slavs called it, was the 
“symbol of world Christian unity,” and held “an ideal, almost mystical conception.”162 
The most fundamental legacy that the Byzantine Empire bequeathed to the Rus’ 
was Orthodox Christianity. The peculiar formulation of Orthodoxy had its repercussions 
not only in art but also in the political sphere. After the conquest of Constantinople by 
the Turks in 1453, Muscovy remained as the most powerful sovereign Orthodox state. 
The holy city was captured by the “infidel” Turks, and the universal emperor of all 
Orthodox Christians was dead. The empty seat of the basileus demanded a new 
successor. 
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In the early 16th century, an abbot named Filofei formulated the “Third Rome” 
theory.163 Filofei’s theory purported that after the downfall of the first two Romes, the 
first pagan and the second Christian, Moscow was destined to be the third and the last 
heir of the Roman Empire; and naturally had the right to fill the political vacuum in the 
Orthodox world created by the demise of the Byzantine Empire.164 Although Filofei’s 
theory remained rather obscure in the 16th century, his ideas were taken up much later in 
the 19th century and molded according to the political context of the time. 
On a symbolic level, the marriage of Ivan the Great (Ivan III) with the Byzantine 
princess Sophia Paleologue in 1472, who was the niece of the last Eastern Roman 
Emperor Constantine XI, also provided legitimacy for Russia’s self-identification with 
Byzantium. The adoption of the originally Eastern Roman symbol of the double-headed 
eagle signified the identification with the Roman heritage. In the 16th century, the title 
“Tsar” or “Caesar,” which was originally used to address Byzantine emperors, was also 
adopted in diplomatic correspondence by Muscovite rulers, a practice which became 
official when Ivan the Terrible (Ivan IV) was crowned in 1547.165 With the gradual shift 
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in the balance of power between the Russian and the Ottoman Empires after the 18th 
century in Russia’s favour, Russian tsars often viewed themselves as the protectors of 
Orthodox peoples living under Ottoman rule. This discourse served as a legitimising 
basis for expansionist Russian foreign policy towards the Ottoman Empire. 
Despite the appropriation of the Byzantine legacy in the sense of assuming the 
protector role of Ottoman Christians, Russian perception of Byzantium was not always 
positive. As Russia turned its face towards the West, Byzantium came to represent 
stagnation and everything that explained why Russia lagged behind Western Europe. As 
a reflection of the influence of Enlightenment ideas, Peter the Great blamed Byzantine 
heritage for Russia’s backwardness.166 For Russia’s Western-oriented Tsar, Byzantium 
was a negative, but instructive example. In other words, Byzantium was regarded as a 
predecessor whose heritage was on the one hand appropriated and adopted to Russia’s 
special conditions, and on the other hand held responsible for Russia’s backwardness. 
Russia’s self-perception as the “new Rome” reached its most obvious expression 
during Catherine the Great’s (r. 1762-1796) reign. Catherine the Great’s scheme to re-
establish the Eastern Roman Empire, the “Greek Project” as it was called, foresaw the 
regeneration of the Byzantine Empire, its capital being Constantinople and its emperor 
being a Russian prince. Specifically, the Greek Project called for the expansion of 
Russian influence towards the southern shores of the Black Sea. Capturing 
Constantinople was only the ultimate aim.167 In line with the ideological mission of the 
Greek Project, Catherine brought up her grandson, Constantine, with knowledge of 
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Greek culture. The name Constantine was consciously selected for the young Grand 
Duke, who was expected to be the emperor of the resurrected Byzantium. Many town 
names in southern Ukraine and Crimea were changed from local languages to Greek. 
Catherine’s interest in the Greco-Byzantine tradition was not so much a continuation of 
the previous Muscovite appropriation of Byzantine symbolism. It was rather a reflection 
of the influence of neo-classisism on the erudite Empress, an idea that permeated the 
intellectual tradition of 18th century Europe.168 In this regard, Catherine’s interest in 
Greek culture was more of an import, rather than an idea that formed as a natural 
continuation of the Russian state tradition.169 Catherine’s plans of capturing 
Constantinople were based on economic as well as ideological reasons, which were 
linked to Russia’s expansion in Ukraine and Crimea. Although she never totally 
abandoned the idea, Catherine pragmatically avoided any move that would upset the 
European balance of power throughout her reign, therefore refrained from carrying out 
the Greek Project in its full scale.170 
Another turning point for Russian appreciation of the Byzantine heritage was the 
Greek War of Independence in the 1820s. The Greek independence movement received 
mixed reaction in the Russian government because of its secular and democratic tenets 
and because it risked breaking the fragile European balance of power. However, the 
promise of Greek independence aroused philhellenic and Pan-Orthodox sympathy 
among Russia’s educated public. The unofficial support for Greek freedom proves that 
Russia’s identity as the protector of Orthodox Christians was more than an official 
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foreign policy principle and was embraced by broader segments of the society.171 From 
radicals to conservatives, intellectuals from different political camps had different 
reasons to sympathise with Greek independence. Nevertheless, after gaining 
independence in 1832, Greeks resisted Russian paternalism, like other Balkan nations 
would do in the coming decades. Greek elites preferred Western European political, 
cultural, and economic development models instead of autocratic Russia. The foreign 
policy shift in Greece caused friction with the Russian government in the coming 
decades. 
In the 19th century, Russia’s increasing military and political advantage vis-à-vis 
the Ottoman Empire influenced the way in which Russian intellectuals viewed Russia’s 
role in world history. Of course, not every intellectual was mesmerised by the possibility 
of the restoration of the Byzantine Empire under the aegis of Russia. For critics of 
Russia’s social and political development, Byzantine heritage was to blame: the first and 
one of the most famous examples of anti-Byzantine criticism was put forward by Pyotr 
Chaadaev (1794-1856) in the 1830s. In his “Philosophical Letters,” Chaadaev expressed 
his contempt for the Byzantine culture and regretted that Russia took on its heritage.172 
Chaadaev’s perception of the Byzantine Empire reflected the prevalent attitude among 
Westernised educated public. 
The Slavophiles, despite their obvious differences with the Westernisers, 
displayed an ambiguous attitude as regards the Byzantine Empire.173 In the writings of 
the early Slavophiles of 1840s-1850s, with a few exceptions, there was nearly no 
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indication of a desire to conquer Constantinople, to regenerate the Byzantine Empire 
and there was little reference to Russia’s mission as regards the Balkan Slavs.174 The 
first generation of Slavophiles were interested in the spiritual development of the 
Russian nation, rather than the direction of Russian foreign policy. In this regard they 
could rightly be defined as pacifists rather than expansionists. The early Slavophiles 
emphasised the importance of Orthodox Christianity but only in the way it was 
reformulated by the Russian people. Otherwise, they did not attribute a specifically 
sanctified role to the Byzantine Empire. They were more preoccupied with criticising 
Western European influence on Russian institutions, than fighting Ottoman supremacy 
in the Balkans. 
Only with the mobilisation of the Russian public after the Crimean War (1853-
1856), the pacifist, and in a sense apolitical, Slavophilism evolved into Pan-Slavism, 
which had clearer political goals. After the 1860s, the conquest of Constantinople and 
Russia’s assumed historical mission to unite the Balkan Slavs became frequent themes 
in Pan-Slavist texts. The Slavic component of Russian imperial identity was regarded as 
inseperable from the Orthodox component. In other words, Orthodoxy was seen as 
intrinsically linked to Slavdom. It is interesting that while the first Russian 
archaeologists in the late 18th and early 19th centuries studied ancient Greek and 
Scythian artefacts, especially after the second half of the 19th century, the focus of 
archaeological scholarship in southern Russia shifted from ancient Greece to the 
monuments of Orthodoxy and the Byzantine Empire. Simultaneously, ethno-religious 
sensitivities replaced the neo-classicism of the 18th century. This ideological shift was 
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partly a result of the estrangement between Greece and Russia after the former’s 
independence. While Greece’s Western-oriented direction disappointed Russian 
intellectuals, at the same time rising Pan-Slavism alienated Greek intellectuals from 
Russia.175 It should be noted that Pan-Slavist statesmen or intellectuals by no means 
rejected the Byzantine legacy, but the rise of ethno-national sensitivities transformed the 
way in which Russians embraced the Byzantine legacy. 
The most famous ideologue of Russian Pan-Slavism, the man who transformed 
the Slavophile mysticism into a concrete political programme, was Nikolai Ia. 
Danilevskii (1822-1885), who expounded his opinions in Rossiia i Evropa (Russia and 
Europe), published in 1869. Danilevskii formulated a cyclical approach to world history 
and categorised cultures into several cultural-historical types. The Romano-Germanic 
culture of Western Europe, according to Danilevskii, was on the brink of disintegration, 
and the future belonged to the Slavic cultural type.176 Russia’s destiny, along with other 
Orthodox peoples, “was the destiny of Israel and Byzantium: to be the chosen 
people.”177 Constantinople – or Tsargrad as he preferred to call it – would be the capital 
of the future Slavic confederation led by Russia. For the sake of fairness to their Slavic 
brethren, Danilevskii argued that Constantinople would not be directly annexed to the 
Russian state but would be the free city of the entire union.178 
Another very influential Pan-Slavist text, second only to Danilevskii’s “Russia 
and Europe” was Major-General Rostislav A. Fadeyev’s (1824-1883) pamphlet entitled 
“Opinion on the Eastern Question.” Fadeyev’s pamphlet appeared the same year as 
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Danilevskii’s “Russia and Europe” and expressed similar opinions. Fadeyev was also an 
ardent supporter of Russian imperial expansion. Fadeyev’s pamphlet voiced the general 
mood among Russian Pan-Slavists in the aftermath of the Crimean War.179 Fadeyev 
argued that the ultimate mission of Russia should be leading the Slavic and Orthodox 
world, without making a separation between the two. The historical mission of Russia 
was the liberation of Orthodox and Slav nations. In this struggle, Fadeyev argued, 
Russia’s principal enemy was the Germanic peoples. Once Russia fulfilled its historical 
duty, the Russian Tsar would be the natural head of the liberated Slavs and Orthodox 
peoples. Like Danilevskii, Fadeyev argued that Constantinople should be a free city, 
equally shared by the Orthodox nations; not a national or imperial capital of any 
particular nation. Fadeyev explained why Constantinople should not belong to any 
single nation: 
there is yet another place on the earth immeasurably important to Russia, having 
no national character, but from its exceptionable position too important to belong 
to any small people – Constantinople, with the surrounding suburbs, country, and 
straits. The most positive interests of Russia render it desirable that that city, far 
more eternal than Rome, should become the free city of a tribal union.180 
 
One of the most famous and vocal supporters of Russian expansion towards the 
Ottoman Empire was Fyodor Dostoyevskii, a writer with significant influence on public 
opinion. Like Danilevskii and Fadeyev, the identification of Orthodoxy with Slavdom 
was visible in the writings of Dostoyevskii. His treatise, “The Utopian Conception of 
History,” written in June 1876 in the midst of unrest in Bulgaria, summarised 
Dostoyevskii’s opinions on the Eastern Question. In this treatise, Dostoyevskii argued 
that Orthodox Christianity was the only religion that kept its purity. Russia, as the 
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greatest and strongest Orthodox nation, was destined to put Orthodoxy, its most valuable 
treasure, to the service of mankind. This way, Russia would inspire a spiritual 
regeneration and bring entire mankind together in a universal harmony.181 In this regard, 
Russia had a specifically important task to take the lead and liberate the Slavic and 
Orthodox nations from Ottoman rule. Dostoyevskii differed from Danilevskii and 
Fadeyev in his opinions on Constantinople. He argued that Constantinople was more 
than a strategically important city, it had a spiritual significance and was too important 
to leave either to Greeks or Balkan Slavs. Dostoyevskii explained Russian pretensions 
over Constantinople with these words: 
Relying upon what sublime aims could Russia demand Constantinople from 
Europe? – Precisely as a leader of Orthodoxy, as its protectress and guardian – a 
role designated to her ever since Ivan III, who placed her symbol and the 
Byzantine double-headed eagle above the ancient coat of arms of Russia … Such 
is the ground, such is the right to ancient Constantinople.182 
 
Later in November 1877, after the breakout of the Russo-Ottoman War, 
Dostoyevskii elaborated his analyses on the Eastern Question. Different from 
Danilevskii or Fadeyev, he rejected the idea that Constantinople should be a free city of 
the Slavic-Orthodox confederation. He argued that Russia was superior to the rest of the 
Slavic-Orthodox world in every sense, therefore it would be illogical to leave 
Constantinople to a confederation of Slavic and Orthodox nations. Such an arrangement 
would not bring unity to the Slavic-Orthodox world, on the contrary, would antagonise 
smaller nations against each other. On the contrary, Dostoyevskii argued that Russian 
possession of Constantinople would bring peace and freedom to the Slavic-Orthodox 
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world. He claimed, “Constantinople is the center of the Eastern world, while Russia is 
its spiritual center and its head.”183 
It is noteworthy that in all of the above-mentioned texts, the conquest of 
Constantinople was regarded as linked to Russia’s union with the Balkan Slavs. Pan-
Slavists were not interested in resurrecting the Byzantine Empire in the original sense, 
but they wanted to recreate Byzantium as an empire characterised by Slavic culture. In 
other words, regenerated Byzantium was detached from its Greek origins and depicted 
as a Slavic – more specifically, Russian – achievement. In this regard, Russia usurped 
the Byzantine legacy and reformulated it with an emphasis on Slavic culture. At this 
point, the possible conquest of Constantinople symbolised the fulfilment of a Russian 
imperial dream. From the 18th to the 20th centuries, references to Russian seizure of 
Constantinople would continue to come up in nationalist literature under different 
political circumstances. 
In addition to Westernisers, there were critics of the Byzantine legacy among 
intellectuals who did not fit into the Westerniser camp. For instance, an original 
perspective about Byzantium was put forward by the theologian and philosopher 
Vladimir Soloviev (1853-1900). Soloviev argued that the Byzantine Empire was cut off 
from antiquity and lost the spiritual foundation of its existence, consequently 
represented stagnation.184 He was particularly critical of the church’s subservience to the 
state in Byzantium, which he thought destroyed the universality of the Christian 
tradition. Even in the writings of the most conservative thinkers, Byzantine civilisation 
was not deemed praiseworthy in itself, but only in its association with “Holy Russia.” 
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Among other intellectuals of late imperial Russia, only Konstantin N. Leontiev (1831-
1891) attributed Russia’s value specifically to its association with the Byzantine Empire. 
Leontiev formulated a political theory which he called “Byzantinism,” a curious 
amalgamation of political autocracy and Orthodox mysticism.185 Having a Nietzschean 
disdain for European bourgeois culture, Leontiev was inimical towards Pan-Slavism and 
nationalism in general, and was reluctant to express solidarity with the Balkan Slavs. 
Rather than designating a special mission to Moscow as the Third Rome, Leontiev 
wanted to see the regeneration of the Second Rome, the Byzantine Empire, from its 
ashes. 
In a nutshell, in Russian intellectual life, the image of the Byzantine Empire had 
a complicated meaning. Despite continuous claims to the Byzantine heritage, Russian 
appreciation of Byzantium was an “ambiguous blend of attraction and repulsion” since 
the medieval times.186 On the one hand, under different circumstances and in different 
forms, Russian statesmen, ecclesiastical authorities and intellectuals viewed Russia as 
the legitimate heir to the Byzantine legacy, being the most powerful Orthodox nation. 
On the other hand, especially in the later part of the 19th century, those who looked for 
the origins of Russia’s contemporary social and political problems turned their faces 
towards the Byzantine Empire. Intellectuals on the Westerniser camp were on the whole 
negative towards the Byzantine culture, and blamed it for Russia’s autocratic heritage 
and cultural isolation from the rest of Europe. 
Even those intellectuals such as Danilevskii, Fadeyev, and Dostoyevskii, who 
called for the conquest of Constantinople and reconstruction of the imperial city as the 
                                                        
185 Stephen Lukashevich, Konstantin Leontiev (1831-1891): A Study in Russian ‘Heroic Vitalism,’ (New 
York: Pageant Press, 1967), pp. 136-140. 
186 Obolensky, p. 62. 
73 
 
capital of Orthodoxy, kept a certain distance from the Byzantine legacy.187 The 
messages of Pan-Slavist scholars merged Orthodoxy with ethnic particularism. They 
reconstructed the image of the Byzantine Empire by adding a Slavic, and more 
specifically Russian identity to it. Looking at Pan-Slavist texts, it would be more 
accurate to say that Russian intellectuals usurped Byzantine imagery, and moulded it in 
a Russian context. The Byzantine heritage was not appraised in itself; it was exalted 
only as part of Russia’s imperial identity. Except for the rather distinctive opinions of 
Konstantin Leontiev, intellectuals on the right linked Russia’s cultural achievements not 
to the Byzantine culture imposed from above, but to the peculiar formulation of the 
Byzantine legacy by the Russian people from below. For sure, the origin of Orthodoxy 
was Byzantium, but the way in which Orthodoxy was interpreted defined the 
transformation of the pagan Rus’ into “Holy Russia.” Among other Orthodox nations, 
Russia was depicted as the only candidate which had the capacity to restore the holy city 
Tsargrad and the political unity of Orthodox believers. 
In any case, whether Russian intellectuals exalted the Byzantine heritage, 
downplayed its achievements or entertained mixed feelings, the common theme was that 
they did not question Russia’s status as the inheritor of the Byzantine legacy. There was 
nearly a consensus among Russian intellectuals, who otherwise had totally different 
political opinions, that Russia should actively protect the rights of its Slavic and 
Orthodox brethren in the Ottoman Empire, a role bequeathed to Russia by Byzantium.188 
Liberals and radicals saw the promise of liberty in the Balkan nations’ struggle for 
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independence and hoped a similar spirit of freedom would sweep through Russia. 
Conservatives and religious thinkers, on the other hand, emphasised Russia’s destiny to 
lead the Orthodox-Slavic world and emancipate its ethnic and religious kinsmen. 
As Fyodor Uspenskii put it, the development of Byzantinology as a scientific 
branch of study in Russia should be analysed within the context of Russia’s political and 
cultural interests and self-perception (samoopredelenie).189 Scholarly study of Byzantine 
history in Russia dates back to the 18th century, to the establishment of the Imperial 
Academy of Sciences in 1725. The First scholars who devoted attention to Byzantine 
sources were German historians who settled in Russia.190 Russia’s Greek community, 
inhabiting mostly in southern Russia, also played an important role in the development 
of Byzantine studies both as scholars and as benefactors. Aleksandr Sturdza (1791-
1854) and Gavriil S. Destunis (1818-1895) are especially worth mentioning at this 
point.191 Destunis taught Byzantine history and literature at the Historical-Philological 
Faculty at St. Petersburg University, whereas Sturdza personally funded archaeological 
studies in Novorossiya, and was instrumental in the establishment of the Odessa Society 
of History and Antiquities in 1839. 
Only in the last quarter of the 19th century, did Byzantine studies develop as a 
scientific discipline in Russia. Two academic centres, the Imperial St. Petersburg 
University and the Imperial Novorossiya University in Odessa were especially active in 
training scholars and conducting research in this field. It can be said that V. G. 
Vasilevskii (1838-1899) from St. Petersburg University laid the scientific foundations of 
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Byzantinology in Russia.192 Vasilevskii was originally a classicist and a student of 
Theodor Mommsen, the famous German classical historian.193 Vasilevskii published 
valuable textual sources unknown until then. His analyses determined the major trends 
in Byzantine studies both in Russia and in Europe.194 Among other things, Vasilevskii 
particularly studied Byzantine relations with the peoples of the steppe and the Slavic 
influence on Byzantine institutions. Under Vasilevskii’s editorship, the first scholarly 
journal on Byzantine history, Vizantiiskii Vremennik (the Byzantine Herald) was 
launched in 1893.195 In fact, the idea of the establishment of an all-Russian Byzantine 
society and a journal dedicated to Byzantinology was put forward by Uspenskii long 
before the initiation of Byzantinische Zeitschrift and Vizantiiskii Vremennik.196 
In the late 19th century, the centre of Byzantine studies shifted from the Imperial 
Academy of Sciences to St. Petersburg University. The last decades of the 19th century 
and the early 20th century was the “golden age” of Russian Byzantine studies. In this 
period, there was intensive correspondence and exchange of ideas between Russian and 
foreign scholars. Foreign scholars asked help from their Russian colleagues especially 
with regard to ancient manuscripts from the Christian East.197 Russian Byzantine studies 
reached such a respectable status in European academia that Karl Krumbacher, the well-
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known German Byzantinist scholar, learnt Russian to follow academic literature in this 
language and made his students do the same.198 
Imperial Russian academics made significant contributions to Byzantine studies, 
primarily by focusing on the interactions between ancient Slavs, the Byzantine Empire, 
and the nomadic peoples of the Eurasian steppes. The emphasis on this particular aspect 
of Byzantine history set Russian scholars apart from their European colleagues. Interest 
in social-economic aspects of Byzantine history also became a landmark of Russian 
Byzantine studies. From Vasilevskii to Uspenskii, Russian Byzantinists accepted the 
paradigm that Slavic settlements in the Byzantine countryside played a decisive role in 
the formation of land-ownership laws, as Slavic customs gradually penetrated into the 
Byzantine legal system.199 As a result of their interest in the history of Slavic peasantry 
in the Byzantine Empire, Russian Byzantinists focused on social-economic history of 
the Byzantine Empire. Leading Russian Byzantinists concluded that Slavs played a more 
or less similar role as Germanic tribes did in the West. The most widely accepted 
argument was that while the Macedonian dynasty that ruled the Byzantine Empire from 
the 9th to the 11th centuries sympathised with the Slavic peasantry in the countryside and 
was supportive of the Slavic village commune, the ascendance of the Latins after the 
11th century changed the harmony between the Byzantine state and its Slavic 
inhabitants. Russian scholars argued that with Latin supremacy, feudal institutions 
penetrated into Byzantium.200 The argument followed that the Westernised and 
Latinised rulers after the 11th century neglected the peasantry and brought the 
destruction of the Byzantine Empire. The underlying message of this argument was that 
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feudalism and oppressive policies were not characteristic of the Byzantine Empire, but 
came from the West with the Latin invasion. This perspective was very much in line 
with the Slavophile conception of world history. 
The St. Petersburg school of Byzantinology reached its peak during the last 
quarter of the 19th century. V. G. Vasilevskii and his students V. E. Regel’, H. M. 
Loparev, P. B. Bezobrazov, A. A. Vasiliev, B. A. Panchenko, among others, took the 
lead in Byzantine studies in this period. The latter also served as RAIK’s secretary from 
1901 to 1914.201 Among the most notable scholars who made contributions to the 
development of Byzantinology, we can count Vladimir Ivanovich Lamanskii (1833-
1914) and Nikodim Pavlovich Kondakov (1844-1925). Lamanskii was renowned for his 
studies on the southern Slavs and their relations with the Byzantine Empire.202 He was 
also the mentor and professor of the later director of RAIK, Fyodor Uspenskii. 
Kondakov, a specialist in the history of Byzantine art, was especially distinguished for 
his research on Russian civilisation in the Middle Ages, and the relations between the 
Byzantine and Slavic worlds.203 From 1870 to 1890, Kondakov undertook many 
scientific expeditions in the Russian Empire, especially Crimea and the Caucasus, and 
he joined expeditions in the Balkans, Ottoman Macedonia, Greece, Syria, Palestine, and 
the Sinai Peninsula. He also extensively studied Byzantine monuments in 
Constantinople.204 
Along with Kondakov, F. I. Uspenskii, the only director of RAIK throughout its 
existence, made notable contributions to the development of Byzantine studies. 
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Uspenskii was born in 1845 to a priest’s family in the Galich district of Kostroma. He 
attended the Galich religious school and Kostroma’s seminary before entering the 
Historical-Philological Department of the St. Petersburg University.205 Uspenskii’s early 
religious education might have had influence on his future interest in the history of 
Orthodoxy. At St. Petersburg University, Uspenskii was V. I. Lamanskii’s student.206 
Lamanskii was well-known for his Pan-Slavist political views, which apparently left a 
mark on his student. Early in his career, Uspenskii was distinguished by his academic 
erudition, and used comparative analyses to better situate Byzantine Empire in world 
history.207 His research interest especially concentrated on the socio-political history of 
the Byzantine Empire and Byzantine relations with the Balkan Slavs. While still a 
student at the Historical – Philological Faculty at St. Petersburg University, Uspenskii 
received a prize from the Slavic Benevolent Committee in 1871 with his article “The 
First Slavic Monarchs in the North-West” which was published as a book in 1872.208 In 
1874, Uspenskii defended his thesis “The Byzantine Author, Nicetas Choniates from 
Chonae.”209 This work was based on important sources from the 12th and 13th centuries, 
that is, the period of the Comnenos and Angelos dynasties of the Byzantine Empire and 
Latin supremacy. This thesis proved to be an important contribution to Byzantine 
studies with its information about the mutual relations between Christian and Muslim 
societies in the Middle Ages, and its in-depth and detailed historical analyses.210 
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Immediately after completing his degree at St. Petersburg University, Uspenskii 
was appointed to the Imperial Novorossiya University as a lecturer, and started giving 
lectures on Byzantine history.211 In these lectures, Uspenskii underlined the relevance of 
studying Byzantine history to understand Russian and broader Slavic history. Uspenskii 
claimed that the Byzantine Empire undertook an educative (vospitatel’ny) role in its 
relations with its European neighbours in the West (novoevropeiskie narody) and Slavic 
neighbours in the North. He argued that European historians, while expressing gratitude 
for the positive influence the Byzantine Empire exerted on “wild hordes” (dikiia ordy – 
with this, probably meaning peoples inhabiting areas north of the Byzantine Empire, 
notably the Slavs) and transforming them into “historical nations” (istoricheskie 
narody), they should also not forget the sacrifices the Byzantine Empire made in 
defence of Europe, making itself the “bastion of civilisation” (oplot’ tsivilizatsii).” 
Uspenskii argued, “the new empire in Tsargrad, in the period of a thousand years of its 
existence, continued, by virtue of its historical mission, the development of ideas and 
institutions (poniatiia i uchrezhdeniia), bequeathed [to it] by Rome, and following the 
tradition, spiritually educating new peoples.”212 
Uspenskii’s doctoral dissertation, which was completed in 1879, was entitled 
“The Formation of the Second Bulgarian Kingdom.” In this study, Uspenskii shed light 
on the relations between the Bulgarians, Serbs, the Byzantine Empire, and medieval 
Rus’.213 After the completion of his doctoral studies, Uspenskii’s concentrated on the 
history of the Byzantine Empire as well as the history of southern Slavs.214 Working 
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extensively on Byzantine interactions with its neighbours, Uspenskii also studied the 
relations of the Byzantine Empire with its Muslim neighbours. His study “Melik Gazi 
and Danishmends” (Melik Gazi i Dzul-Nun Danishmendy), which appeared in 1879, 
focused on Muslim-Byzantine relations during the First Crusade.215 Uspenskii’s “Essays 
on the History of Byzantine Civilisation” offers a deep analysis of Byzantine cultural 
life with the rich and novel material base he used.216 
In his academic studies, Uspenskii emphasised the organic links between Russia, 
the Balkan Slavs, and the Byzantine Empire. His arguments implied the antiquity of 
Russian cultural existence in the region once ruled by the Byzantine Empire. If there had 
been intensive cultural interactions between Russians and Byzantine civilisation, then it 
was only natural that Russian culture had penetrated into regions within the Byzantine 
sphere of influence. This argument further strengthened Russia’s position as the 
legitimate inheritor of the Byzantine tradition. The historical and cultural interactions 
between Russians and Byzantium legitimised contemporary Russian scientific (in fact, 
not only scientific, but also political) interest in the history of the Byzantine Empire. 
Uspenskii outlined his arguments in a speech at the Odessa Slavic Benevolent Society in 
1885, in commemoration of the 1000th anniversary of St. Methodius’s death. Uspenskii 
argued that the priest brothers St. Cyril and St. Methodius might have had contacts with 
Russians in Chersonessos – although this argument was not grounded on any objective 
evidence. Uspenskii further claimed that Russian cultural existence on the Black Sea 
coast, especially in Crimea, dated back to as late as the 9th and 10th centuries.217 By 
tracing archaeological records in the Black Sea basin, Uspenskii’s arguments in fact 
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underlined the antiquity of Russian existence on the Black Sea coast, and implicitly 
endorsed the legitimacy and even necessity of incorporating these regions to the Russian 
Empire. 
In another speech he delivered in commemoration of the 900th anniversary of the 
Christianisation of Rus’, Uspenskii explained the relationship between medieval Rus’ 
and the Byzantine Empire. He argued that even though the medieval Rus’ society tried 
to stand against Byzantine cultural influence, Byzantine culture gradually penetrated 
into Rus’ lands, which altered the political ideals of the latter. With the Christianisation 
of the Rus’ in the 10th century, Uspenskii argued that the “Hellenic genius” of the 
Byzantine Empire merged with a “great nation” (velikii narod) to the north of the Black 
Sea.218 
Uspenskii’s discussion of the Crusades also revealed how he linked distant 
history to contemporary political issues. In his discussion of the importance of the 
Crusades for Eastern European history, Uspenskii claimed that the Crusades opened the 
path for the struggle between the East and the West, which continued up to the 20th 
century under the name of the “Eastern Question,” a multi-faceted problem that 
combined various underlying factors with religious, economic, and political aspects. 
Uspenskii nearly identified the Crusades as the origin of the Eastern Question, and 
claimed that Russia was “destined” (suzhdeno) to take part in it.219 Therefore, he defined 
the Eastern Question not only as a political problem, but as a civilisational encounter 
between what he saw as opposing forces, the East and the West, although how he 
conceptualised East and West remained blurry. 
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The theme of “Eastern Question” appeared at various times in Uspenskii’s 
writings. In fact, he identified the history of Byzantine studies with the history of the 
Eastern Question. Uspenskii expressed very openly the view that scientific interests 
always went hand in hand with political and economic interests. Making comparisons 
with European nations, especially with France, which he deemed the cradle of Byzantine 
studies, Uspenskii complained that scientific Byzantinology developed comparatively 
late in Russia. He argued that while the French, since the Crusades, planted the seeds of 
scientific Byzantinology through their missionaries, consuls, and commercial colonies in 
the Near East, Russians were late in embarking on a scientific study of the Byzantine 
Empire, despite the fact that political and religious tendencies brought Russia closer to 
Byzantine civilisation that any other European nation.220 
Uspenskii found it embarrassing that Russian academics lagged behind their 
European colleagues in a field as intrinsically linked to Russian imperial identity as 
Byzantine studies. He sadly acknowledged that until the establishment of RAIK, very 
little was done in the name of Byzantine studies in Russia. There was not a single 
institution dedicated exclusively to the study of Byzantine history, although Byzantine 
studies had to be the “main duty of Russian science,” and a national obligation.221 To 
overcome this shortcoming, Uspenskii made great efforts to strengthen Byzantine 
studies in Russian academia throughout his academic career. On several occasions, he 
expressed dismay at the absence of an institution for Byzantine studies and advocated 
the necessity of a multi-functional institute of Byzantinology. When he was the head of 
the Odessa Historical-Philological Society, he worked for the establishment of a 
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Byzantinology department, which was realised in 1892. Two years later, when the most 
prominent academic publication in the field of Byzantine studies, Vizantiiskii 
Vremennik, started to be published, one of the promoters of the journal was 
Uspenskii.222 When RAIK was established upon the initiative of Russian diplomats in 
Constantinople, Uspenskii ardently participated in this project. In many respects, the 
achievements of the institute were unthinkable without the personal contribution of 
Uspenskii.223 
In addition to Uspenskii, a number of other important Byzantinist scholars were 
actively involved in RAIK’s activities as secretaries and researchers of the institute. 
From 1895 to 1914, six scholars served as secretaries at RAIK, these being, P. D. 
Pogodin (1894-1897), B. V. Farmakovskii (1898-1901), R. K. Leper (1901-1908), B. A. 
Panchenko (1901-1914), F. I. Shmit (1908-1912), and N. L. Okunev (1913-1914). All of 
these scholars were graduates of the Historical-Philological Faculty of St. Petersburg 
University, except for Farmakovskii, who was a graduate of the Historical-Philological 
Faculty of the Imperial Novorossiya University.224 The educational background of these 
scholars point out to the academic influence of these two universities on RAIK. 
To sum up, in the Russian Empire Byzantine studies was marked by an 
ideological undertone, explained by Russia’s perception of itself as the legitimate heir to 
the Byzantine civilisation. Geographically, Russian archaeological interest was mostly 
concentrated around the Black Sea, because this region was rich in terms of Greco-
Byzantine antiquities. In addition, the areas surrounding the Black Sea were annexed to 
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Russia relatively recently, and were highly multi-ethnic and multi-religious. Therefore, 
proving the antiquity of Russian and Orthodox cultural presence in southern Russia was 
not only a scientific enterprise, but had a political aspect to it. Different from their 
European colleagues, Russian Byzantinists prioritised the study of Slavic influence on 
Byzantine institutions. The context in which Russian archaeology and specifically 
Russian Byzantinology developed is essential for understanding the establishment of 
RAIK in 1894, the scope and geographical focus of its scientific interests. 
 
2.4 Byzantine Studies in the Ottoman Empire 
Archaeology was not institutionalised as an academic discipline in the Ottoman Empire 
as it was in Russia. Therefore, it is impossible to trace the academic development of 
Byzantine studies in Turkey before the Republican period. The limited number of 
intellectuals who touched upon Byzantine history in their works were either historians, 
or intellectuals with a particular interest in antiquities. The first book about Byzantine 
monuments written by an Ottoman citizen was a short brochure by the Greek Patriarch 
Constantios I (1770-1859) from 1861.225 In the 19th century, Ottoman historians, such as 
Ahmed Midhat Efendi, Mizancı Mehmed Murad, Celal Nuri, and Namık Kemal started 
to integrate Byzantine history into general histories of the Ottoman Empire, often as a 
historical background to explain and praise the successes of the Ottoman Empire in 
comparison to its predecessor.226 
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Actually, right after the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottomans in 1453, 
Ottoman rulers embraced the heritage of their predecessors and refashioned themselves 
as the heirs of the Byzantine Empire. The adoption of Byzantine traditions was 
especially visible in early Ottoman architectural practices, protocols and ceremonial 
performances.227 The use of Byzantine symbols was a means of providing a legitimate 
basis for Ottoman acquisition of imperial power, authority, and sovereignty in the 15th 
century. Mehmed II (r. 1444-1446; 1451-1481) was known with titles similar to those 
used by the Byzantine basileus. In addition to Ottoman self-perception, post-1453 texts 
by some Greek scholars show that the Ottomans were viewed as the legitimate heirs to 
the Byzantine throne by a broader audience.228 The Greek historians Kritoboulos (1410-
1470) and Amiroutzes (1400-1470), both of whom personally witnessed the 
transformation of imperial power from the Byzantines to the Ottomans, eulogised 
Mehmed II as the legitimate emperor of the Romans, perhaps with a pragmatic intention 
to accommodate to the new political reality.  
Despite the early Ottoman appropriation of Byzantine legacy, this identity 
gradually changed and the memory of the Byzantine Empire drifted into the dusty pages 
of history. Byzantium was once again remembered by Ottoman intellectuals only in the 
19th century, in a very different context. In the last decades of the 19th century, Ottoman 
historians discovered the Turkic identity of the Ottoman Empire. However, different 
from other Turkic states with nomadic traditions, the Ottoman state transformed itself 
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into an Empire, a cosmopolitan political entity with established political traditions. The 
imperial character of the Ottoman Empire intrigued intellectuals like Ahmed Midhat 
Efendi as regards the sources of this imperial tradition, which he found in the Byzantine 
Empire.229 Ahmed Midhat noted that the Byzantine Empire had no historical connection 
to modern Greeks. He added that for the sake of historical coherence, Byzantine history 
should be treated as part of Ottoman history.230 The common theme in the works of first 
Ottoman historians who dealt with Byzantine history was that they based their analyses 
on Western sources, and therefore adopted the negative European attitudes towards the 
Byzantine Empire, considering it as a despotic and corrupt political entity. In a period 
when Ottoman intellectuals were speculating about the reasons of Ottoman decline and 
looking for remedies to reverse the situation, it was practical to link the decline of the 
Ottoman Empire to the negative impact exerted by the Byzantines, than blaming it on 
Islam.231 It is a curious coincidence that Ottoman intellectuals’ criticism of Byzantine 
despotism and corruption echoed the views of Russian intellectuals, who blamed the 
Byzantine heritage for Russia’s contemporary problems. 
The first, and in fact the most comprehensive book published by an Ottoman 
Turk exclusively on Byzantine history was Celal Esad Bey’s (Celal Esad Arseven) 
Constantinople from Byzantine to Istanbul (Constantinople de Byzance a Stamboul), 
published in 1909. The preface of this work was written by the noted French Byzantinist 
Charles Diehl. Written in French, the book obviously targeted a foreign audience. In the 
preface, Diehl noted that Celal Esad’s ardent nationalism, which came to the surface in 
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some parts of the book, might bring smiles to specialists in the West, but he praised 
Celal Esad for successfully undertaking a comprehensive study on Byzantine 
monuments in Constantinople.232 Despite the imperfections of the book, Diehl noted that 
Celal Esad successfully portrayed Byzantine architecture and completed the study with a 
description of Ottoman monuments in the city. Until the publication of Celal Esad’s 
book, the study of the Byzantine Empire was monopolised by Greeks, Russians, 
Germans, the British, and the French, and Diehl concluded that it was interesting to see 
an Ottoman Turk writing about Byzantine art and history. 
Celal Esad argued that the separation of Latin and Orthodox churches prevented 
European archaeologists from taking an active interest in the history of the Byzantine 
Empire. Therefore, Byzantine monuments remained in the shadow of Greco-Roman 
antiquities for quite a long time in European academia. Celal Esad critically stated that 
there had been many academics and specialists in Europe, who scorned Byzantine art 
and downplayed its influence on the development of Western art. At this point, Celal 
Esad drew similarities between European perceptions of Byzantine and Turkish art, and 
pointed out that Turkish artistic development was also subjected to similar prejudices.233 
Diehl had a point when he said that Celal Esad’s analysis of Byzantine history 
was shaped by a nationalist overtone. Although Celal Esad acknowledged the influence 
of Byzantine art on European as well as Islamic artistic traditions, he provided a 
negative picture with regard to Byzantine rulers and society. He contended that internal 
problems, such as the decadence of morals, and economic problems, which were caused 
by very high court spending, made the Byzantine Empire vulnerable to foreign 
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exploitation. Eventually, the Byzantine Empire found itself in the middle of a political 
debacle in the 13th century.234 
In his description of the conquest of Constantinople by the Turks, Celal Esad 
made comparison with the Crusader conquest in the 13th century to portray the Ottomans 
in a favourable light to his European readers. He stated that after the Turkish conquest, 
Constantinople was looted, as was the common practice at the time. Celal Esad referred 
to the pillage of the churches such as Chora and St. Jean Baptiste by the Ottomans, but 
he legitimised the situation by contending that the pillage of the Crusaders far exceeded 
the pillage of the Turks. Celal Esad argued that apart from looting the city, the Ottomans 
also respected and in fact embraced the existing civilisation they encountered in 
Constantinople. The adoption of Byzantine civilisation was visible at the level of state 
symbols. Celal Esad claimed that upon the conquest of the city, Mehmed II adopted the 
crescent as the state emblem, which was actually the sign of the Byzantine Empire, and 
added a star to it.235 
Celal Esad acknowledged the impact of Byzantine art on Seljukid, and later 
Ottoman art. Especially after the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, Turkish 
architecture was definitely inspired by local traditions.236 Ottoman exposure to 
Byzantine architectural tradition was particularly visible in religious architecture, 
considering the similarities between Byzantine churches and Ottoman mosques. But he 
also added that in a short time Turkish art acquired a unique character. 
Another Ottoman intellectual who compiled a work on Byzantine art and 
architecture was İhtifalci Mehmed Ziya, who was a member of the Permanent 
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Committee for the Preservation of Antiquities (Muhâfaza-i Âsâr-i Atîka Encümen-i 
Dâimîsi). His book, İstanbul ve Boğaziçi: Bizans ve Türk Medeniyetinin Eserleri 
(Istanbul and the Bosphorus: The Monuments of Byzantine and Turkish Civilisations), 
originally published in 1920, was more like a list of Byzantine and Ottoman monuments 
in Constantinople.237 In his descriptions of Byzantine-era buildings, Mehmed Ziya drew 
comparisons with European and Ottoman architecture, and concluded that Byzantine 
monuments had more in common with Ottoman, rather than European architecture. For 
instance, in his description of the Great Palace of the Byzantine emperors, built during 
the reign of Constantine the Great in the 4th century, Mehmed Ziya claimed that this 
palace had more similarities with the Russian Kremlin or Ottoman Topkapı Palace, 
rather than the Versailles or the Louvre.238 In an attempt to justify Ottoman conquest, 
Mehmed Ziya claimed that the Ottomans were not responsible for the destruction of the 
Great Palace, since it was already in ruins during the Byzantine period.239 
Mehmed Ziya’s analyses included interesting comparisons between European 
and Byzantine civilisations. He contended that while European peoples were still in a 
state of “nomadism” (bedevi; could also be translated as “barbarity”), the Byzantine 
Empire flourished with magnificence.240 Like Celal Esad, Mehmed Ziya also blamed 
foreigners for the downfall of the Byzantine Empire. He claimed that the Byzantine 
Empire lost its glamour because of the negative impact of foreigners that penetrated into 
                                                        
237 Despite its relatively late publication (1920), in the aftermath of World War I, this book was 
considered as belonging to the pre-Republican literature. It was published before the proclamation of the 
Republic and when the Sultan was still the official head of the state. Therefore, the author could not have 
been influenced by Republican ideology. 
238 İhtifalci Mehmed Ziya, İstanbul ve Boğaziçi: Bizans ve Türk Medeniyetinin Eserleri [Istanbul and the 
Bosphorus: The Monuments of Byzantine and Turkish Civilisations] (İstanbul: 1937), p. 133. 
239 Ibid., p. 135. 
240 Ibid., p. 9. 
90 
 
Byzantine society, which ultimately led to the fall of the Byzantine capital to the Turks 
in 1453.241 
The studies by Celal Esad and Mehmed Ziya were unique in the way they 
handled Byzantine history, and definitely did not reflect overall Ottoman historiography. 
By examining Byzantine history in a more or less positive light, these two studies 
offered a rare perspective among Ottoman intellectuals. Not surprisingly, in the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries, alongside Celal Esad’s and Mehmed Ziya’s accounts about 
Byzantine history, there were an even greater number of historical works with 
nationalist undertones, which portrayed the Byzantine Empire as the bastion of 
corruption and intrigues. In the last years of the Ottoman Empire, the newly emerging 
nationalist historiography presented a negative image of the Byzantine Empire. What the 
studies by Celal Esad and Mehmed Ziya had in common was their appropriation of the 
Byzantine legacy vis-à-vis European rivals. They both pointed to similarities between 
Ottoman and Byzantine art, and implied that the major recipient of Byzantine 
civilisation was the Ottoman Empire, not any other European power. In an attempt to 
legitimise Ottoman destruction of the Byzantine Empire, both intellectuals underlined 
that Byzantine rule was already in decline, and its ultimate downfall was only a matter 
of time. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter intended to emphasise that RAIK was not a unique phenomenon: rather, it 
was part of an already established intellectual and academic tradition within Russian 
academia. Civilisations that prospered around the Black Sea constituted an important 
                                                        
241 Ibid., p. 17. 
91 
 
focus of Russian archaeology since the late 18th century. Interest in Byzantine 
archaeology did not develop only in secular institutions: theological academies and the 
Orthodox Church also actively engaged in archaeological projects. Actually, RAIK’s 
studies echoed similar archaeological projects in Crimea and southern Russia. Often, the 
same scholars participated in archaeological projects on both sides of the Black Sea. The 
director and mastermind of RAIK, Fyodor Uspenskii was a product of this academic 
tradition, both in terms of his education and training, and his ideological standpoint. 
The Russian and Ottoman approach to the Byzantine legacy represented two 
opposing world-views, but at the same time included similar concerns. To start with 
similarities, both Russian and Ottoman intellectuals scapegoated the Byzantine Empire 
for the contemporary problems of their respective empires. However, the differences 
between Ottoman and Russian approaches to Byzantium were more obvious. Russian 
archaeologists claimed a mythical cultural link between medieval Byzantium and the 
19th century Russian Empire. This argument was supported by religious and historical 
premises. In this discourse, Russia emerged as the saviour of Byzantine antiquities. On 
the other hand, Ottoman intellectuals were generally silent about the Byzantine legacy. 
Even when they made references, the Byzantine Empire often appeared as a negative 
symbol in their discourse. This was in contrast with the much earlier post-conquest era 
when the Ottoman sultans viewed themselves as the representatives of the Roman-
Byzantine tradition. Only in the last years of the Ottoman Empire, did a handful of 
intellectuals in their pseudo-academic historical works establish a link between Ottoman 
history and the Byzantine Empire. However, the discourse of these intellectuals was also 
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problematic because while appropriating Byzantine legacy, they also had to legitimise 
its destruction by the Ottomans. 
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Chapter 3 
Archaeology in the Ottoman Empire: 
Cultural Property as a Symbol of Sovereignty 
 
Starting from the mid-19th century, the number of professional foreign archaeologists in 
the Ottoman Empire rose dramatically as a reflection of the increasing 
institutionalisation of archaeology in Europe. German, American, and finally Russian 
archaeological missions followed British and French expeditions. In the first decades of 
the 19th century, Ottoman officials and rulers viewed foreign archaeological 
involvement with a lack of enthusiasm, if not outright apathy. However, towards the end 
of the century, this indifference was replaced by a growing concern and mistrust about 
the goals of foreign archaeological activities. In their struggle to protect the sovereignty 
of a disintegrating empire from the encroachments of the great powers of Europe, the 
founders of the Ottoman Imperial Museum (Müze-yi Hümâyun) came to regard cultural 
property as a symbol of the fragile sovereignty of the Empire and promoted protective 
measures to regulate and finally prohibit the export of antiquities. Moreover, the 
establishment of museums and the initiation of native archaeological expeditions in the 
Ottoman Empire reflected the process of modernisation that started in the mid-19th 
century.242 It should be noted that until the last days of the Empire, the policy of 
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archaeological protection was not consistent, and rulers continued to use ancient 
monuments as gifts and bargaining tools in their dealings with foreign governments. In 
any case, archaeological objects acquired a political significance beyond their historical 
and aesthetic meaning. Ancient history became an arena where the national programs 
and visions of different actors came into a symbolic conflict with each other. 
This chapter will analyse the development of Ottoman archaeology in the face of 
increasing foreign activities across the Empire and how ancient objects and monuments 
acquired a symbolic meaning in diplomatic relations between the Ottoman Empire and 
European powers. Ottoman perceptions of foreign archaeologists and major foreign 
archaeological expeditions which prompted a change in Ottoman policies will also be 
examined. The development of Ottoman archaeology will be analysed as a reflection of 
Ottoman modernisation. In order to gain a better understanding of the mentality of the 
first generation of Ottoman archaeologists, the political and cultural developments of the 
19th century will be briefly explained. Finally, this chapter will deal with the interactions 
between RAIK and Ottoman officials and how Russian archaeologists were perceived 
by the Ottoman bureaucracy. The temporal framework of this chapter is 1846-1914, that 
is the period starting with the organisation of the first museum in the Ottoman Empire to 
the outbreak of World War I. 
In the last decades of the 19th century, classical archaeology shifted its attention 
from Italy and Greece to Ottoman territories.243 After the unification of Italy, Italian 
state institutions regulated archaeological activities on the Italian Peninsula more strictly 
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and initiated a period a nationalisation of archaeology. In the early 19th century several 
Italian states issued edicts outlawing the export of antiquities.244 Greece followed a 
similar pattern after its independence in 1832: the first law prohibiting the export of 
antiquities outside Greece was promulgated in 1834, right after independence.245 Even 
though these measures were not always effective, nevertheless, they signalled the 
development of local archaeology in Italy and Greece. Therefore, the number of foreign 
excavations in these two countries became less frequent in the later part of the 19th 
century. Governments or private institutions in Europe were more likely to sponsor 
archaeological projects that would eventually enrich the collections of museums in their 
capitals.246 After Italy and Greece started to implement protective policies, the Ottoman 
Empire, particularly Anatolia and Mesopotamia, remained as the primary source of 
ancient objects for European museums. 
Ottoman relations with major European powers in the 19th century can be 
examined within the framework of informal imperialism.247 Informal imperialism can be 
defined as limited political, cultural, and economic control exerted over a weak 
sovereign state by a powerful adversary. As the politically weak power is also sovereign 
and has its own laws, complete military and political control by the powerful state does 
not occur, but domination is revealed in terms of political assistance and 
cultural/economic predominance. In the late 19th century the relationship between the 
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major European powers and the Ottoman Empire can be seen as an example of this 
pattern. 
In the 18th and early 19th centuries most European archaeologists in the Ottoman 
Empire were amateurs, who wanted ancient objects either for their private collections or 
for the national museums in their countries. Most excavations were carried out on the 
Aegean coast, in the ruins of ancient cities such as Troy, Xanthos, Miletus, Ephesus, and 
Halicarnassus. Until the organisation of the first antiquities collection in Constantinople 
in the mid-19th century, Ottoman officials did not have much interest in the protection of 
artefacts, especially if they were only “stones.”248 It was not uncommon for Ottoman 
sultans to give ancient monuments to foreign kings and emperors as a sign of mutual 
friendship. An example was Mahmud II, who gave a large amount of the acropolis 
reliefs removed from Assos to the French archaeologist M. Raoul-Rochette in 1838 as a 
sign of his friendship with the French king Louis Philippe I.249 
Starting from the mid-19th century, amateur adventurers who came to the 
Ottoman Empire in search of ancient civilisations were gradually replaced by 
professional archaeologists. Foreign archaeological activities were facilitated by the 
close collaboration between archaeologists and their respective consuls and ambassadors 
in Ottoman cities. Actually, in some cases, diplomats personally undertook 
archaeological excavations. For instance, Charles Newton, who was appointed to 
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Mytilene as consul in 1852, made excavations in Halicarnassus, Didyma, and Knidos. 
Stratford Canning, the British ambassador to the Porte, also played an important role in 
bringing monuments from the Ottoman Empire to Britain through diplomatic 
pressure.250 The Ottoman Empire was not a passive witness to the increasing foreign 
interest in the ancient heritage of its territories. In fact, the second half of the 19th 
century saw an increasing attention to the long-neglected ancient heritage of the Sultan’s 
domains. Ottoman suspicions of European archaeological activities grew, especially in 
the face of increasing European political control over the Empire and domestic turmoil 
at home. 
Ottoman reactions to foreign archaeological activities can be better understood in 
the light of political developments of the period. For Ottoman society, the 19th century 
was a period of constant change. The idea that Ottoman institutions were in need of 
reform appeared in Ottoman thinking in the late 18th century, when the military victories 
of previous centuries gave way to constant defeats by other major powers. Since it was 
military failures that stimulated the quest for renovation, reform started first in the 
military realm during the reign of Selim III (1789-1807).251 Selim III’s reign was 
followed by that of his cousin Mahmud II (1808-1839). As Mahmud II consolidated his 
authority, he undertook new measures to secure administrative centralisation, and he 
challenged the authority of local notables in the periphery of the Ottoman Empire. 
During Mahmud II’s reign, Westernisation for the first time appeared as a formal policy. 
Mahmud II’s policies put an emphasis on the necessity of learning European scientific 
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methods without transplanting its culture.252 However, once contacts with Europe were 
established, the penetration of Western cultural influence was inevitable. Students were 
sent abroad and European-style educational institutions were established at home to 
create the new type of bureaucrat who was open to change and knew foreign languages, 
as well as the intricacies of European diplomacy. 
These reforms culminated in the famous Tanzimat (in Ottoman Turkish, 
reorganisation) period (1839-1876). Tanzimat refers to a series of top-down modernising 
reforms carried out by a new generation of bureaucrats, which restructured the Ottoman 
Empire and accelerated the process of Westernisation.253 The main ideas of Tanzimat 
were formulated in the Gülhane-i Hatt-ı Hümâyun (Edict of the Rose Chamber), which 
was promulgated in 1839. The edict guaranteed the equality of all Ottoman subjects 
before the law, regardless of their religion. In this sense, the new administrative and 
legal structure, as it was envisioned by the reformist bureaucrats, undermined the 
traditional religious categorisation of Ottoman subjects. In addition to that, Ottoman 
bureaucrats tried to forge a supranational Ottoman identity that transcended ethnic and 
religious identities, which were bringing the Empire to the edge of disintegration. 
Tanzimat also had significant legal consequences, which proved to be transformative for 
Ottoman society. With modernisation and increasing administrative and bureaucratic 
centralisation, Tanzimat bureaucrats tried to standardise and secularise Ottoman law and 
administration.254 
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The establishment of modern Turkish bureaucracy can be traced back to 
Tanzimat.255 After this period the bureaucrat became a member of an anonymous 
network of interactions between various government institutions. The emergence of the 
bureaucracy as a new social class was one of the most important consequences of the 
Tanzimat reforms. The reforms also had visible repercussions. The Ottoman urban 
lanscape was transformed with the appearance of an increasing number of buildings in 
European style as a result of European architectural influence. Reformers also tried to 
introduce municipal regulations to reorganise major Ottoman cities on European 
lines.256 
The new Ottoman interest in ancient monuments can be analysed within the 
context of this modernisation trend.257 Ussama Makdisi defined Ottoman archaeological 
interest after Tanzimat as “one more step in the self-incorporation of the Ottoman 
Empire into a European-dominated modernity.”258 On the one hand, museum building, 
as a practice imported from Europe, implied the objective of Westernisation on the part 
of Ottoman bureaucracy.259 On the other hand, displaying ancient objects from all 
corners of the vast Empire indicated Ottoman sovereign rights over territories that were 
still under Ottoman political control. The careful surveillance of foreign archaeologists 
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by local authorities showed the eagerness of the burgeoning bureaucracy to carry out 
legal regulations and extend central rule to the provinces. 
Tanzimat reforms were characterised by an Ottomanist identity beyond ethnic 
and religious denominations. Tanzimat reformers advocated the equality of all ethnic 
and religious groups within the Ottoman Empire and supported the equality of all 
citizens before the law.260 In this regard, Ottomanism of the Tanzimat era was an attempt 
to create a sense of political community which was rooted in territory and sought to 
integrate the heritage of all cultures that had ever existed on Ottoman territories, 
regardless of religion and ethnicity. In practice, the Ottomanist identity was mostly 
embraced by educated upper classes and failed to incorporate wider segments of the 
Ottoman society. Still, Ottomanist thought had an impact on literary and intellectual 
trends in the last century of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomanist idea received a 
revived support after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. Although Ottomanism lost its 
appeal after the Balkan Wars, it left a mark in Ottoman politics as an attempt to create a 
nation out of the cosmopolitan Ottoman society. The display of Greco-Roman 
antiquities in the Ottoman Imperial Museum can be regarded as an extension of 
Ottomanist thought behind Tanzimat reforms, because the founders of the Museum were 
perfect examples to upper classes who were born into the Tanzimat mindset. 
In fact, Ottoman collection of ancient objects did not start in the 19th century. It 
is known that historical objects from the Byzantine era were preserved in the gardens of 
the Topkapı Palace long ago, as early as the 15th century, right after the conquest of 
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Constantinople.261 Nevertheless, the new interest in antiquity collections that started in 
the second half of the 19th century was different in character, and was more related to 
the Empire’s attempt at integration with Europe, than a continuation of an old Ottoman 
tradition. In 1846, Fethi Ahmed Pasha, Field Marshal of the Imperial Arsenal and 
former ambassador to Vienna and Paris, transformed the church of St. Irene, located in 
the gardens of the royal palace, into a museum under the name Mecmua-i Âsâr-ı Âtika 
(Collection of Ancient Monuments), accompanied by Mecmua-i Esliha-i Âtika 
(Collection of Ancient Weapons).262 St. Irene was until then used as a depository to 
store military artefacts from the early Ottoman period. It is very likely that Fethi Ahmed 
Pasha was inspired by the museums he visited in Europe during his diplomatic service. 
During the organisation of the antiquities collection, Fethi Ahmed Pasha was supported 
by Sultan Abdulmecid. It is claimed that on a visit to Yalova, a town on the coast of the 
Marmara Sea, Abdulmecid saw gilded stones. Upon learning that the Byzantine 
Emperor Constantine’s name was inscripted on them, the Sultan ordered to send these 
stones to Constantinople. These monuments were eventually sent to St. Irene for 
exhibition by Fethi Ahmed Pasha.263 The collection at St. Irene was divided in two parts: 
on one side, there were old weapons, jannissary costumes, and the armour collection 
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from earlier periods of Ottoman history, artefacts which had already been preserved in 
St. Irene. On the other side, the Hellenistic-Byzantine artefacts were displayed.264 
Mecmua-i Âsâr-ı Âtika was the first Ottoman attempt at creating a Western-style 
museum.265 The objects in the collection were exhibited in a rather disorganised manner, 
where old Ottoman military paraphernelia lay side by side with ancient Greek and 
Roman tombs. Still, this institution implied the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire over 
vast territories, some of which were only theoretically attached to the imperial centre. In 
a document dating to 1846, local officials in Tripoli, Libya were asked to send ancient 
objects to the collection in İstanbul. In this document, the antiquities collection was 
defined as a museum organised along the same lines as its counterparts in European 
countries. The document was accompanied by an order stating that ancient objects were 
henceforth to be sent to the collection in the imperial capital.266 Embracing the Greco-
Roman heritage as well as the Ottoman past, the museum also reflected the 
supranational identity behind Tanzimat reforms. 
Different from European museums where governments supported the educative 
role of national museums for their own public, the Ottoman Museum targeted not its 
own citizens (as the museum was opened to the public only in 1880) but a foreign 
audience, especially foreign government representatives and aristocrats.267 As early as 
the 1850s the museum became one of the major destinations where Ottoman officials 
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personally accompanied foreign visitors from various countries including Austria, 
Prussia, the United States, Britain, France, and Russia.268 The fact that museum visits 
were mentioned in the documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs hinted at the 
symbolic meaning the Ottoman government assigned to its collection of antiquities. By 
establishing a European-style museum for a foreign audience, the Ottoman government 
implied not only the Western orientation of the Empire, but also visualised its territorial 
integrity for the Western visitors by displaying objects from different regions under its 
control. When the romantic poet Théophile Gautier visited the Ottoman capital, he saw 
Mecmua-i Âsâr-ı Âtika as a sign of progress. Even though Gautier did not find the 
Ottoman weapon and armour collection interesting for a European visitor, he was quite 
impressed by the Hellenistic-Byzantine antiquities in Mecmua-i Âsâr-ı Âtika. He 
asserted that the various objects on display, including ancient sculptures, reliefs, 
inscriptions and tombs, heralded the inception of a Byzantine museum, which could 
evolve into an interesting collection with the addition of new objects.269 
Ottoman archaeological projects also reflected a centralizing tendency. In 1857, 
local authorities in various parts of the Empire were asked to identify ancient 
monuments in their localities and send them to İstanbul for the reorganisation of the 
museum.270 By bringing ancient objects and displaying them in the capital, the Ottoman 
government was stating the authority İstanbul exercised over the rest of the Empire. It is 
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noteworthy that right after the conflict between Maronites and Druzes in Lebanon in 
1860, Ottoman officials regulated the access to the Baalbek ruins in the region, as if to 
reiterate authority over a contested territory.271 
The relocation of antiquities from periphery to the centre was a means of 
underlining the distinction between the modern and Europeanised centre and pre-
modern periphery and thus legitimated central authority over provinces. Later in 1898, 
when Emperor Kaiser Wilhelm II visited the Baalbek ruins, the plaque erected in 
commemoration of his visit was inscribed in Ottoman Turkish and German, but not in 
Arabic, the local language. The tickets to the Baalbek ruins were written in three 
languages; Ottoman Turkish, the official language of the Empire, French, the lingua 
franca of foreign tourists, and Arabic, the local tongue; but only on the Arabic ticket was 
there a warning not to steal anything from the ruins. Therefore, Ottoman archaeologists 
viewed their task as not only to save ancient monuments from the greed of European 
archaeologists, but also from local inhabitants, whom Ottoman officials thought could 
easily be exploited by European treasure-hunters to pillage the ruins.272 In fact, the 
museum-building practice in the Ottoman Empire assumed the impossible task of 
representing a Euro-centric discourse of modernity while resisting it; glorifying an 
Ottoman imperial past, while embodying an anti-imperialist soul.273 
The collections of historical relics were reorganised with the transformation of 
Mecmua-i Âsâr-ı Âtika into a proper museum in 1869 under the administration of the 
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Ministry of Education.274 The first director of the Müze-i Hümâyun, that is, the Imperial 
Museum, was Edward Goold, a teacher at Galatasaray High School, who also prepared 
the first catalogue of the museum exhibition in French. Goold served as the director of 
the Ottoman Imperial Museum from 1869 to 1871. In the same year that Müze-i 
Hümâyun was established, the first antiquities law was promulgated in the Ottoman 
Empire.275 Even though this was a very sketchy legal regulation, one of the seven 
articles in the 1869 act outlawed the transfer of antiquities abroad, without specifying 
what the term antiquity meant. Antiquities could be sold within the Ottoman Empire, but 
the Ottoman state had priority to buy ancient objects for its museum. Moreover, the act 
stated that permission from the Ministry of Education was compulsory for excavation 
and research. In case a foreign government wanted to remove an ancient object outside 
the borders of the Ottoman Empire, the Sultan had the responsibility to make the 
decision.276 This legal regulation is important as it was the first step towards the 
standardisation of procedures as regards antiquities. At the same time, it showed 
Ottoman bureaucracy’s discomfort at the flow of ancient objects to foreign markets. 
Apparently, as early as 1869, antiquities acquired a meaning as a sign of sovereignty in 
the eyes of Ottoman bureaucrats. Nevertheless, the 1869 act still regarded antiquities as 
the property of the Sultan, not of the Ottoman state. 
In 1871, the directorate of the Imperial Museum was abolished by Grand Vizier 
Mahmud Nedim Pasha, and was reinstated again by Ahmed Vefik Pasha in 1872. 
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During this one-year break, the Austrian painter, Teranzio served in the capacity of 
custodian of the museum on the basis of a reference provided by the Austrian 
ambassador, also an antiquities collector, Anton von Prokesch-Osten.277 The second 
director of the Imperial Museum, Philipp Anton Dethier, the headmaster of the Austrian 
High School, was appointed in 1872 and remained in this office until 1881. Dethier 
planned the enlargement of the museum and was behind the 1874 antiquities 
legislation.278 Even though he envisioned the creation of a school of archaeology 
affiliated with the Imperial Museum that would train photographers and restorators in 
addition to archaeologists, this plan was never realised.279 In 1880, the Ottoman Imperial 
Museum became a fully-fledged museum comparable to museums in European 
countries. The increasing number of objects could no longer be stored in the existing 
facilities, and therefore were moved to larger premises known as the Tiled Pavilion 
(Çinili Köşk) in the gardens of the Topkapı Palace. In 1880, the collection was for the 
first time opened to the public.280 During Dethier’s directorship, the number of objects 
in the museum nearly quadrupled.281 
The first instances of conflict between European archaeologists and Ottoman 
officials arose in the mid-19th century, but suspicions reached a peak with the 
scandalous excavation in Troy by the German antiquarian Heinrich Schliemann in 1871. 
Schliemann received a permit from Ottoman authorities on the condition that he would 
send half of the findings to the Imperial Museum in Constantinople. Nevertheless, he 
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did not comply with this arrangement and smuggled the infamous Priam’s Treasure to 
Athens in 1874. The Ottoman government brought the issue to the Greek courts, but 
despite the legal decision to give the objects back to the Ottoman government, 
Schliemann refused to comply.282 The Ottoman authorities punished those who assisted 
Schliemann in smuggling ancient objects. At the same time, the Ministry of Education 
issued an edict to suspend excavations in Troy. Objects that were left behind after the 
Schliemann expedition were placed in the Ottoman Imperial Museum.283 The issue 
became such an international scandal that eventually the Prussian government decided 
to dissuade amateur individuals from undertaking archaeological excavations abroad.284 
From the Ottoman perspective, the Schliemann expedition was important 
because it triggered the enactment of a more extensive regulation about the ownership 
rights of antiquities compared to the 1869 act. According to the act issued in 1874, 
archaeological finds were to be equally divided among the landowner, the Ottoman 
government, and the archaeologists undertaking the excavation. This regulation also 
introduced uniform procedures for archaeological excavations and research. Researchers 
were required to ask for official permission from the Ministry of Education through 
local administrative offices. Nevertheless, the regulation also paved the way for the flow 
of ancient objects to foreign markets. The article outlawing the export of antiquities that 
existed in the 1869 act was replaced with a new article, which stated that antiquities 
could be exported with the permission of the Ministry of Education, but the Ottoman 
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government had the privilege to retain the object for the Imperial Museum.285 The 
reason for this setback is obscure, but some researchers point to the possible influence of 
the foreign director of the Imperial Museum, Dethier, who might have acted as an 
intermediary between foreign archaeologists and the Ottoman Empire.286 
In terms of the development of a consciousness about the protection of 
antiquities, there was a mutual interaction between the Ottoman Empire and European 
powers. While the Ottoman Empire felt threatened by European activities on its 
territories, Ottoman elites also looked upon Europe as an example for the protection of 
cultural heritage, and therefore countered European arguments with the very methods 
taken from Europe. The disagreement over the ownership of antiquities revealed the 
geopolitical difference between European powers and the Ottoman Empire. European 
archaeologists argued that antiquities belonged to humanity, rather than a single nation. 
The prevalent view in Western academia was that there was no serious archaeological 
and scientific interest in countries that were home to Greco-Roman artefacts, except for 
seeing ancient objects as a means of profit, therefore antiquities could not be sufficiently 
protected if they were left to the mercy of local governments.287 From an Ottoman 
perspective, defending ownership rights over ancient objects vis-à-vis Europeans was a 
means of indicating sovereignty. On the other hand, similar to Europeans, Ottomans 
displayed an imperial attitude with regard to exporting monuments from the periphery to 
its capital, in an attempt to display the objects but also to protect them from the 
“natives,” i. e. from local people. 
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Political developments and the change of leadership after the 1870s help to 
explain increasing Ottoman emphasis on sovereignty. In 1876, pro-reform bureaucrats 
succeeded in forcing the regime to adopt a constitution. The first brief constitutional 
experiment came to a halt when Abdülhamid II (r. 1876-1909) suspended parliament in 
1878 using the Russo-Ottoman War as an excuse. Abdülhamid II came to the throne 
when the Ottoman Empire was economically bankrupt, and was politically threatened by 
imperialism. His reign was marked by a politically intolerant autocratic rule. However, 
this does not mean that he reversed the modernisation of the Empire. On the contrary, 
Abdülhamid II initiated reforms in administration, education, and military organisation 
after the example of Europe. Paradoxically, European ideologies profoundly influenced 
Ottoman intellectual movements during his rule.288 Administrative centralisation, aimed 
at by the reforms of Ottoman rulers from Mahmud II to Tanzimat elites, was effectively 
realised by Abdülhamid II. 
Ottoman archaeology was institutionalised during the Hamidian regime. Yet, it 
was not simply Abdülhamid II’s persona that was instrumental in this 
institutionalisation. More important was the bureaucracy, which was created as a result 
of a conscious state project since Tanzimat. The bureaucratic elite, who embraced 
European ideas, were eager to apply these ideas to an Ottoman context. The turning 
point for Ottoman archaeology came when Osman Hamdi Bey (1842-1910), the 
“founding father” of Turkish archaeology, was appointed to the directorship of the 
Imperial Museum in 1881. 
Osman Hamdi Bey was a clear representation of an Ottoman elite with Tanzimat 
upbringing: born into a family of high-ranking officials, his father was a reformist 
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bureaucrat who had served as a diplomat in several European cities as well as assuming 
ministerial positions. Osman Hamdi went to Paris to study law, where he developed an 
interest in painting. In Paris, he received lessons from Orientalist painters such as Jean-
Léon Gerôme and Gustave Boulanger. Upon his return to İstanbul, Osman Hamdi 
assumed several positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1882, he established the 
first Academy of Fine Arts in İstanbul to train Ottoman artists in the European 
fashion.289 Yet, Osman Hamdi’s vision was not based on an uncritical mimicry of 
European institutions, but a careful reconciliation of European science, art and 
techniques with Ottoman national culture.290 
Osman Hamdi Bey started serving at the Imperial Museum in 1877, when he was 
one of the eight members of the Museum Commission affiliated with the Ministry of 
Education.291 From 1881 until his death in 1910, he remained as the director of the 
Imperial Museum. Osman Hamdi’s brother Halil Ethem (1861-1938) assumed the same 
post after his brother’s death, and continued the policies initiated by Osman Hamdi. 
Osman Hamdi Bey initiated many changes in terms of archaeology: he introduced 
European exhibition methods, promoted the publication of a museum journal, and 
                                                        
289 For biographical information, see Shaw, Osmanlı Müzeciliği: Müzeler, Arkeoloji ve Tarihin 
Görselleşmesi, pp. 122-126; Ahmet Cemil Tan, “Osman Hamdi Bey,” Ankara Sanat, No: 10 (1 February 
1967), pp. 8-9; Arif Müfid Mansel, Osman Hamdi Bey (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi, 1959), pp. 189-193; 
Osman Hamdi Bey (İstanbul: Devlet Güzel Sanatlar Akademisi, 1967); Mustafa Cezar, Müzeci ve Ressam 
Osman Hamdi Bey (İstanbul: Türk Kültürüne Hizmet Vakfı Sanat Yayınları, 1987); Edhem Eldem, “An 
Ottoman Archaeologist Caught Between Two Worlds: Osman Hamdi Bey (1842-1910),” in Archaeology, 
Anthropology, and Heritage in the Balkans and Anatolia: The Life and Times of F. W. Hasluck, 1878-
1920, ed. David Shankland, Vol. 1 (İstanbul: Isis Press, 2004), pp. 126-129. 
290 Makdisi, pp. 785-786. In a costume catalogue Osman Hamdi Bey prepared for the Vienna International 
Exhibition of 1873, he praised the quality and beauty of Turkish fabric as opposed to those produced in 
Europe. Osman Hamdi Bey and Marie de Launay, 1873 Yılında Türkiye’de Halk Giysileri: Elbise-i 
Osmaniyye [The Popular Costumes of Turkey in 1873] (İstanbul: Sabancı Üniversitesi, 1999), p. 261; pp. 
223-225. 
291 Mustafa Cezar, Müzeci ve Ressam Osman Hamdi Bey (İstanbul: Türk Kültürüne Hizmet Vakfı Sanat 
Yayınları, 1987), p. 14. 
111 
 
undertook the first Ottoman archaeological excavations.292 His strategy was to enrich the 
museum collection by unearthing ancient objects with aesthetic qualities. In this sense, 
the early Ottoman archaeological practice was marked by the art history-oriented 
approach, embraced by Osman Hamdi Bey and his colleagues.293 In addition to storing 
antiquities, Osman Hamdi organised the Ottoman Museum as a scientific institution that 
actively participated in archaeological scholarship. As Edhem Eldem stated, Osman 
Hamdi envisioned his role as part of his dream to realise a “mission civilisatrice” for his 
country, as a contribution to the integration of the Ottoman Empire into the Western 
cultural world.294 
Osman Hamdi Bey did not have a formal archaeological education. For this 
reason, he tried to establish close connections with foreign scholars and benefited from 
their expertise. Most notable among these scholars was Theodor Reinach (1860-1928), 
with whom Osman Hamdi Bey organised numerous expeditions and made a number of 
publications.295 Yet, probably the most important achievement of Osman Hamdi Bey 
was that he pushed the Ottoman government to enact more extensive laws for the 
preservation of antiquities within the imperial borders. 
The regulation of 1884 came into being in this context.296 According to this 
regulation, all foreign archaeological excavations in the Ottoman Empire were placed 
under the supervision of the Ministry of Education. For the first time, all ancient objects 
found within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire were considered the property of the 
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state, not of the Sultan, and their export was outlawed. The term antiquity was defined in 
a detailed manner that encompassed the history of all peoples inhabiting the Ottoman 
Empire. This definition included all scientific, technical, artistic, and religious artefacts, 
movable and immovable, belonging to any culture that inhabited Ottoman territories at 
any time in history. Destruction of historical artefacts, trading or smuggling them was 
criminalised. Furthermore, all foreign archaeological expedition teams were required to 
submit specific maps, delineating their intended area of research clearly, to Ottoman 
authorities. This was a clear message about complete Ottoman legal, cultural, and 
political claims over all antiquities on Ottoman territory. While educated elites like 
Osman Hamdi Bey were motivated by a concern about the artistic and historical value of 
artefacts, in the end what prompted the Ottoman government to take a definite stand for 
archaeological preservation was the threat they felt against their sovereignty. There is no 
doubt that archaeology is by its very nature linked to territory, and control over territory 
is the essence of sovereignty. In this sense, archaeology implied a strong link between 
sovereignty and property rights of the state not only over ancient objects, but also over 
territories where these objects were found. On a side note, with minor revisions, the 
1884 regulation remained in effect well into 1974.297 
Foreign scholars followed the promulgation of the Ottoman antiquities regulation 
with dismay, to say the least. The regulation reflected the Ottoman demand to be seen as 
equals with Europeans, and this demand was met with suspicion. Ernest Renan’s (1823-
1892) report to the French Ministry of Public Instruction perfectly illustrated European 
perceptions of Ottoman antiquities regulation. The implicit message in Renan’s report 
was that he did not see the Ottomans fit for a “European” scientific activity: 
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This law, a sad proof of the infantile ideas that are formed among the Turkish 
government in scientific matters, will be remembered as an ill-fated date in the 
history of archaeological research … What, in effect, makes these measures 
particularly disastrous, is the immensity of the lands to which they apply, since 
Turkey’s pretensions now reach out to regions over which it had previously had 
only nominal control. The concentration of antiquities in a national museum is 
conceivable (although it presents serious drawbacks) for a country of modest 
espanse and possessing, as it were, archaeological unity. Yet, what should one 
say of a museum housing a jumble of objects originating from Greece, from Asia 
Minor, from Syria, from Arabia, from Yemen, and from so many other lands 
over which the Porte believes it can claim some imaginary sovereignty?298 
 
 
Despite European suspicions, the relationship between European scholars and 
the Ottoman government was not totally confrontational. Osman Hamdi Bey’s strict 
observance of legal regulations did not mean that he was uncooperative with foreign 
scholars. Aware of the shortcomings of Ottoman archaeology, Osman Hamdi 
established careful diplomatic relations with foreign scholars. Although restrictions were 
imposed on foreign archaeologists, the Ottoman government also offered support within 
legal limits.299 
While regulating and monitoring foreign archaeologists more strictly, the 
Ottoman government also funded archaeological expeditions by the staff of the Ottoman 
Imperial Museum. In 1883, the very first professional Ottoman archaeological 
excavation was carried out by Osman Hamdi Bey in Mount Nemrut in the Harput 
Vilâyet, in the ruins of the Kingdom of Commagene.300 Right after the Berlin Museum 
sent Karl Humann (1839-1896) to Nemrut in 1882, the Ottoman government 
commissioned Osman Hamdi Bey and Oskan Efendi to carry out excavations in the 
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same region, in an attempt to catch up with foreign archaeological activities.301 
However, the most significant excavation in Ottoman history was made in 1887 in the 
Sidon ruins in Lebanon, which bolstered Osman Hamdi Bey’s international reputation as 
a respectable archaeologist. In the first excavation in Sidon, Osman Hamdi worked with 
Dimosten Baltacı Bey, while the second excavation was undertaken by Teodor Makridi 
Bey.302 Of the eighteen sarcophagi found in the excavations, eleven were brought to 
Constantinople with the encouragement of Abdülhamid II, which placed the Ottoman 
Imperial Museum among the notable museums in the world. In 1892, Osman Hamdi 
Bey published a catalogue of his findings in Sidon with the French archaeologist 
Theodore Reinach in Paris.303 In the 1890s, Ottoman archaeologists also started to 
participate in international congresses. In August 1892, two Ottoman officials, 
Abdurrahman Süreyya Bey and Kamil Bey were sent to the Lisbon Archaeology 
Congress by the government to present photographs of the Imperial Museum 
collection.304 In the same year, Ottoman representatives participated in the Moscow 
Archaeology Congress.305 By 1894, the entire administrative committee of the Imperial 
Museum consisted of only Ottoman citizens.306 
Abdülhamid II was so satisfied with the results of these expeditions that he asked 
Osman Hamdi Bey to continue his research in Sidon and ordered the construction of a 
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new museum building in Constantinople to store objects brought from Lebanon.307 
Consequently, in 1891, the Ottoman Museum moved to a new building, which was 
designed by the architect Alexandre Vallaury with a neo-classical façade. Despite 
Abdülhamid’s support for the Imperial Museum, the relatiosnship between the Sultan 
and Osman Hamdi Bey was not free of friction. For instance in 1905, Osman Hamdi 
suspected that his house might be searched by police and transferred some of his 
personal records to his friend Theodore Wiegand’s house for protection. Next year in 
1906, when Osman Hamdi was bombarded with over a hundred congratulatory 
telegrams from abroad for the 25th anniversary of his museum directorship, Abdülhamid 
suspected and sent an informer to inquire the reason of his correspondence with 
foreigners.308 
It was not easy to find financial resources for archaeological expeditions, 
therefore Osman Hamdi looked for benefactors who would be supportive of his projects. 
The principal benefactor was Osman Hamdi’s father Edhem Pasha, the Minister of the 
Interior from 1883 to 1885, who provided financial support for the first expeditions.309 
In addition to providing monetary support, Edhem Pasha supported his son with his 
professional network, as well. In his correspondence with local authorities around the 
Ottoman Empire about ancient objects in their localities, Osman Hamdi Bey made use 
of his father’s position as the Minister of the Interior.310 In a note he wrote to the 
Ministry of Education, Osman Hamdi explained the symbolic importance of museums 
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for the cultural development of a country. Referring to the grandeur of European 
museums, he expressed his disappointment at the reluctance of the Ministry of 
Education to provide necessary tools to the Imperial Museum and to elevate it to the 
same level as its European counterparts.311 Despite these setbacks, the staff of the 
Imperial Museum undertook a number of archaeological expeditions around Asia 
Minor, Ottoman Macedonia, the Greek islands, Syria, and Iraq, often in cooperation 
with foreign scholars.312 
Since Ottoman archaeological practices started at the nexus of European 
competition over its ancient heritage, implying Ottoman rights over Greco-Roman 
antiquities was a message about Ottoman sovereignty over territories contested by 
European powers. It was also an attempt to incorporate Ottoman history to the broader 
framework of European history. In a way, classical antiquities in the Imperial Museum 
represented “an empire able both to reach into the past to set the stage for its own 
teleological evolution into modernity and at the same time to translate East for West, 
and, of course, West for East.”313 By putting stress on Greco-Roman classical 
antiquities, which Europeans took as the origin of their civilisation and of civilisation as 
a whole, the development of Ottoman archaeology implied a desire to be accepted as a 
European empire. 
Nevertheless, the antiquity regulations by no means prevented the flow of 
antiquities from the Ottoman Empire to foreign museums. There were numerous cases 
in which local officials reported smuggling of antiquities abroad, mostly with the help of 
diplomatic staff. This shortcoming proves that legal regulations did not have universal 
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practical application. For instance, according to a report from 1902, when the Russian 
fleet, under the command of Admiral Grand Duke Aleksandr Mikhailovich, was 
cruising on the Black Sea, Russian naval officers carried “stones with figures” from the 
Amasra port. The Ministry of the Interior issued a strong warning that such incidents 
should not be repeated, and reminded that the smuggling of ancient objects was strictly 
outlawed.314 
It was not only foreigners who overlooked Ottoman regulations: the Ottoman 
government itself applied protective measures inconsistently and disregarded its own 
laws in certain instances.315 Often, Abdülhamid II and European-educated bureaucrats 
like Osman Hamdi Bey had different agendas about the fate of ancient objects. While 
educated members of the bureaucracy had the European notion that ancient artefacts 
should be protected and kept within national boundaries, Abdülhamid II did not abstain 
from using cultural property as a political tool in diplomatic negotiations. With the 
decline of Ottoman political and economic power, Abdülhamid II used gifts to win 
foreign support, especially of Germany after the 1880s.316 The historical and aesthetic 
value of the gift was parallel to the importance ascribed to political alliance with the 
given power. Abdülhamid II’s practice also implied that he regarded ancient objects, and 
in fact the territories of the Ottoman Empire, as his personal property that could be given 
as gifts upon his personal initiative. This notion contradicted the state-centred view of 
the burgeoning bureaucracy, whose ascendancy depended on the development of state as 
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a body autonomous from the persona of the Sultan. In other words, the difference of 
opinion between the Sultan and bureaucrats was an example of a global pattern in which 
the state with objective laws replaced a monarch as the source of authority. 
By far, the major recipient of ancient objects in the form of “gifts” was the 
German Empire, as Kaiser Wilhelm II was Abdülhamid II’s closest ally in international 
politics. There is less evidence about gifts received by Russian statesmen or diplomats. 
When the Porte allowed the Russian ship Chornoe More to anchor in the Black Sea 
harbour Ereğli in order to remove ancient objects, it was specifically stated that these 
objects were only some “stones” with figures on them.317 In the same year, Abdülhamid 
II presented seven chests of “stone” removed from Tedmur ruins (Palmyra) in Syria to 
Grand Duke Serge Aleksandrovich, who was known to have a personal interest in 
history and archaeology.318 
The growing sensitivity about Ottoman property rights over Hellenistic and 
Roman antiquities is all the more interesting, considering Abdülhamid’s political 
allegiances. Abdülhamid laid a heavy emphasis on Islam as the uniting factor of the 
Ottoman Empire, because the loss of European territories changed the demographic 
structure of the Empire in favour of Muslims. In the Hamidian era, Turco-Islamic art 
also received attention as national symbols. Nonetheless, in the museums that were 
established in the last century of the Ottoman Empire, the bulk of attention was always 
devoted to Greco-Roman antiquities and Islamic objects received only little interest.319 
This was partly related to the fact that Ottoman archaeologists imported archaeological 
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methodology and paradigms from their European colleagues, who prioritised the study 
of classical archaeology.320 The Department of Islamic Arts was established within the 
Ottoman Imperial Museum only in 1889, but a full-scale museum for Islamic arts was 
established only in 1914. As interest in “exotic” works of Islamic art was growing in the 
European market, in 1906 the protective laws were extended to Islamic antiquities as 
well.321 However, Islamic antiquities became a matter of serious public discussion only 
after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, as the Young Turks removed these objects 
from their religious context and transformed them into secular objects of national 
identity.322 Different from Turco-Islamic antiquities, there was rivalry for the ownership 
of Greco-Roman heritage between European powers and the Ottoman Empire, a factor 
that encouraged Ottoman elites to put a special emphasis on the latter in Ottoman 
museums. 
The final legal regulation concerning antiquities was promulgated in 1906.323 
According to this amendment, all objects, regardless of their aesthetic quality, that 
reflected the art, culture, and technology of all civilisations that lived on Ottoman 
territories throughout history, including Islamic antiquities, were categorised as 
archaeologically valuable. Therefore, the new definition of antiquity reflected the wide 
range of cultures that made up parts of Ottoman identity. All archaeological objects 
were strictly considered as the property of the Ottoman state. Museums were authorised 
as the sole institutions responsible for the inspection, preservation, and exhibition of 
antiquities. Foreign archaeological societies could make excavations only on condition 
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that they received permission from the Ministry of Education through the administration 
of the Imperial Ottoman Museum. In 1907, along with Britain, France, and Germany, 
the Ottoman Empire ratified the Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land, known as the Hague Convention. This treaty, originally concerned the rules of 
land warfare, was also the first international treaty that codified the protection of cultural 
property and prohibited the seizure of historic monuments during wars. Unfortunately, 
later during World War I, the treaty fell short of fulfilling its mission.324 
Even Abdülhamid’s closest allies, the Germans, faced stronger Ottoman 
supervision in the early years of the 20th century. By 1905, German excavations in 
Babylon, Assur, and Pergamon were suspended, which made German archaeologists 
complain about the onerous restrictions posed by Ottoman bureaucracy, and especially 
about Osman Hamdi Bey’s determined attitude as regards the execution of the 
antiquities law.325 
In a couple of years, the Ottoman Empire went through a dramatic political 
change, which was also reflected in the politics of cultural property. In spite of the 
severe suppression of opposition, various clandestine political organisations were 
established under the Hamidian regime. The most prominent among them were the 
Committee of Union and Progress, who are often referred to as the Young Turks. 
Ideologically, Young Turks included liberal-minded pluralists, Turkish nationalists, and 
materialist positivist intellectuals, though occasionally these conflicting elements could 
be found within the same person.326 In 1908, these diverse political groups came 
together to overthrow Abdülhamid II, and engineered a coup d’état to reinstate the 
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Constitution. After 1908, when the Committee of Union and Progress attained extensive 
authority in the Ottoman Empire, they carried out a reform program with a focus on 
centralisation and secularisation. 
The Young Turk period was particularly significant for the development of 
public opinion in the Ottoman Empire and the flourishing of the press. For the first time, 
party politics, although many times shadowed by political intrigues and the inexperience 
of politicians, entered the political scene. Legitimacy for political action was sought in 
parliamentary procedures, albeit imperfectly.327 The Committee of Union and Progress 
intentionally nurtured a sense of populism among people, which replaced the charisma 
of the Sultan.328 The state was no longer seen as the Sultan’s private domain, but was 
identified with the Ottoman nation, although there was no agreement on what Ottoman 
nation meant. 
Therefore, the promulgation of the 1906 regulation was only one of the reasons 
for the strict observance of foreign archaeologists in this period. The major reason was 
that the Young Turks were more eager to apply Ottoman laws and to prevent the foreign 
acquisition of Ottoman cultural property than their predecessors. From this time 
onwards, ancient objects were recognised as the property not of the Sultan but of the 
Ottoman nation and the “antiquities question had become a highly sensitive matter of 
international as well as domestic Turkish politics.”329 On a side note, the recognition of 
antiquities as the property of the “Ottoman nation” further increased the ambiguity 
behind this term: transferring artefacts from the periphery, for instance from Arab lands 
to Constantinople and keeping them out of European hands was an act of imperialism 
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and anti-imperialism at the same time. Offering ancient monuments to foreign 
governments in the form of gifts, as Abdülhamid had done various times, was 
unthinkable under the Young Turk regime. Even though foreign archaeologists 
continued to make archaeological investigations, the flow of antiquities from the 
Ottoman Empire slowed down. In 1911, the Ministry of the Interior issued a new order 
to preclude foreigners from undertaking unauthorised excavations.330 
Only months before World War I, the Ministry of the Interior repeated its 
statement that unauthorised excavations should not be permitted across the Ottoman 
Empire, those smuggling antiquities should be punished and the objects should be 
confiscated.331 Despite these official statements, with the outbreak of World War I, the 
Ottoman Empire, especially in Mesopotamia and Anatolia, became an open ground for 
the smuggling of antiquities. In the years to follow until the establishment of the 
Republic, Anatolian antiquities flowed to foreign markets in the absence of a 
government authority. In spite of this, the artefacts in the Ottoman Imperial Museum 
were protected as a result of the dedicated efforts of the museum staff.332 After the 
establishment of the Turkish Republic, some of the archaeological material smuggled 
during the war was repatriated as a result of insistent government efforts.333 The Turkish 
archaeological tradition that started in the 19th century laid the groundwork for 
archaeological policies in the Republican years. 
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3.1 Conclusion 
The development of archaeology in the Ottoman Empire was a reflection of various 
domestic and international trends. On the domestic level, the collection of artefacts in 
the capital showed the Ottoman government’s willingness to project its central authority 
over the provinces. In this sense, Ottoman Imperial Museum was the cultural expression 
of centralisation policies that characterised 19th century Ottoman reforms. At the same 
time, by integrating Greco-Roman history into modern Ottoman identity, the Imperial 
Museum served as the visual representation of the Ottomanist idea behind the Tanzimat 
reforms that shaped the education of Osman Hamdi Bey and his generation. In fact, the 
patterns of Ottoman archaeology from the Tanzimat to the Young Turk period gave 
clues about the changes in identity politics in the Ottoman Empire throughout the 19th 
century. 
Nonetheless, the Ottoman Imperial Museum failed to present a coherent 
discourse about the evolution of Ottoman society in a historical perspective. While 
universal survey museums like the British Museum or the Louvre displayed a positivist 
attitude to explain human history – exhibitions progressing from the ancient to the 
modern and geographically from East to West – the Ottoman Museum did not counter 
this argument by putting forward its own version of linear history. In fact, “Ottoman 
museums jumped from one autonomous collection to another, each of which displayed a 
single aspect of the new Ottoman identity but none of which promoted a model of 
cultural progress with its apogee in Ottoman modernity.”334 
On an international level, the development of museum-building in the Ottoman 
Empire was a reaction against increasing foreign archaeological activity, which was 
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seen as an extension of foreign political influence. Ottoman elites, including Osman 
Hamdi Bey, embraced European ideas and practices and in fact, countered what they 
saw as infringement of Ottoman sovereignty by the very methods they adopted from 
their European colleagues. By making Greco-Roman antiquities native, Ottoman elites 
symbolically reiterated their right over the territories claimed by European powers. 
What characterised Ottoman attitude to foreign archaeologists was a mixture of mistrust 
and toleration within the confines of law. Foreign archaeologists were reminded of 
Ottoman sovereign rights through a set of laws and administrative supervision, although 
in practice, these laws were selectively and inconsistently applied. 
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Chapter 4 
At the Intersection of Science and Politics: 
The Establishment of the Russian Archaeological Institute in 
Constantinople 
 
Among imperial powers competing for archaeological glories on Ottoman territories, 
Russia was a very interesting case, both because of the hostile relations between Russia 
and the Ottoman Empire, and because of the scope of Russian archaeological interests. 
Different from other European scholars, Russian archaeologists in the Ottoman Empire 
focused nearly exclusively on Byzantine and Slavic antiquities. This was partly because 
their expertise lay in these fields, and partly because they felt more competitive in these 
areas vis-à-vis their European counterparts. Considering that academic archaeology had 
a longer history in British, French, and German universities than in Russia, it is 
understandable why Russian archaeologists did not see themselves fit for competition 
over classical Greco-Roman archaeology. Besides, there was also an ideological 
justification for Russian interest in Orthodox and Slavic antiquities. Official Russian 
policy projected an image of Russia as the protector of Orthodox and Slavic peoples of 
the Ottoman Empire, which was symbolically reiterated by a scientific interest in the 
archaeological remnants of these civilisations. 
The idea of creating a scientific community in the Ottoman Empire first 
appeared in the early 1870s, during the diplomatic service of Count Nikolai Pavlovich 
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Ignatiev, who supported active Russian involvement in Balkan affairs.335 However, it 
was only in the late 1880s that Russian diplomats finalised their plans for the 
establishment of an archaeological institute and came into contact with Russian scholars 
to discuss possible proposals for the structure and academic orientation of the planned 
institute. 
As for the location of the archaeological institute, Constantinople was not the 
only option on the table. There were also proposals to establish an institute in Athens, 
which could in fact be easier to implement than an institute in Constantinople. The first 
project for an Athens-based Russian institute came up in 1879.336 In the 1880s, Russian 
universities sent students to Athens, but not having a scientific base of their own, they 
worked in association with German and the French institutes. After the establishment of 
RAIK in 1894, the discussions for an institute in Athens continued. In 1900, the Athens 
institute was nearly established upon the initiative of the Russian minister to Athens, M. 
K. Onu. Onu’s project was approved by the Ministry of Public Education and Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, and the government even allocated a certain amount of money for 
the project. The Greek King George I (r. 1863-1913) promised to give Russian scholars 
a plot of land as gift for the projected institute. But after Onu’s death in 1901, the money 
inflow decreased. In addition, RAIK’s director Fyodor Uspenskii was unwilling to open 
a branch of RAIK in Athens. Due to a number of bureaucratic and financial obstacles, 
the project for an Athens institute failed. Another briefly discussed possibility in 1890-
1891 was the establishment of a Byzantine studies branch within the Imperial Orthodox 
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Palestinian Society, but this project was also shelved.337 
The Russian government’s decision to create an archaeological institute in 
Constantinople is better understood bearing in mind the international political 
conjuncture in the late 19th century. Throughout the second half of the 19th century, one 
of the key themes in European diplomacy was the Eastern Question, in other words, 
diplomatic complications aroused by the decline of the Ottoman Empire.338 Among 
other imperial powers, the Russian Empire pursued an active policy to establish political 
and military control over Ottoman territories after the possible collapse of the Sublime 
Porte. For strategic as well as historical reasons, the Russian Empire was particularly 
concerned with the fate of Constantinople, the Straits, and the Balkans. Strengthening 
mutual relations with the Southern Slavs and other Orthodox peoples of the Ottoman 
Empire constituted one of the most important pillars of imperial Russian foreign policy. 
In essence, academic study of Slavic antiquities and Eastern Christianity coincided with 
Russian political interests in the region. 
1895, the year RAIK started to operate in the Ottoman Empire, was a particularly 
interesting turning point in the history of the Eastern Question. The large-scale 
Armenian massacres of 1895-1896 led European diplomats to exert pressure on 
Abdülhamid II to stop the violence.339 British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury considered 
several options to pressure the Sultan, including the occupation of Hejaz and forcing 
Abdülhamid II to abdicate. Austrian Foreign Minister Golucowski suggested a joint 
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European occupation of the Straits. Russia opposed this plan, seeing the possibility of 
international control over the Straits as a threat to its dreams of occupying the 
Bosphorus. Provoked by the possibility of British action, the Russian ambassador in 
Constantinople, Aleksandr Ivanovich Nelidov (1838-1910) suggested Russian 
occupation of the Bosphorus, which Britain and France opposed. France was 
uncomfortable about the possibility of either Russian or British ascendance in the 
Bosphorus. In short, the period immediately after 1895 witnessed heightened 
international competition over the fate of the Straits, and Russia was an active 
participant in this struggle. 
Macedonia was also the scene of heightened political tension at the time RAIK 
was established. The political conflict in Macedonia was partly linked to a religious one 
that went back to the schism in the Orthodox Church that started in the 1870s.340 In 
1870, Sultan Abdülaziz issued a firman authorising the partial autonomy of the 
Bulgarian Exarchate from the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople. According to 
this firman, the Bulgarian Exarchate would have ecclesiastical authority in Danubian 
Bulgaria, and would have the right to extend its authority to districts where at least two-
thirds of the Orthodox Christian population agreed to join it. The latter clause led to a 
“scramble for dioceses”341 in Macedonia between the Greek and Bulgarian churches in 
the coming decades, as rival ethnic claims manifested themselves in religious terms. 
The Russian government found itself in a delicate situation in a conflict between 
its religious brethren – Greeks and Bulgarians. The Greco-Bulgarian conflict sparked the 
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tension between Pan-Orthodoxy and Pan-Slavism in Russia, although these two 
ideologies also shared a common ground for political action and the boundary between 
them was not always clear. While some voices from Russian bureaucratic, ecclesiastical, 
and intellectual circles sympathised with the Bulgarians and regarded the Greeks as 
tools of Western Europe, others embraced a Pan-Orthodox vision according to which 
Russia should lead all Orthodox believers regardless of their ethnicity.342 At least in the 
Exarchate crisis, the Pan-Slavists had the upper hand. Despite mixed messages of the 
Holy Synod and the Russian government who tried to keep a careful distance with both 
Greeks and Bulgarians, the eventual Russian support went to Bulgarians. This crisis was 
an example of the fact that Slavdom and Orthodoxy, two pillars of Russian imperial 
identity, did not always overlap, but sometimes diverged and even came into conflict 
with each other.  
The Macedonian Question arose as a hot issue in European diplomacy especially 
after the San Stefano Treaty of 1878, which was signed at the end of the Russo-Ottoman 
War of 1877-1878. The Great Bulgaria created with San Stefano included most of 
Ottoman Macedonia and stretched from the Black Sea to the Adriatic. San Stefano was 
regarded as a concession to Russia by other European powers, and consequently was 
revised with the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 to restore European balance of power.343 The 
Treaty of Berlin reassigned the Ottoman Empire most of the Macedonian territories it 
lost during the war and approved the establishment of a much smaller autonomous 
Bulgaria. Russian support for Bulgaria at the expense of Serbian interests in Macedonia 
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estranged Serbian government from their Slavic “big brother” in the North, and 
eventually led to a Serbian-Austrian compromise.344 
Nevertheless, Russo-Bulgarian relations were also not free of tension after the 
liberation of the latter. In 1885, autonomous Bulgaria under Prince Alexander I annexed 
Eastern Rumelia despite the protests of European powers. Among other European 
powers, Russia also opposed the unification, partly because any Bulgarian move could 
leave Russia in a difficult situation by destroying the status quo among the European 
powers in the Balkans.345 Another reason was Russia’s uneasy relations with Bulgaria’s 
prince, Alexander I and political elites, who resented Russian interference in Bulgarian 
politics. Russia called an ambassadorial conference for the restoration of the status quo, 
which averted an all-European diplomatic crisis for the time being, but after the 1885 
unification, Bulgarian-Russian relations were seriously strained. 
The Bulgarian unification movement triggered Serbian King Milan, who feared 
that unified Bulgaria would be disproportionately advantaged in the struggle over 
Macedonia, to declare war on Bulgaria. The Serbian-Bulgarian War of 1885 ended in 
Bulgarian victory, and the great powers had to accept Bulgarian union with Eastern 
Rumelia. However, in 1886, Prince Alexander of Bulgaria was ousted from power after 
a coup supported by Russia. Alexander’s rule was followed by Ferdinand I. Ferdinand’s 
first years on the throne were shaped by the policies of the Prime Minister Stefan 
Stamboulov, who was an opponent of Russian interference in Bulgarian politics.346 In 
fact, Stamboulov’s policies echoed the overall resentment among leading Bulgarian 
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nationalists against political plots engineered by Russia. Despite Stamboulov’s 
scepticism against Russia, the newly crowned Prince Ferdinand looked for Russian 
approval to secure his position. In the early 1890s, the difference between Ferdinand and 
Stamboulov widened, and in 1894, the Prince accepted Stamboulov’s resignation. The 
period after 1894 was marked by another Russo-Bulgarian rapprochement. 
In a nutshell, the timing of RAIK was critical for a number of reasons. It was a 
period of intense rivalry between European powers over the fate of the Turkish Straits 
and a period of violent inter-communal conflict between Greeks, Bulgarians, and Serbs 
in Macedonia. In the midst of these international political crises, Russian foreign policy 
rested on avoiding direct confrontation with other European powers while protecting 
Russian interests in the Near East and the Balkans. However, despite its cautious 
attitude, Russian foreign office also attached great importance to forging ties with 
Orthodox and Slavic nations of the Balkans. 
Transnational ethnic solidarity may be fictive and imagined, but the fact that 
many European politicians, diplomats and intellectuals clung to it in late 19th century is 
crucial for understanding international politics before 1914.347 Therefore, any analysis of 
Russia’s Balkan policy at the turn of the century should take into account Pan-Slav and 
Pan-Orthodox sympathies in addition to more tangible factors, such as economic and 
geostrategic interests. In other words, Russian foreign policy in the period between 1894 
and 1914 was driven by a mixture of Realpolitik and identity politics. The establishment 
of RAIK should be examined within this political context. 
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The idea to create a scientific community dedicated to the study of the ancient 
world was born among Russian diplomats against the above-mentioned political 
background. In 1884, a delegation of Byzantinist scholars, participants of the 6th 
Archaeological Congress in Odessa, visited Constantinople to inspect Byzantine 
monuments in the city. Among those visitors were Fyodor Ivanovich Uspenskii, 
Nikodim Pavlovich Kondakov (1844-1925), and Aleksandr Ivanovich Kirpichnikov 
(1845-1903). The communication with these scholars convinced Russian diplomats that 
a scientific society in the Ottoman capital would be useful.348 
The first project for the establishment of a scholarly institution in the Ottoman 
capital was outlined in 1887 by the secretary of the Russian Embassy in Constantinople, 
Pavel Borisovich Mansurov (1828-1910).349 In this proposal, Mansurov pointed to the 
importance of the Balkan Peninsula for Russian foreign policy and argued that current 
political affairs inevitably led Russia to a power struggle with the great powers of 
Europe in the Balkans.350 
Mansurov stated that it was not only great powers that created obstacles for 
stronger Russian influence in the region. Referring to the recent history of Greece, 
Romania, Serbia, and most lately Bulgaria, Mansurov observed that there were voices 
against Russia also within these nations. Therefore, Russia was in a delicate position in 
the Balkans. He noted, “Whoever will be our opponent in future, [whoever is] hostile 
towards us, will find a powerful instrument in the millions of inhabitants of the Balkan 
                                                        
348 Basargina, Russkii Arkheologicheskii Institut v Konstantinopole, pp. 21-22. 
349 Izvestiia Russkogo Arkheologicheskogo Instituta v Konstantinopole (henceforth cited as IRAIK), 
“Otkrytie Russkogo Arkheologicheskogo Instituta v Konstantinopole 26-go Fevralia 1895 goda,” Vol. 1 
(1896), p. 3. 
350 Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv (henceforth cited as RGIA), f. 757, op. 1, d. 1, l. 2-14 
(P. B. Mansurov to the Embassy in Constantinople, 30 March 1887). 
133 
 
Peninsula for their endeavours.”351 He warned that in the absence of effective Russian 
cultural involvement, especially the educated segments of Balkan societies could 
gravitate towards Western culture, and this Western orientation often went hand in hand 
with mistrust towards Russia. Among lower classes of the Balkan societies, Mansurov 
observed that there was still sympathy towards Russia. He argued that this sympathy 
should be strengthened, considering that Russia had a historical mission as the protector 
of Balkan Christians. Among other reasons, the establishment of a Russian scientific 
community in the Ottoman Empire was a necessity to counter the expansion of Western 
European cultural and political influence in a region where the primary role should 
belong to Russia. 
Mansurov had a reason to be concerned about the political allegiances of the 
Balkan Slavs. Although Balkan intellectuals maintained close relations with Russian 
intellectual circles, on the whole, they looked up to Paris, London, Berlin, and Vienna as 
much as St. Petersburg for intellectual stimulation.352 Even among Russian intellectuals 
they mostly followed the radical critics of the Russian government, which paradoxically 
meant that Russian cultural infiltration in the Balkans had mixed results for Russian 
foreign policy. The European orientation of Balkan intellectuals would have significant 
geopolitical implications at the turn of the century. 
Among other fields of arts and sciences, Balkan scholars were exposed to 
European influence in archaeological scholarship, too. As a matter of fact, Russian 
archaeologists were not free of competition in the area of Balkan archaeology. Although 
Byzantine and Slavic history received considerably less attention than classical Greco-
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Roman history in European academia, there were still respectable studies by European 
scholars in these fields. One scholar, Joseph Strzygowski, is worthy of mention at this 
point – both for his ground breaking theories and for the political implications of his 
studies. Born in the Polish borderlands of the Habsburg Empire to a German-speaking 
family, Strzygowski’s political sympathies lay in pan-Germanism, while his academic 
work was characterised by an anti-classicist approach.353 He taught at the University of 
Vienna from 1909 to 1934. Strzygowski particularly made pioneering contributions to 
the study of Byzantine, Islamic, Armenian, and Balkan art and architecture. Overall, he 
rejected the Euro-centric (or rather Mediterranean-centric) approach of most classicists 
and downplayed the cultural continuity between classical Greco-Roman civilisation and 
medieval Europe. Instead, Strzygowski emphasised the influence of Near Eastern and 
North European cultures on late antiquity culture in Europe. This perspective was not 
very different from the paradigm supported by many Russian Byzantinists, who 
emphasised the Slavic influence on Roman – or Byzantine – culture. 
In a sense, Strzygowski’s studies liberated individual national cultures on the 
periphery of the Habsburg Empire by suggesting a course of cultural and artistic 
development independent from the imperial Roman – later Holy Roman and Habsburg – 
influence. Not surprisingly, this approach was welcomed by nationalists on the 
Habsburg periphery. As a result of his good relations with the Serbian King Peter I, in 
1909, Strzygowski was appointed to a jury to decide the design of the mausoleum of 
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Karadjordjevic kings.354 He was also invited by the Serbian Academy of Sciences for 
scientific collaboration. Strzygowski’s reputation in Serbian academia and his popularity 
with the Serbian king meant that Russian archaeologists and diplomats had a reason to 
be concerned about competition with European scholars in the Balkans. Not only in 
terms of intellectual stimulation but also in terms of scholarship many Balkan 
intellectuals turned their faces towards Europe as much as towards Russia. 
Therefore, the concerns of Russian diplomats about the possibility of losing the 
spiritual and intellectual leadership in the Balkans was not far from reality. In his 
proposal about the establishment of a scholarly institute, Mansurov argued that Russia’s 
role in the Balkans should be strengthened not only through military and political 
means, but more importantly, through science, and particularly through a scientific study 
of the history of the Orient. He claimed that even though Orthodoxy was definitely the 
most important spiritual force linking Russia to the Balkan Peninsula, in the late 19th 
century, “it [is] dangerous to neglect science, the impact of which unconsciously sprawls 
to very distant spheres.”355 Mansurov’s project was vaguely defined, and projected the 
study of Turco-Islamic as well as Byzantino-Christian history. When Mansurov’s 
project was realised 10 years later with the establishment of RAIK, the aim of the 
Institute was more clearly and narrowly defined. 
What stood out in Mansurov’s proposal was the emphasis he put on the 
importance of cultural influence, and Russia’s weakness in this respect. While other 
European empires reinforced their military and political capabilities with cultural 
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institutions, Russia, as it appeared in the above proposal, was lagging behind its political 
rivals in the cultural realm. Mansurov feared that Russia’s inadequacy risked leaving the 
arena to other European powers. At the juncture of science and politics, above all other 
possible scientific activities, archaeology was seen as a legitimate tool for extending 
cultural, and eventually political influence. Study of antiquities linked the past with the 
present, gave a solid basis to contemporary political projects, and provided a scientific 
explanation for Russia’s claim to be the protector of Orthodoxy and Slavdom. 
Among other prominent statesmen, the Russian ambassador in Constantinople, 
Aleksandr Ivanovich Nelidov especially promoted the project of creating an 
archaeological institute in Constantinople.356 Politically, Nelidov was in favour of 
expansionist policies towards the Ottoman Empire, which in the end compelled the 
Foreign Service to send him away from Constantinople. M. S. Anderson defined 
Nelidov as “the ambitious and rather unrealistic Russian ambassador,” who suggested 
the seizure of the Bosphorus in 1882, 1892, and 1895, a suggestion that failed in view of 
strong French and British opposition. Nelidov’s ambitious plan was not approved by 
more pragmatic statesmen in the Russian government, who did not want to alienate 
European powers.357 Eventually, Nelidov’s passionate support for the Russian seizure of 
the Bosphorus risked breaking the fragile balance of power between the European 
empires, which accounted for his appointment to Rome in 1897.358 
Nelidov developed the initial proposal put forward by Mansurov. In November 
1887, Nelidov sent letters to Uspenskii, Kirpichnikov, and Kondakov, all Byzantinist 
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professors at the Imperial Novorossiya University, explaining Mansurov’s project and 
asking the scholars to share their opinions on this issue.359 Nelidov’s letters echoed 
Mansurov’s basic premises. The ambassador explained that an idea had arisen in the 
Russian Embassy in Constantinople about the establishment of a scientific institution in 
the Ottoman capital that would study ethnographical, archaeological, theological, and 
artistic materials of the Christian East from a scientific perspective. Nelidov argued that 
such an institute would definitely have political uses. It would prepare suitable ground 
for Russian influence, and help develop self-consciousness among the Orthodox 
population (edinovertsy). Serious and independent study of the history of Orthodox 
peoples, according to Nelidov, would facilitate their cooperation with Russia, and 
consequently would strengthen Russia’s influence in the Balkans and the Near East. In 
the same year, Uspenskii, along with Kondakov and Kirpichnikov, started the 
preparations for the creation of an archaeological community in Constantinople. 
Uspenskii, Kondakov, and Kirpichnikov were not the only scholars who 
submitted a proposal to the Russian Embassy. Russian diplomats were also attracted to 
another proposal submitted by the Eastern Commission of the Imperial Moscow 
Archaeological Society. The proposal of the Imperial Moscow Archaeological Society 
abounded with messages that called for Russia’s special mission in the Balkans.360 The 
scholars from the Moscow Archaeological Society emphasised that there were 
intangible ties connecting Russia to Ottoman Christians, who viewed Russia as their 
protector. The history of the Balkan Slavs could be considered part of their own national 
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history for Russians. Similarly, Moscow’s status as the third Rome gave Russian 
scholars the responsibility to learn the history of Orthodox Christianity, which was the 
basis of Russian culture. The Moscow Society considered Russia so closely connected 
to Byzantine history that they claimed, “[M]onuments from the glorious past of the 
Byzantine Empire, in many ways, speak about us more eloquently than our own 
monuments.”361 Therefore, the establishment of a scholarly institution to study 
Byzantine antiquities, not in Russia but in the very heart of the Byzantine Empire, would 
“strongly influence the spiritual and political life of Eastern Christians.”362 The proposal 
acknowledged that European scholarship was ahead of Russia in terms of knowledge of 
the Orient, which gave European nations greater leverage to have a cultural impact on 
Eastern peoples. The proposal of the Moscow Archaeological Society called for the 
establishment of an institute for the study of Slavic, Hellenistic-Byzantine, and Islamic 
antiquities. This proposal was considered impractical because of the range of expertise 
and the institutional complexity it required. However, the Moscow Archaeological 
Society and its chairman Countess Praskovya Sergeevna Uvarova (1840-1924) actively 
supported the creation of RAIK in later years, and her effort was praised by Nelidov.363 
Uspenskii, Kondakov, and Kirpichnikov’s proposal was oriented specifically 
towards Byzantine studies. Uspenskii’s expertise in medieval Balkan, Slavic, and 
Byzantine history shaped the academic framework of the projected institute in 
Constantinople. In their proposal, the Odessa professors emphasised Russia’s 
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educational mission among the Orthodox and Slavic population of the Ottoman Empire 
(“edinoplemennye i edinovernye naselenii”).364 In fact, before the RAIK project 
appeared as a possibility, Uspenskii was in constant communication with the Governor-
General of Novorossiya, K. K. Roop, for the establishment of a Byzantine Society in 
Odessa, within the Imperial Novorossiya University. Roop even contacted Count 
Delianov, the Minister of Public Education, to request support for the Byzantine 
Society. However, when RAIK appeared as a serious option, Delianov responded that it 
would be impossible to get approval from the Ministry of Finance for two institutes with 
similar missions.365 In the end, the proposed Byzantine Society in Odessa was shelved 
on behalf of RAIK. 
In a letter he wrote to the Governor-General of Novorossiya in June 1888, 
Uspenskii underlined the necessity of Byzantine studies for Russia, and explained the 
reasons for his desire to create a scientific Byzantine Society and a special journal 
dedicated to Byzantine studies.366 Uspenskii pointed out that the influence of the 
Byzantine Empire on the formation of the Russian state and church structure was 
indisputable. In addition, he argued that not only history but also contemporary political 
and moral obligations tied Russia to the Christian East. Uspenskii stated that Russian 
national interests, and therefore the fate of Russian historical scholarship lay in the study 
of the Byzantine Empire and Orthodox Christianity. Uspenskii argued that religious 
principles strongly promoted Russian influence among Ottoman Christians. This role 
ascribed an important responsibility to Russia to learn the history of the Byzantine 
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Empire and Orthodoxy, because without knowing their past it was impossible to restore 
ties with Russia’s Slavic and Orthodox brethren in the Ottoman Empire. 
According to the project laid down by Kondakov, Uspenskii, and Kirpichnikov, 
the mission of the institute was described as follows:367 
1) Organisation and direction of Russian scholars in the region, who would 
conduct research about the ancient history of Greece, the Byzantine Empire, and the 
Near East. These scholars would be responsible to the director of the institute and would 
submit reports of their studies. The plan also included accommodating interns who 
studied at the theological seminaries in Russia. 
2) Study of monuments, geography, topography, laws, mode of life (byt’), 
epigraphy, and art in the region that corresponded to the former realm of the Byzantine 
Empire. 
3) Organisation of scientific expeditions and excavations upon the agreement of 
the Russian ambassador with Turkish and Greek authorities. 
Uspenskii’s support for the Archaeological Institute in Constantinople implied 
that he anticipated a “war of cultures” between the great powers of Europe in the Near 
East. Therefore, he considered other European powers as rivals of the Russian Empire in 
this cultural competition. In his memoirs, Uspenskii argued that future wars over the 
Near East would be fought through creating spheres of cultural influence.368 He stated 
that in Western Europe, university chairs dedicated to the study of Byzantine history had 
been established long ago and they were ahead of Russia in terms of academic study of 
Byzantine history. This situation necessitated more effort on the part of Russia to catch 
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up with the rest of Europe. Uspenskii argued that Greek and South Slav academia could 
not afford to study Byzantine question extensively as a result of their meagre means, 
therefore the responsibility to explore Byzantine history fell on Russia’s shoulders. For 
all these reasons, Uspenskii underlined the need for a specialised scientific society 
dedicated to the study of Byzantine art and history. He emphasised that this task should 
be assumed by Russian scholars not only because Russia had strong historical and 
geographical links to the Byzantine Empire, but also because through their knowledge 
of Slavic history, Russian scholars could complete the missing links in the history of 
Eastern Rome, links that could not be sufficiently understood by Western European 
scholars. 
Uspenskii later pointed out that despite the diplomatic and governmental support 
he received, some academics and bureaucrats had doubts about the projected Byzantine 
Institute. He referred to his correspondence with the important Byzantinist scholar V. G. 
Vasilevskii, who was sceptical about the creation of a specialised Byzantine Institute, at 
a time when there were already a number of archaeological institutions and societies in 
Russia.369 The Ober-Procurator of the Holy Synod, Konstantin Petrovich Pobedonostsev 
(1827-1907) was another influential figure who expressed negative opinions on the 
matter. Pobedonostsev had doubts about Russian scientific capacity, arguing that Russia 
did not have enough academic strength to afford an overseas institute, neither was 
Constantinople an appropriate location for such a project.370 Pobedonostsev argued that 
Constantinople did not have libraries or universities to facilitate scholarly activities, and 
Russian scholars would be academically isolated in this city. 
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In November 1888, ambassador Nelidov sent a letter to the Minister of Public 
Education, Count Ivan Davydovich Delianov (1818-1898), in which he advocated the 
establishment of a scientific institution in the Ottoman capital.371 Nelidov argued that 
Byzantine history was a very important, if not the most important, source of Russian 
national consciousness (grazhdanstvennost’), therefore, it was necessary for Russian 
scholars to familiarise themselves with the Byzantine civilisation and deepen their 
knowledge of Byzantine history and culture. A scholarly institute in Constantinople 
would channel individual scholarly activities through an institutional structure. In recent 
years, increasing numbers of Russian scholars were visiting the Ottoman Empire for 
research. However, without coordination, these individual scientific enterprises did not 
produce fruitful results, particularly due to the lack of scientific facilities, libraries and 
scholarly societies in Constantinople. This insufficiency caused loss of time and money 
for researchers. A scholarly institution in Constantinople to coordinate Russian scholarly 
activities in the region would make a significant contribution to Russian historical 
scholarship. 
Nelidov added that the establishment of a “Russian scholarly institution in 
Constantinople would be a bridge between us and significant parts of the local 
community and would strengthen the feeling of respect and trust of the local community 
towards Russia.”372 One common theme in Nelidov’s, Mansurov’s, and Uspenskii’s 
letters was the emphasis on the role of science and scholarship as a way to gain respect 
among the Orthodox Christian Ottoman population. Comparing their international 
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standing with other European empires, Russian diplomats recognised the importance of 
“soft power,” as well as military power, and science was seen as a powerful instrument 
of the former. However, with its autocratic political system and the state’s conflict with 
much of the intelligentsia, it was difficult for Russia to represent a positive example for 
the Balkan nations. As it will be seen in more detail in the next chapter, the attempts of 
Russian diplomats to create a basis for solidarity through an archaeological study of 
Orthodox and Slavic civilisations did not produce the expected outcomes. 
In addition to the Ministry of Public Education, Nelidov also forwarded the 
project prepared by Kondakov, Kirpichnikov, and Uspenskii to the Holy Synod in 
December 1888 and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February 1889.373 Despite 
Pobedonostsev’s earlier reservations, it seems that he was persuaded about the 
usefulness of the project, probably because his advisor in Eastern affairs, Ivan E. 
Troitskii, was a supporter of the project.374 Both the Holy Synod and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs expressed their sympathy for the proposed institution. In the same year, 
a commission, made up of professors from the Imperial St. Petersburg University upon 
the recommendation of the Ministry of Education, was organised to discuss the details 
regarding the institute. The commission concluded that an annual allotment of 12.000 
roubles was necessary to maintain the institute. However, despite their approval of the 
project, it took a few years to convince the Ministry of Finance about the allocation of 
resources for an overseas institute. In a letter from 4 July 1889, Uspenskii wrote to 
Nelidov that the Ministry of Finance refused to allocate the 12.000 roubles that was 
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requested for the project, and asked the Embassy to make a renewed application on 
behalf of RAIK.375 
RAIK was designed as a centre for the historical and archaeological study of the 
Christian East, in particular for the study of Byzantine monuments. The project was also 
seen as a way of strengthening Russia’s influence over Christian peoples of the Ottoman 
Empire. This political message was explicitly stated nearly in every memorandum and 
official letter that was penned in the process of RAIK’s establishment. A very clear 
correlation between successful scientific achievements and political influence permeated 
the discourse of Russian diplomats, bureaucrats, and scholars that supported the project. 
The idea particularly received support from the Holy Synod and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, but the 12,000 roubles requested for its realisation created perplexity on the part 
of the Ministry of Finance.376 
From 1889 up to the official approval of the Institute by Emperor Alexander III 
in 1894, there was a constant exchange of letters between Uspenskii, the Embassy in 
Constantinople, the Ministry of Public Education, and the Ministry of Finance; the first 
three trying to convince the latter. In December 1890, Delianov wrote to Nelidov that he 
personally communicated with the Minister of Finance, Ivan Alekseevich 
Vyshnegradskii (1832-1895), about the annual allocation of 12.000 roubles from the 
State Treasury starting from 1891. Minister Vyshnegradskii responded that although he 
sympathised with the establishment of a scholarly institute in Constantinople, 
considering the current high government spending and budget deficit, it would not be 
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possible to allocate the requested amount from the State Treasury in the coming year.377 
Vyshnegradskii repeated his cautious support in his letter to ambassador Nelidov in 
January 1891: he noted that he found a scholarly institute in Constantinople useful, 
especially because this institute would be the centre of scholarly research in the East, as 
well serving as a political centre. Nevertheless, he explained the difficulty of securing 
sufficient funds for such a project considering financial difficulties. Rather than totally 
rejecting the proposal, Vyshnegradskii offered a middle way: he suggested that in the 
coming year, the project proposed by professors Kondakov, Kirpichnikov, and 
Uspenskii could be discussed in detail and the Ministry of Public Education could bring 
the subject to the State Council next year.378 Apparently, the early 1890s was not an 
appropriate time to be asking for financial support for a costy archaeological institute, 
given that the famine on the Volga basin seriously restrained financial capabilities of the 
Russian Empire.379 
Between 1891 and 1894, the draft charter of the project was reviewed by a 
number of government bodies. Count Delianov submitted the draft to the director of the 
Imperial Public Library and Imperial Moscow Archaeological Society for suggestions. 
In March 1892, Delianov introduced the project to the State Council, and once again the 
project was turned down due to financial constraints. The State Council decided to 
postpone the project until favourable economic conditions, and suggested sending the 
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draft charter to the Imperial Academy of Sciences in the meantime for examination.380 
In 1892, the Imperial Academy of Sciences established a commission to examine the 
project, which eventually expressed support for the creation of a scholarly institute in 
Constantinople. 
Finally, in 1893, the Ministry of Public Education managed to get verbal 
approval from the Ministry of Finance and secured the necessary funds for the institute. 
It seems that the political views of Tertii Ivanovich Filippov (1826-1899), the director of 
the State Comptroller’s Office, played a role in this approval. Filippov regarded RAIK 
as a political instrument that would provide a scientific basis for Russian claims to 
assume leadership in the Orthodox world.381 After learning about the institute project, 
Filippov wrote to Nelidov: 
Union with the Byzantine Empire determined our highest mission in the world. 
With this union, we are a people chosen by God, entrusted with the protection of 
the true church… Having such a perspective on the importance of Byzantium for 
us and professing it publicly for decades, can I ever be indifferent to the project 
you proposed?382 
 
In the coming decades, Filippov’s support for RAIK proved invaluable, because 
in addition to securing financial support for the institute, Filippov also put his contacts 
within the Greek Patriarchate at the disposal of Russian archaeologists, thus opening the 
gates of the libraries and archives of Mount Athos to Russian scholars.383 
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In 25 October 1893, the Ministry of Public Education again presented its 
proposal about the institute to the State Council. In this report, Minister Delianov stated 
the importance of Byzantine civilisation for the development of Russian culture and its 
consequent significance for Russian historical scholarship. This historical links with the 
Byzantine Empire made a scholarly institution in Constantinople desirable. Delianov 
stated that he agreed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that a scholarly institution in 
the Ottoman Empire would strengthen Russia’s ties with the local population and 
contribute to Russia’s influence over Orthodox Christians, especially in the Balkans.384 
Delianov also outlined the agreement he reached with the new Minister of Finance, 
Sergei Witte (1849-1915) on the financial question. The two ministers agreed for the 
allocation of 6.000 roubles from the 1894 budget, and 12.000 roubles starting from 
1895. Therefore, the institute would start to function not in January, but in July 1894. 
Furthermore, Delianov added that the institute should have an imperial status and should 
be directly attached to the court.385 This last proposal meant that Delianov wanted RAIK 
to come under the Ministry of the Imperial Court, which could be secured only with the 
approval of Alexander III. 
On 4 December 1893, the State Council discussed Delianov’s proposal and 
consulted ministries and government bodies to hear their opinions on the issue. On 
behalf of the Ministry of the Imperial Court, Count Aleksey Aleksandrovich Bobrinskii 
(1852-1927), a member of the Imperial Archaeological Commission, expressed negative 
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opinions about the creation of an archaeological institute in Constantinople. First of all, 
he drew attention to the fact that the project bypassed the Imperial Archaeological 
Commission, which was the foremost archaeological institution in Russia at the time. 
Bobrinskii gave the example of the Russian archaeological commission in Rome, which 
ended up being a short-lived experience. Considering the amount of financial resources 
the institute in Constantinople required, Bobrinskii argued that if the government had 
necessary funds, they better should allocate it to the Imperial Archaeological 
Commission for its work on Byzantine antiquities. Instead of a separate institute in 
Constantinople, Bobrinskii proposed the strengthening of a Byzantinist Institute in 
southern Russia.386 Bobrinskii’s ideas reflected his correspondence with the Minister of 
the Imperial Court, Illarion Ivanovich Vorontsov-Dashkov (1837-1916), who also 
argued that the planned institute in Constantinople would be unproductive and costly. 
Vorontsov-Dashkov argued that it was unlikely that RAIK would achieve fruitful 
results in Constantinople, especially if it would be established in the proposed form.387 
He argued that the aims and duties of the institute, as well as the responsibilities of its 
director and secretaries were so extensively defined that they would be impossible to 
realise. Vorontsov-Dashkov instead suggested the organisation of the institute into 
several specialised departments that would more effectively direct scholars in different 
fields. He warned that without a sufficient number of experts and material resources, the 
institution would fall short of becoming a “bridge between us [Russia] and a significant 
part of the local population,” and could not rightfully carry the flag of Russian science 
abroad. All in all, instead of establishing a separate institute in Constantinople, 
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Vorontsov-Dashkov suggested the allocation of the government funds to the Imperial 
Academy of Sciences or one of the existing societies – like the Odessa Society of 
History and Antiquities. 
In a report submitted to the State Council in February 1894, the Ministry of 
Public Education responded to criticisms and elucidated the reasons for their insistent 
support for a separate institution in Constantinople. Overall, the concerns boiled down to 
three major themes. From a practical point of view, the variety and extent of the 
institute’s duties were difficult to fulfil considering the insufficiency of its staff and 
annual budget. From a political perspective, if the mentioned institute proved a failure 
because of lack of support on the part of the Russian government, it would bring loss of 
prestige, an undesirable outcome. There were also concerns about whether 
Constantinople was a proper location – critics pointed to lack of scientific institutions, 
little local sympathy for scholars, and particularly negative attitudes towards Russians in 
the Ottoman capital.388 Consequently, there were suggestions to opt for an institute in 
Athens, where there were already scientific institutions and archaeological societies, and 
where the Queen was a Russian Grand Duchess. Besides, Russians would be more 
welcome in the Greek capital.389 Another option was opening a Byzantine studies 
branch under one of the existing societies in Russia and allocating the funds in this 
direction instead of a separate institution. 
In response to such criticisms, ambassador Nelidov explained that the idea to 
create a scholarly institution in Constantinople was born out of practical necessity: every 
year, increasing numbers of Russian scholars visited the Ottoman Empire for research, 
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but without coordination and unaware of each other’s studies, they sometimes worked 
on the same subject in vain. Being unfamiliar with local conditions, these scholars asked 
for support from the Embassy, although the Embassy was not capable of providing 
scientific guidance. This situation required an institution that would serve as a hub for 
Russian scholars. The task of the institute would be the coordination and guidance of 
Russian scholars visiting the East, rather than large-scale archaeological research, 
meaning that the institute could survive on the allocated amount of funds. In short, there 
were already Russian scholars interested in Byzantine antiquities, but they needed 
subsidies and on-site guidance. With regard to questions about the suitability of 
Constantinople, Nelidov argued that if the interests of Russian scientists lay in classical 
antiquities, then the establishment of an institute in Athens could be discussed as an 
option. However, considering that Russian scholars were more interested in Byzantine 
history, Constantinople would be an appropriate choice. He further argued that the 
institute might find more local support than it was assumed in the Ottoman Empire.390 
Finally, on 24 February 1894, the State Council formally approved the 
establishment of RAIK with a unanimous decision.391 The final resolution of the 
Council concluded that a separate scientific institution in Constantinople would be 
preferable. Administratively, the institute would be under the Ministry of Public 
Education and the Russian Embassy in Constantinople at the same time. To enhance its 
scientific activities, it should be in constant communication with universities, academies 
and other institutions in Russia. Finding Nelidov’s arguments satisfactory, the State 
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Council deemed that the approval of the Imperial Academy of Sciences was convincing 
enough to support the project. The resolution explained that there was no need to be 
concerned about finances: the Russian government would not cease to support RAIK in 
future years. According to the agreement reached between Delianov and Witte, 6000 
roubles would be allocated to the institute starting from July 1894, and 12,000 roubles 
would be allocated for coming years. However, responding to Delianov’s request to give 
an imperial status to the institute and placing it under the direct patronage of the 
Emperor, the State Council was reluctant; stating that only after the institute proved 
itself could this question be considered again. 
It seems that Uspenskii wanted to postpone the establishment of the institute 
until the necessary funds were secured, or at least until a sufficient amount was secured 
to create a good library. He was also informed by Nelidov that an earthquake in 
Constantinople in July 1894 made most houses uninhabitable and it was difficult to find 
accommodation.392 However, Delianov wanted to accelerate the process, and wanted the 
institute to be established no later than 1 July 1894.393 
Final revisions to the RAIK charter were made by the director of the Imperial 
Public Library, the Imperial Moscow Archaeological Society, the Imperial Academy of 
Sciences, and ambassador Nelidov. It seems that Uspenskii and Nelidov were not in 
agreement about the authority of the ambassador over the institute. While Uspenskii 
expected more autonomy from the Embassy, Nelidov seemed to prefer keeping the 
institute under his command. In a letter written by the Embassy secretary Mansurov to 
Uspenskii in 1893, Mansurov explained that Nelidov was offended at Uspenskii’s draft 
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charter because the changes Nelidov deemed necessary to place the institute more 
closely within the administrative structure of the Embassy were left out.394 Nelidov 
envisaged the institute as a headquarters affiliated with the Embassy that would provide 
assistance and guidance to Russian scholars visiting the East. When the State Council 
finally approved the establishment of the institute, Nelidov’s role was authorised as he 
demanded. The State Council emphasised the ambassador’s role in appointing the 
director, as well as honorary members and fellow researchers of the institute. 
When the charter of the institute was officially confirmed, the objectives were 
defined in a way to embrace the history of ancient Greece, Asia Minor, and the 
territories that had been under Byzantine rule. The charter did not openly refer to the 
history of the Balkan Peninsula and its Slavic inhabitants, so as not to create suspicions 
on the part of Ottoman authorities as well as European powers that Russia was trying to 
expand its sphere of influence among South Slavs under the pretext of archaeological 
activities. Russian scholars were concerned about persuading both Turks and Europeans 
in Turkey that RAIK was nothing more than a pure scientific enterprise, because there 
were suspicions that RAIK was in fact a political club posing as a scientific 
institution.395 Uspenskii recalled that in the first years when RAIK was established, 
Russian scholars had to “dispel the opinion that originally formed among foreigners that 
Russia had other than scholarly intentions in establishing what would be in fact a 
political Slavic club under the name of the Institute.”396 However, Uspenskii noted that 
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in time RAIK acquired a respectable position among similar institutions in the West, 
thanks to its archaeological discoveries, publications, and the quality of its scholarship. 
The charter set out the following points:397 
1) The Russian Archaeological Institute at the Imperial Embassy in 
Constantinople (its full name – Russkii Arkheologicheskii Institut pri Imperatorskom 
Posol’stve v Konstantinopole) aimed to guide the on-site scientific activities of Russian 
scholars working on the history of ancient Greece, Asia Minor, and the territories that 
once constituted the Byzantine Empire, with a particular emphasis on the history of 
Christian antiquities. Consequently, the institute intended to promote the development of 
Russian archaeology by studying architectural and literary artefacts in the mentioned 
territories. Universities, academies, and institutes in Russia could send their staff to 
RAIK for on-site research. The director and secretaries of the institute would provide 
academic guidance to visiting scholars as regards their area of study. Visiting scholars 
could also conduct research together with the permanent RAIK staff. 
2) The scientific duties of the institute included; in line with the first article, the 
study of monumental art and antiquities, ancient geography and topography, 
manuscripts, numismatics, epigraphs, languages, and oral literature of the countries and 
peoples that constituted the Byzantine Empire (contemporary Greek Kingdom and the 
Ottoman Empire). In this article, the Balkans, particularly Bulgaria was intentionally 
excluded from the areas of interest to avoid suspicions on the part of the Ottomans. In 
practice, as will be seen in the next chapter, the autonomous Bulgarian Principality was 
one of the most frequent destinations of the RAIK staff. 
3) The institute would undertake archaeological excavations and organise 
                                                        
397 PFA RAN, f. 127, op. 1, d. 1, l. 272-275 (Charter of RAIK, 1894). 
154 
 
expeditions in line with special agreements concluded between Russian diplomatic posts 
in Constantinople and Athens and the Turkish and Greek governments. 
4) The institute would publish meeting protocols and annual reports about its 
activities. The report would be submitted to the Ministry of Public Education, and a 
copy would be sent to the Imperial Academy of Sciences to be published at the 
discretion of the Academy. 
5) The institute was administratively and academically under the direct control of 
the Ministry of Public Education. At the same time, because it operated outside Russia, 
it was dependent on the Russian ambassador in Constantinople and was under his 
immediate protection. The ambassador also acted in the capacity of honorary chairman 
of the institute. 
6) The institute staff included; a director, secretary (the number of secretaries 
depended on the need and increased in time), and members. 
7) The director was entrusted with the administrative, academic, and economic 
management of the institute. He was selected among candidates with a doctoral degree 
from Russian universities, and with a scholarly reputation in the field in which the 
institute operates. 
8) The director was appointed and dismissed by the Minister of Public 
Education, who made the decision upon consulting the Honorary Chairman (the 
ambassador to Constantinople) and the President of the Academy of Sciences. 
9) The responsibilities of the director included: 
a) Guiding institute members as regards their scientific projects. 
b) Promoting and supporting visiting scholars from Russian universities, 
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academies, and institutes, collaborating with them in archaeological projects. 
c) Organizing archaeological excavations and excursions. 
d) Providing guidance to members to familiarise them with ancient monuments 
in the locality. 
e) Preparing an annual report about the activities of the institute. 
f) Collecting information about discoveries and scholarly activities with regard 
to regions that fall within the scope of the institute’s interest. 
g) Establishing contacts with consular services, institutions, and individuals 
whose assistance would be useful to the institute. 
10) The scientific secretary was the immediate assistant to the director in his 
responsibilities and acted in accordance with his instructions. He was also responsible 
for the maintenance of the collection and the library, as well as for office duties. 
11) The scientific secretary was selected among candidates, who completed a 
degree relevant to the institute’s scholarly interests. He was appointed by the Minister of 
Public Education upon the proposal of the director. 
12) In the absence of the director, the scientific secretary would act on his behalf. 
13) Members of the institute were appointed by the Minister of Public Education 
upon consulting the Honorary Chairman of the institute. The members would be drawn 
from the following groups: 
a) Members of scholarly societies in Russia, 
b) Officials at the Russian Embassy in Constantinople and Russian diplomatic 
mission in Athens. 
In addition, members included the following groups of scholars who visited 
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Constantinople: 
c) Recent graduates of the Historical-Philological, Law, and Oriental Studies 
Faculties, who were commissioned by the Ministry of Public Education upon the 
recommendation by their home university. 
d) Recent graduates of the Imperial Academy of Arts who were commissioned 
by the Academy. 
14) All persons referred to in the above articles were required, upon arrival at 
Constantinople, to present the research instructions provided by their home 
organisations to the director of RAIK. They also had to submit progress reports to the 
director about their studies. 
15) For visiting scholars sent by academic institutions in Russia to RAIK, the 
period of their stay in Constantinople or other towns was determined in the instructions 
provided by their home institution. 
16) Throughout their stay at RAIK, candidates from theological academies were 
responsible to the Holy Synod. During their studies at the institute they were guided by 
special programmes, provided by the academy of which they were members. 
17) When the tenure of visiting scholars expired, they should send reports to 
their home institutions in Russia about the state of their research. 
18) Members could make use of the RAIK library and antiquities collection and 
upon the approval of the director, could take part in scientific activities and publish their 
works in the institute publications. When they travelled in the East, they would receive 
recommendation letters from the Russian ambassadors in Constantinople and in Athens. 
19) During their study at RAIK, expenses of the members were not covered by 
157 
 
the institute. However, if the members participated in the archaeological expeditions 
undertaken by RAIK, the director could assign them an appropriate allowance from the 
expedition budget. 
20) In addition to members explained above, RAIK also had honorary members 
(pochetnye chleny) and associate members (chleny sotrudnikov), who were proposed by 
the director and approved by the Minister of Public Education in consultation with the 
ambassador to the Porte. Honorary members and associate members would be selected 
among foreigners who were specialists in relevant subjects. 
21) The director could summon non-members as well as members to meetings 
about expeditions, excavations, and other scientific matters. 
22) RAIK would hold open lectures and seminars. Foreigners could participate 
when the lectures and seminars were held in foreign languages. 
23) RAIK would have a library and an antiquities collection. 
24) RAIK would have a seal with the national emblem and with its full name 
below. 
25) The funds allocated for the institute came from: a) the amount allocated from 
the State Treasury b) other sources. 
The director and secretaries of the institute would not retain their former 
positions at Russian universities, but the charter stipulated that they could enjoy the 
same benefits and privileges as professors at Russian universities. The 12.000 rouble 
allowance was distributed as follows: 4000 roubles and 2000 roubles respectively for the 
salaries of the director and the secretary (or secretaries); 2500 roubles for the rent, 100 
roubles for the maintenance of the library and the museum, 1000 roubles for scientific 
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excursions and excavations, and 500 roubles for other expenses. On 23 May 1894, Tsar 
Alexander III approved the charter of RAIK,398 and on 11 July 1894, the Tsar appointed 
Uspenskii as RAIK’s director, upon Delianov’s proposal.399 The first scientific secretary 
of RAIK was P. D. Pogodin, suggested by Minister Delianov and approved by 
Uspenskii.400 
According to the charter, archaeological expeditions of RAIK were funded by 
the government, but the charter left the door open for contributions by private donors. In 
addition, the Ministry of Public Education and the Holy Synod sent scholars from 
Russian universities and theological academies to undertake research at RAIK and 
subsidised them. In the charter, the object of RAIK was defined as coordinating and 
accommodating Russian scholars conducting historical and archaeological research in 
Greece, Asia Minor, and the territories that fell under Byzantine rule. Despite this broad 
description, RAIK mainly specialised in Byzantine archaeology and the history of the 
Orthodox Church, to the extent that the activities of the institute may well be described 
as church archaeology. Although it was not specified in the charter, the second major 
theme that appeared frequently in the studies of RAIK was the history and archaeology 
of the South Slavs – either Bulgarian or Serbian – and their relations with the Byzantine 
Empire. 
A clarification as regards the geographical scope of RAIK’s activities should be 
made at this point. Certainly, within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire, RAIK was 
supposed to receive excavation and expedition permits from relevant Ottoman 
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governmental institutions. In the independent Serbian Kingdom, Russian archaeologists 
asked for permission from Serbian authorities. The situation in Bulgaria was a little 
complicated. After the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-1878, the Principality of Bulgaria 
became autonomous from the Ottoman Empire. In 1885, the Principality annexed 
Eastern Rumelia. Although the Principality – including Eastern Rumelia after the 
annexation – was theoretically under Ottoman suzerainty until 1908, it had its own 
constitution and even independent foreign policy. Therefore, within the borders of the 
autonomous Bulgarian Principality, Russian archaeologists asked for permission from 
Bulgarian, not Ottoman, authorities. The rest of Macedonia, which remained part of the 
Ottoman Empire until the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, was under full Ottoman 
sovereignty. Consequently, archaeological studies in Macedonia were subject to 
Ottoman approval. 
Fyodor Uspenskii happened to be the first and the last director of RAIK. In order 
to facilitate their communication with Ottoman authorities, both the Ministry of Public 
Education and the State Council found it practical to place the institute under the 
protectorate of the Russian Embassy in Constantinople. Administratively, the 
ambassador was also the chairman of RAIK. In the course of nearly twenty years of its 
existence, there were five different Russian ambassadors to the Ottoman Empire, the 
most active supporter of RAIK being Nelidov, who served in the Ottoman capital 
between 1894 and 1897. 
There was definitely a certain degree of religious and nationalist sensitivity 
behind the establishment of a Russian archaeological institute in the Ottoman Empire. 
Both Russian diplomats who proposed the project and bureaucrats at the Ministry of 
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Public Education and other government bodies legitimised RAIK through historical 
references about Russia’s – real or imaginary – links with the Byzantine Empire. In this 
discourse, Russia emerged as the spiritual heir to the Byzantine heritage. A multi-
faceted and systematic study of Byzantine history was regarded as a step for the 
development of Russian national consciousness, and a useful tool for furthering 
contemporary political interests of the Russian Empire. The establishment of RAIK was 
also an assertion of Russian primacy when it came to claiming the Byzantine 
inheritance. 
After its authorisation by the Tsar in 1894, RAIK’s office in Constantinople was 
officially opened with a religious ceremony on 26 February 1885, with the participation 
and prayers of Archimandrite Boris.401 26 February was also the birthday of the late 
Tsar Alexander III, who passed away in the autumn of 1894, shortly after approving the 
establishment of RAIK. The opening ceremony intentionally coincided with his 
birthday. In the opening ceremony, both ambassador Nelidov and director Uspenskii 
delivered speeches emphasizing Russia’s political role in the Near East and the 
importance of learning history to develop a solid foreign policy in the region.402 Nelidov 
indicated that studying the history of the Byzantine Empire was the chief responsibility 
of Russian historical scholarship.403 He argued that the foreign policy of a great nation 
should be guided by moral and spiritual principles, and Russia could find these 
principles in the study of the Byzantine Empire. 
                                                        
401 IRAIK, “Otkrytye Russkogo Arkheologicheskogo Instituta v Konstantinopole 26-go Fevralia 1895 
goda,” Vol. 1 (1896), p. 1. 
402 PFA RAN, f. 127, op. 1, d. 1, l. 14 (P. B. Mansurov to Uspenskii, 20 September 1893). 
403 IRAIK, “Otkrytye Russkogo Arkheologicheskogo Instituta v Konstantinopole 26-go Fevralia 1895 
goda,” Vol. 1 (1896), pp. 5-6. 
161 
 
After Nelidov, Uspenskii took on the stage to explain the cultural and political 
significance of the establishment of RAIK. In his talk, the director stated that the second 
half of the 19th century was significant for the Russian nation for various historical 
reasons: the 1000th anniversary of the establishment of the Russian state was celebrated 
in 1862, and the 900th anniversary of the Christianisation of Rus’ was celebrated in 
1888. Such historical incidents tied Russia closely to the Christian Near East, the former 
realm of the Byzantine Empire, historically, culturally, and politically.404 Therefore, 
Uspenskii pointed to a correlation between Russia’s contemporary political interests in 
Asia Minor and the Balkans and its historical ties with the region. 
Both Nelidov and Uspenskii legitimised the establishment of RAIK by making 
reference to European political rivalry over the Near East, which reflected itself in 
archaeology. Years later, in a report he wrote in 1918 to the Department of Science in 
the People’s Commissariat for Education, Uspenskii outlined the founding principles of 
RAIK with reference to Europe-wide political competition. He stated that 
Constantinople stood at the centre of international competition, which made the Russian 
position in this city all the more important. He lamented that if the Russians were not 
respected in the East as much as the French, it was because Russia did not try to 
penetrate Turkey through cultural institutions, i.e. schools, religious missions, charitable 
organisations, commercial and industrial initiatives, in the same manner as the French, 
British and Germans operated. Uspenskii noted, “[I]n general, the weakest side of our 
situation is the insufficiency of our cultural initiatives in Tsargrad, in which we are far 
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behind our competitors.”405 Only one institution, he claimed, RAIK was an exception to 
this shortcoming. However, Uspenskii noted, even in this unique institution, which 
acquired a respectable reputation among German and French scholars, Russia could not 
fully make use of its position because of financial difficulties. 
Even though financially and politically it was expedient to have the support of 
the Russian Embassy, director Fyodor Uspenskii was by no means willing to surrender 
his professional autonomy to his political superiors in the diplomatic service. Uspenskii 
noted that until 1897 the Ottoman government did not recognise RAIK as a separate 
institution. Until then, there was not a special agreement with the Turkish government, 
stipulating RAIK as an institution independent of the Russian Embassy and having the 
right to communicate with the Turkish government separately. In the first years the 
Ottoman government referred to RAIK staff as Embassy officials, and the institute was 
regarded as an inherent part of the Russian Embassy. Even after its authorisation by the 
Ottoman government, RAIK had to communicate with the Turkish government through 
the Embassy every time they needed a permit to carry out excavations or other scholarly 
activities. Uspenskii seemed to be uncomfortable about his dependence on diplomats. 
He stated, “… our scientific institution had to endure the burden of depending on 
coincidental circumstances and other people’s failures or reluctance.” The dependence 
on the Embassy meant that RAIK would be vulnerable to political relations between the 
two empires. Especially when they launched large-scale projects, RAIK would be sent 
from one Ottoman Ministry to another, and the future of its studies would remain 
insecure. Uspenskii considered diplomatic interference offensive: “[E]liminating direct, 
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sometimes humiliating … interference in purely scientific work, legalizing our 
institution in Turkey by a special agreement with the Ottoman government remains a 
matter of the future. Without that, we cannot expect reliable, permanent success; we 
cannot set out plans that require long-term systematic work.”406 
Despite some opposition and reservation in the process of its establishment, after 
1894 there was constant Russian governmental support for RAIK. To ensure constant 
scholar mobility between Russia and Constantinople, on 12 February 1901 Uspenskii 
requested the allocation of scholarships for young scholars wishing to undertake 
research at RAIK from the Ministry of Public Education.407 Following the example of 
the German Archaeological Institute in Rome and the French School in Athens, the 
Ministry of Public Education agreed to grant scholarships every year to two scholars for 
a duration of two years. 
There was especially a very close cooperation between RAIK and the Holy 
Synod. In 1901 Uspenskii requested the Holy Synod to send scholars from the four 
theological academies to Constantinople. In September 1902, the Holy Synod agreed 
upon a resolution to send one scholar every year for a yearly term to study at RAIK. 
After 1902, scholars from theological academies visited RAIK on a more regular basis 
than scholars from Russian universities. This constant flow of scholars made the Holy 
Synod one of the most active supporters of RAIK. In addition to its academic and 
bureaucratic links with the Holy Synod and the Ministry of Public Education, RAIK was 
also administratively connected to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the Embassy 
in Constantinople. These links with three major governmental institutions made it safe 
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to argue that RAIK was a governmental project, reflecting the ideology of the 
bureaucracy in the last decades of the Russian Empire. 
Alexander III could not survive long enough to appreciate the activities of the 
institute he approved in 1894, but his successor Nicholas II showed a personal interest in 
the activities of RAIK, which was manifested by his private donations to acquire 
antiquities several times.408 Actually, the last Tsar of the Russian Empire had been a 
history enthusiast since his childhood. Among the subjects Nicholas II was privately 
tutored when he was a young Grand Duke, he was attracted to history the most. He was 
also an honorary member of the Imperial Historical Society from the age of 16.409 
Uspenskii’s direct communication with Nicholas II implies the Emperor’s personal 
support for RAIK. In his notes from September 1897, Uspenskii recounted that he 
appeared before the Emperor to request a raise in RAIK’s budget. Uspenskii justified his 
demand by explaining that RAIK was a “tool for Russia’s cultural influence over the 
East, among Slavs and Greeks.”410 Nicholas II agreed with this argument, saying, “[t]his 
is very much desirable.” However, Uspenskii added, with such modest means, it was 
difficult to fulfil this historical responsibility. The Emperor agreed to make a raise in 
RAIK’s budget, and also praised the achievements of Uspenskii as the director of RAIK. 
Despite its constant financial shortcomings, RAIK managed to become a hub 
for Russian scholars visiting the Ottoman Empire. In 1895, immediately after its 
establishment, the institute established links with Russian consulates around the 
Ottoman Empire, as well as Greek, Serbian, and Bulgarian diplomats. A large number of 
diplomats, Russian as well as foreign, were accepted as honorary members. As soon as 
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RAIK was established, letters were sent to Russian diplomatic missions around the 
Ottoman Empire and diplomats in independent Balkan nations, informing them about 
RAIK’s mission and asking them to provide information about antiquities and 
monuments in their area of jurisdiction.411 In particular, the diplomats were requested to 
inform RAIK about the feasibility of research and information about local conditions, if 
antiquities were on sale or not, and if they were on sale, information about potential 
sellers and buyers. The letters produced positive results. Shortly afterwards Russian 
diplomats sent letters expressing their support and readiness to help RAIK.412 
In his exchange with the Serbian and Bulgarian missions in the Ottoman 
Empire, Uspenskii referred to historical ties between these nations and Russia, the study 
of which was the reason why RAIK was established.413 In addition, Serbian and 
Bulgarian diplomats were asked to be honorary members of the institute. RAIK not only 
established connections with the Balkan Slavs but also fostered connections with 
Athens. Already in 1900, RAIK secured a permanent building in the Greek capital. 
Rooms in the Petraki Monastery were offered to the Russian Embassy for the use of 
RAIK.414 
In addition to its diplomatic contacts, RAIK established relations with the 
Greek Patriarchate too. In 1896 a letter was sent to the Greek Patriarchate, asking 
information about ancient monuments, manuscripts or any other ancient objects worthy 
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of interest. In exchange, Patriarch Anthimus VII (1895-1896) asked clergymen in his 
jurisdiction about ancient religious buildings in their locality, any libraries or archives, 
or oral traditions that needed to be recorded.415 Therefore, archaeology formed a basis 
for cooperation between RAIK, Russian diplomatic posts across the Ottoman Empire, 
the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate and its local representatives. 
RAIK also had scientific contacts with numerous prestigious universities and 
societies, and institutes in Britain, the USA, Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Austria, 
Greece, Romania, Switzerland, and France. Its library was enriched through book 
exchange agreements with various academic institutions. The desire to catch up with 
European scholarship prompted Russian archaeologists to cooperate, if possible, with 
European scholars, and participate in international congresses and meetings. In its very 
first year, in 1895, Uspenskii and Pogodin visited Athens to familiarise themselves with 
archaeological methods used by foreign archaeologists in this city.416 Another example 
of academic cooperation was R. K. Leper’s participation in a German-led expedition in 
1905 in the Aegean islands and the Aegean coast of Asia Minor, which was led by 
Professor Wilhelm Dörpfeld from the German Archaeological Institute in Athens.417 
Archaeological cooperation was extended to other foreigners in the Ottoman 
Empire who had an interest in antiquities. For instance, Paul Gaudin, a Levantine 
engineer from İzmir, an ardent art and antiquities collector and amateur archaeologist, 
was one of the most frequent donors, and also an associate member of RAIK. Gaudin 
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sent many ancient objects as gifts to the institute.418 However, the closest relationship 
was established with the French Assumptionist Church in Kadıköy, Constantinople. 
This French Church also functioned as a research centre with a focus on the history of 
the Eastern Churches and the Byzantine Empire, and therefore had shared interests with 
RAIK. The Assumptionist Church published an academic periodical named Les Echos 
d’Orient.419 While Uspenskii and other RAIK members frequently wrote articles for Les 
Echos d’Orient, the articles of clergy-scholars of the French Church appeared in the 
official periodical of RAIK, the Bulletin of the Russian Archaeological Institute in 
Constantinople. The two institutions made an agreement and shared the study of 
Constantinople’s history and archaeology. While the French Assumptionist Church was 
responsible for the expeditions and surveys on the Asian side of the city, RAIK was 
responsible for the study of the European side.420 
In addition to Europeans, American scholars followed the establishment of 
RAIK with interest. In the first months of 1895, The American Journal of Archaeology 
and of the History of the Fine Arts reported the establishment of RAIK and described 
the bureaucratic structure and scientific objects of the Institute.421 In the coming years, 
this journal continued to regularly publicise the scientific activities of RAIK to its 
readers. 
What emerges from this picture is the contrast between the explicitly stated 
political intentions of Russian bureaucrats, diplomats, and scholars to justify 
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archaeological studies and the international scientific collaboration that transcended 
political intentions. Scholars looking for financial support from governments usually 
find it convenient to make a political case for support. On the other side of the coin, 
governments are seldom interested in “pure” research in the humanities. However, 
despite the obvious and openly stated political agenda, RAIK’s activities prove that 
there was also academic cooperation between intellectual elites, a cooperation that went 
beyond imperial, national, and religious boundaries. If archaeological discoveries were a 
distinctive sign of imperial prestige, scientific collaboration was a means of being 
integrated into the “civilised” and cultured international community. National and 
imperial rivalries were expressed only within the confines of this code of behaviour. 
RAIK’s relations with the Ottoman authorities and especially the Ottoman Museum will 
be examined more closely in the next chapter, but suffice it to say that even with the 
Ottoman Museum, despite all the mutual suspicions, the relationship was formed on the 
basis of this code that governed the relations of cultured cosmopolitan intellectuals. 
This brings us to the initial question that triggered this research; the complicity 
of scholars, in this case archaeologists, in political projects. Why certain questions are 
asked and why governments prefer to support one field of research over others shed 
light on the identity and the priorities that are promoted by the state. In the case of 
RAIK, the emphasis of a number of diplomats and Byzantinist scholars on shared 
identity with Balkan nations found support from government bodies and the Tsar 
himself. The importance given to shared ethnic and religious identity reflected the mind-
set of the imperial bureaucracy in the last decades of the Russian Empire. However, the 
conjunction of interests between scholarship and politics does not invalidate the 
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academic value of RAIK’s archaeological studies; neither does it mean that scholars 
who participated in these projects were mere tools in the hands of policy-makers. It was 
not the scientists who set the political agenda, but existing political circumstances 
facilitated the emergence of certain modes of scholarship. 
The Russian Empire’s discovery of soft power was another theme that could be 
detected in the discussions that led to the creation of RAIK. Both diplomats and scholars 
frequently evoked the example of the French to point to the importance of cultural 
influence. Russian diplomats discovered that being a great power required more than 
mere military power, and realised the importance of cultural institutions. They were also 
aware of the fact that Russia was behind European powers in this respect. At this point, 
RAIK was designed as an institution that would facilitate academic and cultural contacts 
between Russia and the Balkan nations. If RAIK succeeded in this target, then it would 
reveal that Russian foreign policy was not solely based on military power and would 
hence contribute to Russia’s prestige. However, as will be outlined in the next chapter, 
political realities were not compatible with these hopes. Sharing Orthodox faith or 
Slavic background had little practical value in the late 19th century, considering the 
Macedonian dispute between the Greeks, Bulgarians, and Serbians. Being ethnic or 
religious kinsmen (edinovertsy i edinoplemmeniki) did not keep the Balkan peoples 
together, therefore the image Russia tried to create, the protector of Slavs and the 
Orthodox, was gradually losing its meaning. Ideas emanating from Western Europe, like 
nationalism, liberal values, and parliamentary democracy were becoming more 
attractive to educated segments of Balkan societies, rather than Slavdom and Orthodoxy. 
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Chapter 5 
Expeditions of the Russian Archaeological Institute and Contacts with 
Ottoman Authorities 
 
Russian archaeological activities in the Ottoman Empire started when the Ottoman 
Empire was already in the process of standardizing procedures to deal with foreign 
archaeologists. We know that there were unsystematic individual Russian expeditions in 
the late 1880s, conducted mainly by diplomats. The correspondence between 
Abdülhamid II’s court and local military authorities reveal that these individual 
activities were perceived as suspicious and were immediately reported to the Sultan. For 
instance, in 1889 the Russian consul in Edirne made archaeological investigations in the 
countryside and local authorities immediately prepared a report stating that the consul 
was not accompanied by an Ottoman official.422 On another occasion, Ambassador A. I. 
Nelidov’s visit to ruins in Çanakkale was reported to Abdülhamid II.423 In addition to 
such sporadic investigations by diplomats, the Imperial Orthodox Palestinian Society, 
established in 1882 upon the initiative of Grand Duke Serge Aleksandrovich, carried out 
the first professional Russian archaeological expeditions in the Ottoman Empire. In 
addition to its theological work, the Palestinian Society undertook archaeological 
excavations on an unsystematic basis. Documents reveal that the Ottoman government 
permitted investigations of a scientific nature as long as the excavation team obeyed 
                                                        
422 BOA, Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Askeri Maruzat (Y. PRK. ASK.), 56/20, 13 Zilkade 1306 (11 July 
1889). 
423 BOA, Y. PRK. ASK., 91/105, 09 Zilhicce 1310 (24 June 1893). 
171 
 
Ottoman laws. In 1891, upon the Grand Duke’s request to make archaeological 
investigations about Christian and Byzantine monuments in Syria, Palestine, and the 
Sinai Mountain, the Ottoman government issued a permit on the condition that the 
excavation team acted in accordance with Ottoman laws and that the gendarmerie 
accompanied them.424 
RAIK was not only the first Russian scientific community abroad, but also the 
first foreign archaeological institute in the Ottoman Empire. At first, Abdülhamid II and 
bureaucrats at the Sublime Porte displayed a reluctant attitude to RAIK’s establishment, 
which bordered on outright suspicion. In 1894, Russian ambassador Nelidov 
communicated his desire to create a school of archaeology in Constantinople that was 
planned to be under the administration of the Russian Embassy. The Sublime Porte 
responded to this request with an official note trying to dissuade the Russian Embassy 
but ambassador Nelidov insisted on his plan.425 Eventually, RAIK opened its offices in 
the Ottoman capital in 1895. In April 1895, Osman Hamdi Bey, the director of the 
Ottoman Museum, sent a gift to RAIK, a photographical album of the antiquities 
collection of the Ottoman Museum as gesture of support. In exchange, RAIK sent four 
fragments from bronze statues to the Ottoman Museum.426 Finally in September 1897, 
two years after the opening of its offices, RAIK was officially authorised by the 
Ottoman government to make scientific investigations, surveys, and excavations.427 
Abdülhamid II’s authorisation of RAIK in September 1897 was communicated 
to the Russian Embassy by the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmed Tevfik 
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Pasha.428 According to the irade issued by the Sultan, members of RAIK could carry out 
archaeological studies in the Ottoman Empire, provided that they acted in accordance 
with existing Ottoman antiquities regulations. These rules included officially notifying 
local administrative authorities before expeditions and not undertaking research without 
proper permits.429 Russian archaeologists were expected to give half of their findings to 
the Ottoman Imperial Museum. Officials from the Ottoman Ministry of Education were 
responsible for deciding which objects Russian and Ottoman sides would retain. At the 
same time, Russian archaeologists could enjoy some privileges; the books and 
pamphlets they brought from Russia were to be exempt from the customs tax and 
subject to only procedural examination at the custom.430 
The note, sent by the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs, meant that both the 
Sultan and the Ministry recognised RAIK as an institution separate from the Russian 
Embassy. More importantly, the Ottoman government granted rights to RAIK that had 
never been granted to foreigners before. Since RAIK was the first and only permanent 
foreign archaeological institution in the Ottoman Empire, the 1897 irade that formed the 
basis for RAIK’s activities in the Ottoman Empire did not have a precedent. Considering 
the initial Ottoman reluctance to accept RAIK’s establishment, the rights granted in the 
irade looked very generous. It is possible that the Ottomans did not want to be regarded 
as uncooperative in the sphere of science and scholarship, as it would make the Ottoman 
government look “uncultured” and therefore would be a blow to Ottoman prestige. 
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In 1897, a month after the authorisation of RAIK by Abdülhamid II, Fyodor 
Uspenskii received an Imperial Order from the Sultan.431 Next year, in 1898, Osman 
Hamdi Bey became an honorary member of RAIK. Therefore, a basis for scientific 
collaboration was established between Ottoman and Russian archaeologists in the highly 
politicised world of archaeology. Nevertheless, it is difficult to say that there was a 
genuine cooperation between Russian archaeologists and their Ottoman colleagues. On 
the contrary, Uspenskii frequently complained about Osman Hamdi Bey’s lack of 
interest as regards RAIK’s activities. Uspenskii recalled that although he tried to 
establish cordial relations with Osman Hamdi Bey, even visited his house twice, and 
offered to take Osman Hamdi’s paintings to St. Petersburg for an exhibition (his 
paintings were known to be Osman Hamdi’s soft spot), Osman Hamdi’s response to 
these gestures were cool, to say the least. Uspenskii noted, “It is difficult to say if the 
director is our friend.”432 The director of RAIK wrote to the Russian ambassador in 
1906 that Osman Hamdi Bey ignored Russian archaeologists: he visited RAIK only 
once, and although he was the first person to whom Uspenskii always sent invitations 
for academic meetings and lectures held at RAIK, Osman Hamdi Bey never once visited 
any of the scholarly meetings. On top of that, the Sublime Porte was not totally free of 
suspicions vis-à-vis the Russians: Russian governmental emblems and signs with the 
name of RAIK could not be displaced on the institute building. What bothered 
Uspenskii the most, however, was the strict surveillance of their scientific activities by 
the Ottoman government.433 
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For their part, Russian archaeologists respected Osman Hamdi’s life-long effort 
that manifested itself in the Ottoman Imperial Museum – Uspenskii stated that the 
Ottoman Museum was one of the most important museums in Europe in terms of the 
richness and importance of its collection.434 However, he complained that besides the 
Ottoman Museum, there was not a serious interest in the scientific study of antiquities 
amongst the population of the Ottoman Empire.435 Uspenskii argued that only some 
predominantly Greek educational societies and some Greek individuals had an interest 
in archaeology, but their studies lacked a scholarly methodology. 
In order to familiarise themselves with the surviving historical monuments from 
the Byzantine era, RAIK undertook numerous expeditions between 1895 and 1914. The 
relations between Russian archaeologists and the Ottoman government were sometimes 
smooth, but sometimes there were disagreements as regards the scope of RAIK’s 
archaeological research. Even though RAIK’s charter encompassed the study of pre-
Christian Hellenistic antiquities, Uspenskii and his colleagues directed their attention 
primarily to the study of Byzantine history, theology, art, and ancient Slavic history. 
Their expeditions targeted regions which were under Byzantine political or cultural 
influence; primarily, Macedonia, Mount Athos, Bulgaria, Serbia, Asia Minor, Greece, 
Syria, and Palestine. During these expeditions Russian archaeologists gathered 
manuscripts from monasteries and made sketches of monuments, photographed 
buildings, made excavations, and collected valuable monuments and objects, some of 
which were brought to Russia after the closure of RAIK. Consequently, the institute 
acquired a rich material base for scientific study. Throughout its existence, RAIK spent 
                                                        
434 RGIA, f. 757, op. 1, d. 40, l. 3-4 (Uspenskii to Ministry of Public Education, 9 December 1914). 
435 PFA RAN, f. 127, op. 1, d. 1, l. 100 (Uspenskii to Ministry of Public Education, 1914). 
175 
 
considerable effort on researching and preserving valuable manuscripts and earned a 
well-deserved reputation in international scientific circles for that effort. Uspenskii 
participated in most expeditions undertaken by RAIK and was responsible for most of 
the scientific work. In nearly all volumes of the Izvestiia, Uspenskii had an article. Even 
as regards articles written by his colleagues, he either supervised them or helped with 
the materials needed for the study.436 
Even before the official recognition of RAIK by the Sultan, Uspenskii was given 
permission in May 1895 by the Ottoman Ministry of the Interior to make excavations on 
the Black Sea littoral, around the cities of Trabzon, Sinop, and Samsun.437 While local 
officials were requested to provide the necessary help to Uspenskii and his colleagues, 
on the other hand they were asked to keep an eye on his behaviour.438 A few months 
later, when Uspenskii wanted to make investigations in Constantinople, the same 
caution was repeated. Local officials were asked to offer Uspenskii any kind of help he 
needed, while keeping him under surveillance “without making this evident to him.”439 
These first excursions were not systematic, rather they were intended to 
familiarise Russian archaeologists with Byzantine antiquities in the Ottoman Empire, 
and they laid the ground for more systematic archaeological studies in future. Both the 
Black Sea coast and Constantinople would be RAIK’s favourite spots for research in the 
coming years. During the first Trabzon expedition in 1895, Russian scholars collected 
objects of Christian art, including ancient manuscripts and icons with Slavic 
inscriptions, which were thought to be made by the medieval Rus’, from the period 
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when Byzantine rule extended over to the northern shores of the Black Sea.440 They also 
conducted research in the monasteries of Sumela, Vazelon, Perister in Trabzon, where 
they would carry out more systematic studies in later years. 
In 1897, Ivan Alekseevich Zinoviev (1839-1917), who was the former head of 
the Asiatic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the leading expert of the 
Ministry on the Near East, replaced Nelidov as the ambassador in Constantinople. The 
same year Zinoviev was appointed, RAIK made its first important acquisition: the 
discovery of the Codex Purpureus Petropolitanus, also known as Codex N, Purple 
Codex or the Sarmısaklı Codex. The Codex was found in 1896 in the Sarmısaklı village 
near Kayseri, in the middle of Anatolia.441 This ancient Bible, which dated back to the 
6th century, was written in silver and gold letters. Before the Russians arrived at 
Sarmısaklı, the Americans and the British bargained with villagers for the acquisition of 
this ancient Bible. Russian archaeologist Ia. I. Smirnov coincidentally learned about this 
manuscript on his trip around Asia Minor and informed Uspenskii about it.442 Uspenskii 
immediately asked the ambassador to find the means for the purchase of the Sarmısaklı 
Codex. Finally, the Codex was bought for 10,000 roubles through the personal donation 
of Tsar Nicholas II (r. 1894-1917), who presented it to the Imperial Public Library in St. 
Petersburg.443 The Emperor’s personal donation is proof of his personal interest in 
RAIK’s activities in the Ottoman Empire. 
Encouraged by the Tsar’s donation, Uspenskii made a request for monetary 
support in a letter to the Ministry of Public Education in August 1898. He reminded the 
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Ministry that despite its very modest means, RAIK had achieved a lot in a short period 
of time: an impressive library, a valuable manuscript collection, a numismatics 
collection, numerous expeditions, and a significant number of members in different 
parts of the Ottoman Empire. Uspenskii stated that RAIK’s primary responsibility was 
to study Christian antiquities and prevent them from being smuggled abroad, “and hence 
fulfil its scientific and political role in the East.”444 However, given financial constraints, 
this duty was very hard to accomplish. Uspenskii stated that if RAIK did not acquire the 
Sarmısaklı Codex, it would end up abroad, too. In fact, being transported from Asia 
Minor to Russia, the Codex was indeed sent abroad. Obviously, what Uspenskii meant 
by “abroad” was either Europe or the USA. The acquisition of a Christian antiquity, 
when there were rival Western collectors, was considered a success for RAIK and for 
Russia in the international competition over antiquities, and Russia’s primary 
responsibility was defined as successfully competing with other foreigners in this race. 
Eventually, Uspenskii’s repeated requests became successful. In 1898, RAIK’s budget 
was raised by 7,500 roubles, upon the Emperor’s approval.445 
After a series of preliminary expeditions and investigations, Russian 
archaeologists asked for an excavation permit from the Ottoman authorities for the first 
time in 1898, during an expedition to Ottoman Macedonia. Although it was easier to 
obtain permissions for research trips, when trips involved excavations, the Ottoman 
government applied stricter regulations. In the summer and fall of 1898, there were two 
excursions to Ottoman Macedonia, to the Pateli village near the town of Sorovich446 
between Selânik (Thessaloniki) and Manastır (Bitola). Along the Selânik-Manastır 
                                                        
444 RGIA, f. 757, op. 1, d. 5, l. 7 (Uspenskii to Ministry of Public Education, 26 August 1898). 
445 IRAIK, “Otchet v 1898 godu,” Vol. 4, Issue 3 (1899), p. 109. 
446 Today, Sorovich is in Greece, known as Amyntiao. 
178 
 
railway, near Pateli, a necropolis from the late Bronze Age was discovered during the 
construction of the railway. Engineers working on the site informed RAIK about the 
discovery. One of the members of RAIK, Z. E. Ashkenazi donated 3000 francs for the 
trial excavation. 
This was the first instance when the relations between RAIK and the Ottoman 
Museum cooled. The major problem, according to Russian archaeologists, was that the 
privileges of the two institutions were doomed to come into conflict with each other.447 
On the one hand, the Ottoman Museum was the major governmental institution 
concerning antiquities and had a monopoly over archaeological activities in the Ottoman 
Empire since the 1884 antiquities regulation. On the other hand, RAIK demanded full 
and uninterrupted rights to make excavations and research in Ottoman territories based 
on the irade issued by the Sultan in 1897. In practice, RAIK wanted to bypass the 
authority of the Ottoman Museum by relying on the privileges granted by Abdülhamid 
II. 
In the summer of 1898, Uspenskii addressed the Governor of Manastır, 
Abdülkerim Pasha, through the Russian consul in the city, A. A. Rostkovskii. The 
Governor stated that he had to submit the question both to Constantinople and to the 
Administrative Council of the Manastır Vilayet (Vilayet Meclis-i İdaresi) for further 
discussion.448 The Council, uninformed about the Sultan’s irade, submitted an inquiry to 
the Porte about the legality of Russian archaeological activities in Pateli. Abdülkerim 
Pasha promised that as soon as he received an official note from the Porte, the question 
would be discussed at the Administrative Council and the response would be 
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immediately communicated to the Russians. Abdülkerim Pasha also confidentially told 
Uspenskii that the Administrative Council was unlikely to risk giving a permit for 
excavation without formal approval from Constantinople because the village Pateli and 
the area lying around it was considered emlâk, that is, private land belonging to the 
Sultan. Finally in September 1898 Russian archaeologists received permission from the 
Ottoman Ministry of the Interior to start diggings in the area, but their excavation was 
strictly overseen by local representatives of the Ottoman government.449 When 
Uspenskii and his colleagues initiated investigations in Pateli, the authorities gave a 
permit on the condition that their findings were to be exhibited at the Imperial Ottoman 
Museum in Constantinople.450 
In Pateli, an interesting coincidence crossed RAIK’s path with the famous liberal 
politician Pavel N. Miliukov (1859-1943). Before engaging in politics, Miliukov was a 
historian, who served as assistant professor at the Department of History and Philology 
at Moscow University from 1886 to 1895. Miliukov was fired from Moscow University 
in 1895 for the political messages of his public lectures.451 He was first exiled to 
Ryazan. While in exile, he received an invitation from the University of Sofia to take the 
chair of History.452 He spent the period between 1897 and 1899 abroad, travelling 
around the Balkans and lecturing at Bulgarian institutions. In Sofia, he briefly gave 
lectures on Roman, medieval, and Slavic history, as well as philosophy of history. 
However, Miliukov had to leave the University of Sofia in a few months. One reason for 
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this hasty leave might be his acquaintance with several Bulgarian opposition figures. In 
addition, the Bulgarian government could not withstand the pressure from the Russian 
diplomatic representative in Sofia to dismiss him from the university. Until 1899, 
Miliukov mostly spent his time travelling around Macedonia and dedicated himself to 
archaeological studies. In later years, Miliukov left his mark on Russian politics as the 
founder of the Constitutional Democratic (Kadet) Party, as a member of the Duma from 
1907 to 1912, and as the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Provisional Government 
after the February Revolution in 1917. 
When RAIK undertook the expedition to Macedonia, Miliukov had already left 
his position at the University of Sofia, but he was still travelling in the Balkans. In 1897, 
he made a brief visit to Constantinople and was acquainted with Uspenskii. While in 
Bulgaria, Miliukov was already interested in international politics, especially the 
Macedonian Question. RAIK’s archaeological expedition proved to be a useful excuse 
for him to travel around Macedonia without arousing suspicion on the part of Ottoman 
authorities. As a result of this expedition, Miliukov published an atlas of Macedonian 
ethnography in 1900.453 The excavation in Pateli, the very first excavation of RAIK, was 
initiated by Miliukov in the autumn of 1898. The RAIK secretary Farmakovskii took 
over the excavation from 14 October to 14 November 1898. The excavation team 
discovered numerous ceramic, bronze, and iron objects from the late Bronze Age, as 
well as bones and skulls.454 However, they had to stop excavations in mid-November 
1898 due to the start of the cold and rainy season. Uspenskii transmitted his desire to 
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continue more systematic excavations next autumn in 1899 to the Governor of Manastır, 
Abdülkerim Pasha.455 
A few months later, in March 1899, the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
warned RAIK through the Russian Embassy that it was not legal to undertake 
excavations without receiving necessary permits beforehand from the Ottoman Ministry 
of Education, the Ministry with which the Ottoman Museum was affiliated.456 This 
warning meant that Abdülhamid II’s irade was not sufficient on its own for RAIK to 
freely start archaeological activities, but the Russians should also consult the Ottoman 
Museum. The note also stated that the Ottoman Museum had not yet received any 
objects from the Pateli expedition, even though it was reported that sixteen chests of 
objects were brought to the Russian Embassy in Constantinople.457 The Ottoman 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs required RAIK to comply with the previous agreement and 
send the findings to the Ottoman Museum for partitioning. 
Secretary Farmakovskii and director Uspenskii responded to this note by citing 
the rights accorded to them by the Sultan.458 The Russian archaeologists stated that the 
Sultan’s irade gave them the right to carry out research anywhere in the Ottoman 
Empire. On top of that special permit from the Sultan, Russian archaeologists also noted 
that in October 1898 they had informed local authorities, including the Governor of 
Manastır, Abdülkerim Pasha, about their expedition. Apparently, Uspenskii assumed 
that he could bypass the Ottoman Museum by referring to the irade, and that RAIK 
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could engage in dialogue with local administrative authorities on its own, without the 
interference of the Russian Embassy. 
In his defence against the Ottoman government, Uspenskii stated that RAIK 
operated totally openly and legally, using all sorts of assistance from central and local 
authorities: the Minister of the Interior communicated with the Governors in Selânik and 
Manastır about providing excavation permits to the Russian Institute. The Governor of 
Manastır Abdülkerim Pasha commanded a police officer to help the director, dispatched 
an official to oversee the excavation and to keep an inventory of found items. Uspenskii 
claimed that this official had never told them to send half of the items to the Ottoman 
Museum, either during the excavation or during the shipment of the items to 
Constantinople.459 In view of the fact that the items found did not have a special 
monetary value, Uspenskii concluded that the Ottoman government was not interested 
and did not want to keep half of them. Besides, having a permit for excavation from the 
Sultan, he did not consider it a legal obligation to ask for a permit again from the 
Ottoman Ministry of Education, especially because excavations were carried out on the 
Sultan’s private land. Uspenskii complained that he could not even understand how he 
could be seen to have violated existing regulations.460 The director of RAIK presumed 
that the Ottoman Ministry of Education had been notified through administrative 
channels about RAIK’s permission to undertake excavations in Pateli. The presence of a 
police officer detached to the excavation area, who closely followed the excavation, 
supported Uspenskii’s view that this officer was a representative of the Ottoman 
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Ministry of Education, while in fact he was commissioned by the local governor.461 The 
misunderstanding stemmed from the fact that despite the Ottoman Museum’s claim to 
full monopoly over archaeological activities in the Ottoman Empire, Russian 
archaeologists only notified the Ottoman Ministry of the Interior, not the Ottoman 
Museum and hence violated the bureaucratic chain. 
With regard to the Ottoman Museum’s demand to receive half of the findings 
from the expedition, Uspenskii claimed that out of the sixteen boxes sent to the Russian 
Embassy in Constantinople, only three had antiquities found during the excavations, of 
which two boxes contained pottery and only one box contained bronze and iron 
materials. The remaining boxes had not yet been opened and they only contained bones 
and skulls from the necropolis. He invited Osman Hamdi Bey, who was also an 
honorary member of RAIK, to personally visit and inspect the contents of the boxes 
whenever he wanted. Uspenskii stated that the excavations in Pateli were not carried out 
for commercial ends, but only for the sake of archaeological and “pure scientific 
objectives.” This scientific concern was obvious, considering that the findings did not 
have any material value. Uspenskii asked to keep the objects until they were thoroughly 
investigated in their entirety. He stated, “I dare to hope that the enlightened Ottoman 
government would consider it beneath their dignity to insist on the surrender of half of 
the materials, before they were researched and published by the Institute.”462 
Next year, in August 1899, Uspenskii this time requested permission to continue 
the excavation in the same area through Ambassador Zinoviev. The director asked for 
all possible precautions to avoid any sign of suspicion on the part of the Ottoman 
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government after the last year’s crisis, and especially requested Zinoviev to consult the 
Ottoman Museum to prevent any misunderstanding.463 During this second expedition, 
RAIK confirmed that they would send the objects after completing their investigation.464 
In spite of this assurance, the Porte sent Tevhid Bey, an official from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and specialist in antiquities, to Manastır to oversee the excavation, in 
addition to sending a note to the Russian Embassy to specify the share of the Ottoman 
Imperial Museum.465 On top of that, the Ministry of the Interior warned local officials in 
Manastır to ensure that Russian archaeologists acted within the confines of Ottoman 
laws.466 Finally, the question was brought to a resolution thanks to the direct 
communication between Uspenskii and the director of the Ottoman Museum, Osman 
Hamdi Bey. Boxes full of objects discovered at the Pateli expedition were opened at the 
Ottoman Museum and the contents were equally divided.467 Nevertheless, RAIK had to 
submit the materials to the staff of the Ottoman Museum before they were extensively 
studied at the Institute.468 
The Macedonia expedition of 1898-1899 showed the sensitivity of the Ottoman 
government about exercising its authority vis-à-vis Russian archaeologists within its 
boundaries. The Ottoman government, through its various ministries and state 
institutions, was reminding foreign archaeologists of its sovereign rights. The sensitivity 
of the Ottoman government, especially of the Ottoman Museum is worthy of attention, 
given the insignificance of the findings at the Pateli excavation – remnants from the 
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Bronze Age without any contemporary political or religious connotation. This incident 
showed that the Ottoman government was not concerned with ownership rights over 
antiquities only because of the symbolic meaning attached to them, but that the very act 
of monitoring foreign archaeologists and compelling them to obey Ottoman laws was a 
political message in itself. In this context, even politically insignificant Bronze Age 
materials could turn into a sign of sovereignty. 
In fact, the site at Pateli was only a coincidental discovery in the Macedonian 
expedition of 1898-1899. The major intention of this expedition was the study of 
Christian antiquities – especially Slavic monuments of Ottoman Macedonia.469 During 
the expedition, Uspenskii was accompanied by A. A. Rostkovskii, the Russian consul in 
Manastır, Miliukov, and M. I. Rostovtsev. Like Miliukov, Rostovtsev was a world-
famous historian, specialising in the history of southern Russia.470 From a historical 
perspective this expedition was especially important to understand the history of 
medieval Bulgarian – Byzantine relations. Throughout the expedition, Russian 
historians gathered important information about the history of Ottoman Macedonia.471 
The most important discovery of the expedition was an inscription from the late 10th 
century, from the period of Tsar Samuil of medieval Bulgaria, which was the oldest 
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known example of Slavic letters. Another important achievement was the discovery of 
an inscription delineating the Bulgarian-Byzantine border in the early 10th century.472 
More interesting than archaeological discoveries, however, were the 
observations of archaeologists about the contemporary political situation in Macedonia, 
reflected in the institute report for 1898. The report was written by the archaeologists 
who participated in the Macedonia expedition, including Miliukov. Russian scholars 
stated that the most important part of Macedonia for Slavic history was the region 
around Selânik, Ohrid Lake, and Prespa, a region which was the setting for inter-
communal fighting at the turn of the century.473 Until then, little archaeological study 
was conducted in this area because of political instability. 
Referring to the conflict between the Bulgarians and Serbs, Russian 
archaeologists deemed it necessary to make a correction with regard to a 
misunderstanding in Russian public opinion.474 The Russian public, the report remarked, 
falsely blamed Greeks for destroying ancient Bulgarian and Serbian monuments that 
gave evidence to historical rights of the Slavs in Macedonia. “Our observation in 
Macedonia did not confirm these complaints,” Russian archaeologists claimed. Ancient 
Slavic inscriptions were not smeared, scraped, and replaced with Greek inscriptions. 
Likewise, there was no evidence proving the intentional destruction of frescoes and 
icons in Bulgarian churches by the Greeks. On the contrary, the report described the 
mutual treatment of Bulgarians and Serbs as “barbarian” (v varvarskom obrashchenii), 
and claimed that the current war between Serbs and Bulgarians threatened Slavic 
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antiquities more than Turkish intolerance (neterpimost’) or Greek phyletism.475 Russian 
archaeologists noted that many times they had witnessed Bulgarians destroy Greek or 
Serbian monuments, and scrape or seriously damage frescoes with the images of Serbian 
tsars. The report argued that the only motivation for such behaviour could be political. 
There was serious danger for Slavic monuments if Bulgarian ecclesiastical authorities 
did not curb the intolerance of their representatives in Macedonia. Some examples of 
such intentional destruction were Treskavets Monastery near Pirlepe (Prilep) and 
Markov Monastery near Üsküp (Skopje). Given the Bulgarian-Russian political 
rapproachement at the time and considering that one of the writers of the report was 
Miliukov, who had strong pro-Bulgarian sentiments, the report was interesting for 
pointing to inter-communal struggles between Bulgarians and Serbs and for blaming the 
Bulgarians for the destruction of antiquities. 
In fact, these observations indicated why Russia’s self-inflicted role as the 
protector of Ottoman Christians, or more specifically, Balkan Slavs was a dead end. The 
primordial ties between Russia and the Balkan nations, which were frequently evoked to 
legitimise RAIK’s establishment, did not have a practical meaning in an age when 
nationalism challenged supra-national, imperial identities in the Balkans.476 As the 
expedition report documented, Orthodoxy or common Slavic heritage was far from 
being a uniting factor in the Balkans at the turn of the century. Exploring the past of 
Balkan nations to foster stronger ties with them in future – RAIK’s primary goal – was 
easier said than done. The report hints at the fact that ancient monuments were regarded 
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as solid evidence for territorial claims over Macedonia – therefore, were targeted and 
destroyed by rival groups. 
RAIK’s studies in Macedonia were not the only ones of its kind; archaeological 
and historical studies were conducted by scholars from different ethnic backgrounds, as 
the struggle over Macedonia reflected itself in the scientific realm. Especially after the 
Congress of Berlin in 1878, anthropologists, linguists, and other scholars came up with 
theories and scientific studies to claim Macedonia for their respective ethnic groups. 
Bulgarian linguists indicated linguistic proximity with the Macedonian Slavs, as did the 
Serbs. On the other hand, Greek scholars emphasised the importance of the religious 
authority of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the formation of national identity.477 
A very interesting aspect of RAIK’s Macedonia expedition was the involvement 
of Pavel Miliukov. It is surprising to see a reformist politician, a critic of pre-1905 
Russia, a staunch opponent of the Russian government, who was even jailed for his 
political views, as part of an archaeological project about Orthodox churches in 
Macedonia. Considering that the expedition was supported by the Russian Embassy in 
Constantinople and the Ministry of Public Education at the same time, we can conclude 
that the Russian government did not object to incorporating a political opponent in a 
government-sponsored scientific project, as long as he did not openly engage in political 
activities. Essentially, RAIK’s collaboration with a well-known government critic 
further confirms that academic concerns of RAIK staff went beyond political 
considerations. Academic cooperation with such world-famous scholars like Miliukov 
and Rostovtsev also indicates the quality of RAIK’s archaeological research. 
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Although Miliukov’s involvement in a scholarly activity does not necessarily 
give an idea about his political perspective, it is thought-provoking to examine his 
archaeological-historical interests against the background of his ideas on Russian 
foreign policy. In his memoirs, Miliukov noted that his experience in Macedonia shaped 
his opinions on the Balkan question during the crisis of 1908, when he became a vocal 
supporter of the Bulgarian cause in the Third Duma.478 Miliukov was no less a supporter 
of active Russian involvement in the Balkan affairs than his right wing opponents in the 
Duma, but different from his political adversaries, Miliukov was inspired by democratic 
movements in the Balkan Peninsula.479 
One should be cautious when reaching a conclusion about the relationship 
between the state and intelligentsia in late imperial Russia only by looking at Miliukov’s 
statements, but the fact that RAIK’s archaeological projects received support from 
Nicholas II on the one hand and Miliukov on the other, people at the opposite ends of 
the political spectrum in domestic affairs, deserves attention. It is possible to argue that 
despite their different attitudes in domestic issues, there was a certain degree of 
consensus between intellectuals with different political inclinations as regards Russia’s 
position and identity in international politics. If the political programme of conservative 
politicians and intellectuals as regards the Balkan question was characterised by Pan-
Orthodoxy or Pan-Slavism, Miliukov was attracted by the democratic tendencies of 
young Balkan nationalists. Consistent in his democratic priorities, Miliukov was at first 
hopeful about reformist capacity of the Young Turks.480 Despite these very different 
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starting points, eventually, Russian intellectuals from different walks of life shared the 
belief that Russia should be actively involved in the affairs of its ethnic and religious 
brethren. Especially during World War I Miliukov came closer to the right-wing, and 
supported Russian seizure of the Straits.481 
The 1898 Macedonia expedition was an example of RAIK’s interest in Slavic 
antiquities, and it was not the only one. The second excavation of RAIK was conducted 
in autonomous Bulgaria, near Shumen. The excavations in Aboba,482 the ancient 
Bulgarian capital in the 7th-9th centuries, in 1899-1900 was the outcome of Russian – 
Bulgarian archaeological collaboration. During this excavation Uspenskii worked with 
Karel Škorpil, lecturer at Varna Gymnasium, M. IU. Popruzhenko from the Imperial 
Novorossiya University and V. N. Zlatarskii from Sofia High School.483 
After the first preliminary expedition to Bulgaria in 1896, director Uspenskii 
wrote a letter to the Princess of Bulgaria, Marie Louise: 
[Y]our Royal Highness so deeply and correctly evaluates the meaning of 
archaeological science for national identity and for the development of respect 
for antiquities. Having before us the experience of European states, I have the 
firm conviction that only with the initiative of enlightened governments, can 
archaeological scholarship have a solid scientific basis… I would be grateful if 
you had the opportunity to take archaeological study in Bulgaria under the 
protection of Your Royal Highness.484 
 
In this letter, archaeological scholarship was seen both as an indicator of being 
enlightened and civilised, and as an indispensable part of national consciousness. Just 
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like it was for the Ottoman elites, Europe was taken as an example that should be 
followed. It is particularly interesting that the director of a Russian national project such 
as RAIK should stress the role of Europe, not Russia, as a role model for Bulgarian 
scholarship. As a matter of fact, Europe was an example for Russian archaeologists as 
well, and increasing level of involvement in archaeological activities was an assertion of 
Russian equality with Europe in cultural terms. Taking the lead in an area closest to 
Russian history and identity – the history of Orthodoxy and Slavdom – would affirm 
that Russia had succeeded in catching up with its European role model in science. 
In his letter to the Princess of Bulgaria, Uspenskii emphasised the importance of 
ancient history for the development of national consciousness with these words: “Love 
for [their] antiquities characterises all cultured nations. [This love] stimulates a sense of 
national identity, which develops with the learning of national history and literature.”485 
Uspenskii stated that individual efforts to study ancient history were insufficient and 
measures for the preservation and collection of antiquities should be undertaken by the 
Bulgarian government.486 He drew a road map for Bulgarian archaeology: he proposed 
the establishment of central organisations to study antiquities, the preservation and 
publication of manuscripts, and systematic excavations in ancient sites.487 
Throughout 1898 Uspenskii tried to establish contact with the Bulgarian 
Ministry of Education to undertake expeditions in Bulgaria. Not receiving any response, 
he wrote directly to Prince Ferdinand I of Bulgaria for permission to undertake 
expeditions and excavations.488 Upon receiving this letter, Ferdinand I, who was also an 
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honorary member of RAIK,489 sent a response assuring Uspenskii that he would inquire 
of the Bulgarian Ministry of Education. Finally, RAIK received permission for 
archaeological research with the following conditions: 
1) RAIK would receive half of the discovered materials. 
2) A commission formed by the Bulgarian Ministry of Education would assess 
the value of monuments. 
3) RAIK should clearly delineate its area of excavation. 
4) The excavation permit was given only for two years. 
5) The Bulgarian Ministry of Education would employ officials from the 
National Museum in Sofia to help RAIK. 
6) If the discovered objects were distinctive in terms of their aesthetic value and 
historical importance, RAIK had to turn them over to the National Museum in Sofia 
after the completion of studies. The commission from the Bulgarian Ministry of 
Education was responsible for determining the value of discovered objects.490 
Obviously, it was not only the Ottoman government that was sensitive about 
ownership rights over antiquities, but the autonomous Bulgarian government also 
expressed its sovereign rights to Russian archaeologists in clear terms. This was after all 
a logical corollary to Uspenskii’s own letter to the princess saying that archaeology was 
essential to Bulgarian national identity. 
The RAIK report from the 1899 expedition to Aboba and Preslav recalled that 
Bulgarian nationalists blamed the Russians for smuggling Bulgarian antiquities to 
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Russia following the 1878 Russian occupation.491 The report found this thesis difficult 
to prove and claimed that Preslav was looted long ago, in addition to being destroyed by 
the Turks recently in the 19th century. In any case, the disagreement between Russian 
archaeologists and Bulgarian nationalists showed that the “liberation” of Bulgaria by the 
Russian army in 1878 was remembered with mixed feelings by the Bulgarians. 
The question of Bulgarian antiquities went back to the Russian occupation of 
Bulgaria during the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish War. After the retreat of the Russian 
armies at the end of the war, a large number of senior Russian officers and 
administrative personnel were left behind to ease the transition of the recently 
established state, but essentially with an intention to keep the Principality as a Russian 
dependency.492 The Russian imperial attitude caused discontent among nationalist 
Bulgarian leaders, and the bitterness in Russian-Bulgarian relations continued in the 
next decades. Although by 1898 the relationship was ameliorating, it was still fragile. 
Whether the Bulgarian antiquities were really smuggled to Russia or not, in any case, 
the presence of a rumour against Russia among Bulgarian nationalists implied that 
despite the Russian Empire’s self-perception as the saviour of Slavdom and Orthodoxy, 
the practical reality on the ground was different. Actually, as Uspenskii recalled in his 
letter to Princess Marie Louise, the love for antiquities indeed stimulated a sense of 
national identity for Bulgarian patriots. This national identity, however, was specifically 
marked by “Bulgarianness,” and could turn against Russia too, as the Bulgarian identity 
was not necessarily expressed within the framework of a broader Slavic and Orthodox 
identity. 
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After the preliminary studies in 1896 and 1899493 and after the securing of 
permits from the Bulgarian government, excavations in Aboba started in 1900. The 
excavation team identified the oldest Bulgarian churches and revealed that the first 
capital of the first Bulgarian Kingdom was Aboba, not Preslav as had previously been 
assumed.494 Among the findings in Aboba was the palace from the early 9th century 
attributed to the medieval Bulgarian Khan Omurtag, which had an alley of columns with 
the names of cities Omurtag conquered in Thrace.495 Part of these columns were brought 
to the National Museum in Sofia before Russians started excavations. The materials 
discovered in this expedition were important not only for Bulgarian history but also for 
the overall history of the Balkan Peninsula. 
Amongst their excursions to the centres of Byzantine-Slavic heritage, RAIK’s 
expedition to Syria in 1900 stood apart in terms of the geographical focus of interest. 
However, the Syria expedition reflected the same feeling of competition with European 
archaeologists. In this excursion that took place between April and June 1900, the 
painter Nikolai Karlovich Kluge (1869-1947) and the dragoman of the Russian 
consulate in Jerusalem, I. Huri accompanied Uspenskii. Financial support for the 
expedition came from the Imperial Orthodox Palestinian Society, which donated 5000 
roubles to RAIK for the expedition to ancient Palmyra in Syria.496 This was a brave 
undertaking, considering that Syria was also at the centre of European scholarly 
attention and Russian archaeology was still behind European scholars in methodological 
and material terms. In fact, the acknowledgement of this shortcoming prompted Russian 
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scholars to focus on Slavic and Byzantine archaeology, fields which were relatively less 
studied by Europeans, and fields in which Russia had comparative advantage. 
The Palmyra expedition was originally motivated by the discovery of the 
Palmyra Customs Tariff in 1882 by the Russian archaeologist Prince Semyon 
Semyonovich Abamelek-Lazarev (1857-1916). This important monument, dated from 
137 BC, outlined an ancient tax law. It was particularly important from a linguistic 
perspective, as the text was written in both Aramaic and Greek. In 1884, Abamelek-
Lazarev published an article entitled “Palmyra” about the importance of this monument. 
After this publication, an idea was born among Russian specialists to acquire the 
monument for a Russian museum.497 In 4 May 1899, at a meeting of the Imperial 
Russian Archaeological Society P. K. Kokovtsev, a professor from the Department of 
Hebrew and Assyrian Languages at the Imperial St. Petersburg University, strongly 
supported this opinion. Shortly afterwards, the chairman of the Imperial Academy of 
Sciences, Grand Duke Konstantin Konstantinovich, wrote a letter to the Russian 
ambassador in Constantinople, Ivan Zinoviev, inquiring about the possible means for the 
acquisition of the Palmyra Tariff. Zinoviev showed great interest in this cause, and 
personally entered into dialogue with Abdülhamid II to acquire the Tariff. 
RAIK assumed responsibility for the practical questions surrounding the transfer 
of the monument. After Uspenskii’s preliminary analysis in Palmyra in May 1900, 
Zinoviev fulfilled the necessary procedures and on 13 October 1900, Abdülhamid II 
announced that he gave the Palmyra Tariff – seven chests of “stone” as it was described 
in the original document – to Grand Duke Serge Aleksandrovich, who was known to be 
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interested in archaeology.498 In 1901, Uspenskii visited Syria again to arrange the export 
of the monument, together with the dragoman, Huri. The stone plates were sent from 
Palmyra to Damascus, then to Beirut by railway, from Beirut to Odessa, and finally to 
the Imperial Hermitage in St. Petersburg.499 
While Uspenskii, Kluge, and Huri were busy with the transfer of the monument 
from Palmyra, they heard rumours circulating in St. Petersburg.500 In the imperial 
capital, there were concerns among scholars that the dragoman Huri, an incompetent 
person, was in charge of the transfer. They also feared that Arabs or the Turkish 
authorities could fool Huri and sell the original Palmyra Tariff to Europeans. Although 
this fear proved to be ungrounded, the anxiety was caused by the possibility of losing an 
archaeological trophy to European competitors. 
Apparently, European competition was one of the motivations for the Palmyra 
expedition. Professor Kokovtsev, who worked on the tombstones acquired from Palmyra 
in 1901, proudly expressed the important achievement by Russian archaeologists in a 
field where Europeans took the lead.501 The painter Kluge, who extended his trip to 
Palestine and Transjordan and made studies in Madeba (in modern Jordan), made a 
comparison with Catholic missionaries, and remarked that Catholics were very good at 
publishing and publicizing their studies. Russia, he claimed, could use its links with the 
Orthodox Arab population to make archaeological discoveries, as well.502 
Archaeological success was identified with imperial prestige and Russian civilisational 
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status. Consequently, the ability to compete with European scholars had a particular 
importance for Russian archaeologists. 
Acquisition of the Palmyra Tariff was definitely one of the most important 
achievements in RAIK’s history, and a sign of increasing self-confidence vis-à-vis their 
European rivals. On the other hand, by offering the monument as a gift to the Russians, 
Abdülhamid II actually disregarded the antiquities law of 1884 that the Ottoman 
Imperial Museum was so sensitive about, since the law very clearly outlawed the 
transfer of antiquities abroad. Although the transfer of the Palmyra Tariff to Russia 
contradicted existing regulations, Abdülhamid II’s authorisation made the deal legal. 
Nevertheless, it seems that in addition to such legal acquisitions, RAIK might 
have acquired antiquities through illegal means as well, although not on a large scale. 
Russian archaeologists were definitely not the only foreigners who attempted to 
smuggle antiquities outside Ottoman territories. In fact, with their very limited financial 
resources, they were less capable of doing so than their European and American 
competitors. The Russians also started archaeological studies in the Ottoman Empire at 
a time when the Ottomans had already grown sensitive about cultural property, another 
factor restricting the possibility of antiquities smuggling. 
The exchange between Russian diplomatic representatives in Samsun, an 
important city on the Black Sea coast, and Uspenskii hint at the possibility of their 
involvement in a small-scale illegal antiquities trade. In November 1902 the Russian 
vice-consul in Samsun, Viktor Fedorovich Kal’, sent epitaphs to RAIK from the ancient 
city of Amisos near modern Samsun and asked Uspenskii to determine a price for these 
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ancient objects.503 The conversation about the prices of antiquities implied that Kal’ 
probably received antiquities from a local dealer and acted as intermediary between 
RAIK and the dealer. In fact, a similar letter from Kal’ to Uspenskii written a month 
later clarified this network a little more. In December 1902 Kal’ sent artefacts, which he 
personally bought from a local resident, as gifts to RAIK. These artefacts included silver 
and bronze objects, necklaces, earrings, rings, and pieces from an Apollo statue. 
However, he stated, these were not all the objects. In this letter Kal’ explained that a 
certain Uzun Mihal, whom he described as the only person interested in archaeology in 
Samsun, conducted secret excavations around Amisos, especially in the ancient 
necropolis from the Roman period.504 According to Mihal’s testimony, professional 
excavations in the nearby theatre and temple could produce promising results. 
Kal’ continued to send ancient objects to RAIK throughout 1903. In February 
1903, he sent three bronze Byzantine crosses, found near Vona, Ordu on the Black Sea 
coast.505 Kal’ wrote that he bought these objects very cheap, and asked for the amount 
from Uspenskii. It is understood from the letter that Uspenskii specifically wanted these 
pieces. Kal’ also promised that he would let Uspenskii know if there would be secret 
excavations around Samsun. In June 1903, he further sent two packages full of 
antiquities, including bronze plaques to RAIK. Some of these artefacts were Kal’s gifts 
but for some he asked Uspenskii to pay an amount he deemed sufficient.506 
Upon the information provided by Kal’, it appeared that Samsun was a 
promising location for archaeological research. In 1904, Uspenskii sent RAIK member 
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Leper to Samsun for preliminary research. On this trip, Leper did not encounter any 
obstacles from the Ottoman authorities. In addition to Samsun, Leper visited Sinop, 
Giresun, Inebolu, and Ordu on the Turkish Black Sea coast. He investigated the cultural 
links between Amisos near Samsun and Panticapaeum near Kerch, and the overall 
connection between the Turkish Black Sea coast and southern Russia, which were 
linked by the common Pontic heritage.507 
In June 1904 Uspenskii asked Ambassador Zinoviev to help him secure a permit 
to make excavations in Samsun in the autumn of 1904, explaining that there were 
already illegal excavations in the region and proper excavations would save antiquities 
from being plundered.508 After Pateli, this was the second time RAIK asked to undertake 
excavations in the jurisdiction area of the Ottoman Imperial Museum. This time, the 
excavation request failed from the start and the Ottoman government did not allow the 
Russians to undertake excavations in Samsun. Nearly a year later, in May 1905, 
Zinoviev notified Uspenskii that the Ottoman government was in the process of 
promulgating a new antiquities law and would not allow excavations until its 
finalisation.509 In his letter to Zinoviev from May 1905, Uspenskii complained that the 
promulgation of the new law did not prevent the Ottoman government from granting 
excavation permits to the Berlin Museum in Didyma; even the German ambassador was 
present at the excavation site.510 Uspenskii stressed that RAIK was different from such 
individual projects – RAIK had a permanent status and a permanently valid permit 
received from the Sultan in 1897. He stated that the privileges granted by the Sultan 
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could not be abrogated by another institution, even in case of the promulgation of a new 
antiquities law. Only the Sultan himself, Uspenskii noted, could change the legal basis 
on which RAIK operated in the Ottoman Empire. 
Uspenskii asked Zinoviev to bring the issue to the attention of the Porte again. 
After examining Uspenskii’s objection, the Ottoman Ministry of the Interior stated that 
the right to make excavations on Ottoman territories belonged only to the Ottoman 
Imperial Museum, hence foreign scientific societies and foreign researchers could 
excavate only exceptionally and with a special permission from the Ottoman Imperial 
Museum. In case of a second appeal by the Russians, the Ministry of the Interior 
suggested to the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs to notify the Russian Embassy 
about this situation in an appropriate manner.511 In the end, Uspenskii could not get 
permission for the planned excavation in Samsun. 
The general discontent about Ottoman antiquities regulations prompted foreign 
scholars to solve the issue through diplomatic and political channels. In 1906 the 
director of the Royal Museum in Berlin, Theodor Wiegand (1864-1936) visited RAIK, 
where he discussed the issue of Ottoman surveillance with Uspenskii.512 Uspenskii 
adamantly argued that the question regarding the new Ottoman antiquities regulation of 
1906 should be brought before the embassies, since the rights of foreigners in the 
Ottoman Empire were at stake. Wiegand, in response, assured Uspenskii that he would 
inform relevant German institutions and the German government would join every step 
taken by the Russian Embassy in the desired direction. 
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Nevertheless, to the dismay of Uspenskii and other foreign archaeologists, the 
new antiquities regulation had a clause restricting the possibility of an appeal through 
diplomatic action in cases of conflict with the existing law. Article no. 33 of the new 
regulation had a clear clause about that matter: “Conflicts with the existing law are 
within the responsibility of civil courts.”513 Uspenskii particularly expressed his 
disappointment about this article.514 
Criticizing the response of the Ottoman government, Uspenskii referred to the 
1897 irade of the Sultan, which provided a legal basis for the studies of Russian 
archaeologists.515 He concluded that it was clearly expressed in the text of the irade that 
RAIK was recognised as a special foreign institution operating in the Ottoman Empire. 
Although the irade contained a provision about the necessity of compliance with 
Ottoman regulations, like asking for permission from the Ottoman Ministry of 
Education and notifying them about the exact time and location of research, the 
privileges bestowed upon RAIK were granted permanently. Nelidov viewed this irade 
as a special kindness on the part of the Sultan and thought that it would permit RAIK to 
engage in archaeological activities without obstacle. The recognition of RAIK as a 
scholarly institution receiving special privileges should not only liberate it from the 
proposed regulations concerning archaeological excavations, but should also create a 
special legal basis for its activities. 
Uspenskii complained that the Ottoman government unilaterally changed the 
laws regarding antiquities, and with the promulgation of this new law RAIK’s interests 
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were disregarded. In fact, it was only natural for the Ottoman government to issue the 
mentioned law without consulting foreigners, because the antiquities question was 
undoubtedly a domestic matter. However, since the name of RAIK was not openly 
mentioned in the law, Uspenskii felt that RAIK was being ignored. He stated, “[N]ot 
having the opportunity to negotiate, [RAIK] was put face to face with the already 
approved and issued law.” The 1906 law included an article that practically abolished 
the privileges granted by the Sultan to RAIK: “provisions regarding antiquities that are 
contrary to this law will be repealed.”516 In fact, as previous excavation in Pateli proved, 
RAIK’s privileges were largely non-functional and it is difficult to say that Russian 
archaeologists enjoyed any real advantages derived from the Sultan’s earlier decree. 
Despite Uspenskii’s complaints about Ottoman double standards against 
Russians, not only Russians but all foreign archaeologists were compelled to obey 
Ottoman antiquities regulations. By mid-1905 even Germans, Abdülhamid II’s allies, 
were at an all-time low in their relations with Osman Hamdi Bey. The reluctance of 
some German archaeologists to comply with Ottoman regulations brought excavations 
at Babylon, Assur, and Pergamon to a halt, while the future of digs at Baalbek, Miletus, 
and Didyma was uncertain. The German archaeologist Robert Koldewey (1855-1925) 
expressed his dissatisfaction about the strict order from the German Embassy in 
Constantinople asking German archaeologists to obey Ottoman regulations. Koldewey 
complained, “[I]f I take the communications from Constantinople seriously, we would 
do well here, when his Excellence Hamdi Bey slaps us on the left cheek, not only to 
offer him the right cheek, but to thank him most politely.”517 The letters of the Russian 
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consul in Baghdad to Uspenskii from 1911 recounted that the failure to comply with 
regulations brought German archaeologists into conflict with Ottoman authorities and 
that the Ottomans were very unlikely to give ancient objects to the Germans.518 
Particularly after 1906 the Ottoman government monitored foreign 
archaeologists more seriously. Suspicion of Russian archaeologists was especially 
evident, if the expeditions were made in strategic locations. For instance, when local 
authorities noticed that one of the members of RAIK and his interpreter were drawing 
maps around the Sakarya River, which ran from the east of Constantinople before 
reaching the Black Sea, it was seen as a highly dubious act and the Ministry of the 
Interior warned local authorities not to allow map-drawing in this region.519 
 Uspenskii and his colleagues received permission to make scientific 
investigations from 1908 to 1914, mostly examining Byzantine monuments around 
Constantinople, but there is no document from this period complaining either about 
suspicious activities on the part of Russian archaeologists or about the failure to enforce 
Ottoman regulations.520 After 1906, there are significantly fewer documents about 
Russian archaeological activities in the Ottoman archives. Right after the new regulation 
was promulgated, the Russian Embassy requested an official permit for the continuation 
of archaeological investigations by RAIK.521 Uspenskii received permission to make 
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some investigations, take photographs, and make drawings of ancient monuments in the 
Edirne province and around Constantinople.522 
Unable to receive permission for excavations and seriously restricted in their 
scientific studies both by Ottoman regulations and financial constraints, Russian 
archaeologists turned their attention to areas they could more easily handle. Receiving 
permits for surveys was easier to obtain than excavations in Ottoman territories. 
Therefore, after 1906 RAIK devoted its energy to make surveys of Byzantine 
monuments, mostly in regions within close proximity to Constantinople. One of the 
most successful examples of such a survey was their study in the Kasımiye Mosque in 
Selânik. 
In late 1907 and early 1908 the Turks started to restore the Kasımiye Mosque in 
Selânik. This monument was originally a Byzantine church from the 5th century, the 
Church of Hagios Demetrios, before being converted into a mosque by the Ottomans in 
the late 15th century. In January 1908, N. V. Kokhmanskii from the Russian Consulate-
General in Selânik sent a letter to Uspenskii to inform him about the repairs.523 The 
Russian consulate-general engaged in dialogue with the governor of Selânik, Mehmed 
Şerif Rauf Pasha, to facilitate studies in the church-converted-mosque. Kokhmanskii 
said that the governor of Selânik was especially amiable and concerned with the 
“benefits of science,” which should be used as an advantage.524 The Governor Mehmed 
Şerif Rauf Pasha inquired if an album would be published about the mosaics after the 
scientific work was completed. 
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As a result of the restoration, the plaster covering the frescoes and mosaics was 
removed from the walls and magnificent works of art were revealed. Hearing this, 
Uspenskii went to Selânik in the winter of 1908, but when he arrived at the city the 
refurbishment of the mosque was nearly done. Most parts of the walls were again 
covered with plaster and workers started drawing Muslim signs on the walls. Because 
the apse was totally covered with Muslim signs and it was not possible to touch them 
after they were made, Uspenskii restricted his analysis to other parts of the church.525 
The painter Kluge copied the mosaics and frescoes that were not yet covered. The 
mosaics of the church-mosque were mostly about the life and miracles of St. Demetrius, 
the patron saint of Thessaloniki, and were important for the history of Orthodox 
Christianity and Byzantine iconography.526 
 
5.1 Studies in Constantinople 
Of course, as the former capital of the Byzantine Empire and cradle of Orthodoxy, 
Constantinople was the focus of RAIK’s scholarly attention from the start, and deserves 
to be analysed under a separate heading. In the course of the twenty years of its 
existence, RAIK made numerous studies around Constantinople and regularly published 
them in the Izvestiia. As soon as RAIK’s office in Constantinople was established in 
1895, the archaeologists undertook a preliminary expedition to familiarise themselves 
with the monuments of the city. The capital of the Byzantine emperors received the 
lion’s share in terms of the numbers of articles and lectures RAIK produced. The 
archaeological interest in Constantinople echoed the political sensitivities of significant 
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numbers of influential Russian intellectuals, who dreamed that one day Constantinople 
would be “liberated” from the Turkish rule, and might indeed be governed by Russia.527 
The first remarkable study of RAIK in Constantinople was carried out in Kariye 
Mosque, or the Chora Church before its transformation into a mosque by the Ottomans. 
Built as part of a monastic complex in the 5th century, Chora Church was transformed 
into a mosque by the Ottomans in the early 16th century. The mosaics and frescoes in the 
interior were examples of the Palaeologian Renaissance of the 14th century. In March 
1899 Uspenskii asked permission through Ambassador Zinoviev to make architectural 
plans, take photographs and make sketches of mosaics and frescoes inside Kariye.528 He 
pointed to the danger posed for the monument, whose art treasures were threatened by 
neglect. Uspenskii was already in communication with the President of the Imperial 
Academy of Arts, Count I. I. Tolstoy to commission a painter and photographer to help 
prepare the reproductions of mosaics. The Imperial Academy entrusted N. K. Kluge 
with this task.529 Shortly after Uspenskii’s request, the Ministry of Religious 
Foundations granted a permit for the study of the monument.530 The Minister notified 
the Russian ambassador that he would provide any necessary help in case need arose.531 
The work in Kariye was completed in 1904 and results of the study were published as an 
album. Tsar Nicholas II made a personal donation of 10,000 roubles for the publication 
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of Kariye mosaics.532 This donation was another instance showing the Tsar’s sympathy 
for the RAIK enterprise. 
RAIK started the systematic study of the topography of Constantinople in 1902. 
Even though the investigations of Russian archaeologists in this period were closely 
followed by Ottoman officials, the Russians were allowed to take photographs, draw 
sketches of monuments, and were provided with assistance when necessary.533 In 1903, 
after much difficulty, Uspenskii managed to receive a permit to do research in the 
library of the Topkapı Palace, which he continued with intermittently until 1914. In 
addition to a large collection of Islamic manuscripts, this library also contained books 
and manuscripts that the Ottomans inherited from the Byzantine emperors.534 Here 
Uspenskii discovered the famous Topkapı Octateuch Bible from the 12th century, also 
known as the Seraglio Octateuch.535 Important both for its artwork and for its content, 
the Topkapı Octateuch was an important literary monument from the Comnenos 
dynasty. The foreword of the Topkapı Octateuch was written by Isaak Comnenos, son of 
Alexios I Comnenos.536 In 1903, RAIK received an additional permit to take 
photographs of the miniatures in the manuscript. The Imperial Russian Archaeological 
Society gave Uspenskii an award for his work on the Topkapı Octateuch.537 Uspenskii 
recalled that he could not see all parts of the Topkapı library due to the suspicious 
attitudes of the Ottomans, who monitored him closely during his study at the Palace.538 
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RAIK undertook important studies at the İmrahor Mosque, or the Monastery of 
Stoudios in the years 1906-1909. Historically, the Monastery of Stoudios was the most 
important Byzantine monastery in Constantinople. The only remaining part of the 
original monastic complex in the 19th - 20th century was the remnants of a 5th century 
basilica, which was converted into a mosque by the Ottomans in the late 15th century. 
Until 1906 RAIK could not receive a permit to make studies in the interior of İmrahor, 
as it was closed after the 1894 earthquake. After two years of struggle, the Russians 
finally secured a permit in late 1906 from the Ministry of Religious Foundations to 
make a survey, at a time when there was a restoration going on at the building. 
However, this permit was short-lived and Russian archaeologists were not allowed to 
continue their studies in 1907.539 Uspenskii recalled that in 1907 the Ottoman 
government created obstacles to foreigners who wanted to visit mosques converted from 
churches, even Hagia Sophia.540 
In 1909, thanks to repeated requests of the Russian ambassador to the Grand 
Vizier Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha and the Minister of Religious Foundations Halil Hamdi 
Hamada Pasha, RAIK finally received a permit to remove the plaster on the walls and to 
make excavation in the interior of the half ruined mosque.541 Until then there had been a 
number of Europeans who made topographic and architectural studies in 
Constantinople, but receiving excavation permits in the Ottoman capital was nearly 
impossible. The only exception was the British archaeologist Charles Newton’s 
excavation in the Hippodrome in 1855, when Britain and the Ottoman Empire were 
                                                        
539 IRAIK, “Otchet v 1907 godu,” Vol. 14 (1909), p. 155. 
540 PFA RAN, f. 127, op. 1, d. 148, l. 3-4 (RAIK Report to Ministry of Public Education, 1907). 
541 PFA RAN, f. 127, op. 1, d. 1, l. 105-106 (Uspenskii to Ministry of Public Education, 1914). 
209 
 
allies during the Crimean War.542 The Russian excavation in İmrahor was important in 
the sense that it was the first excavation linked to Constantinople’s Christian past. The 
excavations continued from September to December 1909.543 Although it was inferior to 
Kariye in artistic terms, historically, the Monastery of Stoudios had a particular 
importance for Russian religious history. The monastic charter of the Kiev-Pechersk 
Lavra was based on the example of the Monastery of Stoudios.544 
At the end of July 1912 a great fire in Constantinople destroyed the Turkish 
quarters of the city from the east of Hagia Sophia and Hippodrome nearly up to the sea. 
The Great Palace of the Byzantine emperors, constructed in the 4th century during the 
reign of Constantine the Great, was believed to be in this area. After the fire, among the 
burnt stones of Turkish houses, the terraces, foundation and even the lower floors of the 
imperial palace were revealed. Before the reconstruction of the burnt quarters started, it 
would be very convenient to study the topography of the imperial palace. RAIK secured 
permission from the Ottoman government to make plans, drawings, and take 
photographs, and started topographical studies in spring 1913.545 Before 1914, Russian 
archaeologists were in preparation of a large-scale excavation in this part of the city, but 
the outbreak of World War I interfered in this first systematic study of Constantinople’s 
Byzantine past. 
5.2 Conclusion 
The Balkans and Constantinople received by far the lion’s share in RAIK’s expeditions 
and excavations. The archaeological projects of RAIK reflected Russia’s Slavic and 
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Orthodox identity. RAIK not only contributed to the study of Byzantine and Slavic 
history and archaeology, but also to the study of Orthodox theology, as was exemplified 
by the close collaboration between RAIK and the Holy Synod. Sometimes by its own 
staff and sometimes in collaboration with fellows from the Holy Synod, RAIK made 
extensive research in the churches, monasteries, and monastic libraries in Bulgaria, 
Ottoman Macedonia, Mount Athos, Mount Sinai, as well as in the archives of the Greek 
Patriarchate in Constantinople.546 These clergy-scholars delved into the history of the 
Orthodox Church, as well as examining theological, liturgical, and canonical questions. 
The confluence of religion and archaeology hints at the motivation behind Russian 
archaeological activities and imperial Russian policy in the Ottoman Empire. 
In addition to scholars from theological academies, RAIK cooperated with 
world-wide famous historians such as Mikhail Rostovtsev, Pavel Miliukov, A. A. 
Vasiliev and Pavel Kokovtsev. Foreign scholars such as Joseph Strzygowski, Theodor 
Wiegand, Karel Škorpil, and Konstantin Jireček also made contributions to RAIK’s 
studies. Notwithstanding the obvious political motivations of diplomats and bureaucrats 
for supporting archaeological studies in the Ottoman Empire, the existence of an 
academic network that divided across ideological, national, and imperial lines indicated 
a genuine scientific concern on the part of scholars. 
As was the case for the Ottoman Empire, Russians learnt archaeological 
methodology from European scholars. Europe was both taken as an example and seen as 
a rival. In the expedition reports, in private correspondence, and in other documents, 
Russian archaeologists and diplomats explained the necessity of establishing an 
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archaeological institute with reference to rivalry with European powers but they also 
expressed themselves in the context of values and objectives defined by Europe. 
Acquisition of ancient monuments in Ottoman territories, when European collectors 
were competing for the same antiquities, was seen as a victory, as was exemplified by 
the acquisition of the Palmyra Tariff and the Sarmısaklı Codex. If archaeological glories 
reflected imperial prestige and if the Louvre, the British Museum, and later the 
Pergamon Museum competed with each other to visualise the grandeur of their 
respective empires, then the Imperial Hermitage had to be a part of this competition, too. 
In the discourse of Russian archaeologists and diplomats, being a great power 
was identified with investment in the academic study of history. Certainly, linking 
historical studies to imperial status was not limited to Russian scholars, as European 
governments were also supporting historical studies with similar motivations and 
European scholars were also competing with each other in academic terms. Actually, 
Russian scholars’ allegiance to an initially Western concept of academic excellence and 
value showed the internalisation of these values by Russian elites. In their legitimisation 
of RAIK’s activities, Russian diplomats and scholars regarded historical consciousness 
and interest in antiquities as a sign of being enlightened. Therefore, falling behind 
Europe would be detrimental to the international prestige of the Russian Empire. The 
establishment of an archaeological institute in Constantinople was partly an attempt to 
prove Russia’s imperial standing. Archaeological studies, the very act of bringing a 
monument to Russia, were regarded as a sign of imperial glory. 
A very often and explicitly repeated reason for supporting RAIK’s activities was 
extending influence over the Near East through science and cultural institutions. Both 
212 
 
Russian diplomats and scholars cited examples from European powers, most notably 
France, to point to the importance of cultural influence. “Soft power,” in modern 
parlance, was Russia’s weak side and Russian diplomats who came up with the RAIK 
project were aware of this shortfall. Nevertheless, they tried to infiltrate Ottoman 
territories and the Balkans through an archaic identity and used slogans from another 
century, like Orthodoxy and Slavdom. Although in the late 19th century some 
intellectuals in the imperial centres propagated pan-nationalist programmes, the 
intellectuals of the newly emerging nation-states prioritised local identities over pan-
national identities. In the age of rising micro-nationalism in the Balkans, ancient 
monuments were not defined as “Slavic” or “Orthodox,” but as the remnants of 
particular nations. Strict Bulgarian surveillance of Russian archaeologists proved that 
the “Orthodox and Slavic” brethren of Russia were not any less likely to monitor foreign 
archaeological activities than the Ottomans. 
The Ottoman government, on the other hand, was on the defensive in its 
relationship with Russian archaeologists, as the provider of antiquities. Russian 
archaeologists arrived in the Ottoman Empire relatively late, compared to the French, 
the British or Germans. As long as their activities remained scientific and they acted 
within the confines of Ottoman laws, members of RAIK received permission for 
archaeological expeditions. Nevertheless, even in this case, their activities were closely 
supervised by the authorities both in the provinces and in the centre, and Russian 
archaeologists were frequently reminded of the procedures they should follow. Actually, 
RAIK’s relationship with the Ottoman government was characterised by a combination 
of cooperation and conflict. On the one hand, Ottomans were suspicious of Russian 
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archaeological activities, and very strictly monitored Russian archaeologists. The openly 
stated political agenda of RAIK shows that this suspicion was not totally baseless. Also, 
the Russians were frequently seeking study permits in politically instable regions that 
were at the forefront of international interest, such as Macedonia, which further 
increased Ottoman suspicions. On the other hand, Ottoman sensitivity about ownership 
rights over antiquities was part of a broader Ottoman policy, and was not exercised 
peculiarly vis-à-vis the Russians. 
In addition to suspicions, however, there was also a certain degree of cooperation 
between the Ottoman government and RAIK. Although the director of the Ottoman 
Museum Osman Hamdi Bey was described as very distant by Russians, in the end, the 
Ottoman legal framework made RAIK’s studies possible. RAIK even found the 
opportunity to make excavations in Constantinople, a very rare opportunity for foreign 
scholars. Despite their reservations, the Ottoman government provided necessary 
conditions for archaeological research. In this context, being supportive of science was a 
sign of being part of the “enlightened” and “civilised” world, and the Ottoman Empire 
could not risk being perceived as backward and unsupportive of scientific activities by 
foreigners. Ottoman sensitivity made sense in the context of the highly fluid 
international political atmosphere of the late 19th - early 20th century and of the dominant 
values of the era. In an attempt to survive as a viable political entity and reinforce its 
vulnerable sovereignty, the Ottoman Empire launched its project of modernity, and 
archaeology was a symbolic manifestation of this endeavour. 
There was a radical transformation in both countries after World War I and the 
patterns of relationship fundamentally changed. The contrast between the periods before 
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and after World War I further proved the political nature of RAIK’s activities. The 
radical political change and the new identity promoted by the Bolsheviks indicated why 
Byzantine studies lost their appeal for the Soviet regime. 
  
215 
 
Chapter 6 
On the Eve of the Balkan Wars: 
Archaeology in the Midst of Political Unrest 
As repeatedly noted in this dissertation, the Balkans, along with Constantinople and the 
Black Sea littoral were the key regions that attracted RAIK’s scholarly interest. 
However, amidst the growing political tensions in the first decade of the 20th century, it 
became more and more difficult for RAIK to undertake expeditions in the Balkan 
region, especially in Macedonia. The story of RAIK’s expeditions in the Balkans 
illustrated why the ideological background that characterised the establishment of 
RAIK, was not a viable political project. Since the Russian Empire based its foreign 
policy to a certain extent on religious and ethnic principles like Orthodoxy and Slavdom 
the rise of micro-nationalism caused Russian foreign policy many problems. When the 
Orthodox believers and Slavs fought with each other, Russia found itself in a delicate 
position. Therefore, the primary motivation behind RAIK, extending influence over the 
Balkan Peninsula through studying the history of Orthodoxy and Slavdom was 
problematic, because ancient monuments were no longer defined broadly as remnants of 
Orthodox or Slavic civilisation. Instead, they were seen as symbols of particular national 
histories. The causes of conflict in the Balkans were so complicated and multi-faceted 
that it would be a crude simplification to assume that the only obstacles on Russia’s path 
were other European powers and the Ottoman Empire. In fact, shortly before the Balkan 
Wars, ethnic tensions in the Balkans reached a level beyond the control of any imperial 
entity, including Russia. 
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The political background of RAIK’s expeditions in the Balkans testified to the 
complications Russia faced in the region at the turn of the century. One example was 
RAIK member Fyodor Ivanovich Shmit’s (1877-1956) visit to Selânik in 1903 for a 
brief observation of Byzantine monuments of the city.547 1903 was a very tense year for 
Russian-Ottoman relations, especially in Macedonia. After the failed Ilinden Uprising 
precipitated by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO), Austria-
Hungary and Russia compelled the Ottoman Empire to follow the Mürzsteg reform 
program to consolidate order in the region. Very unwillingly, the Sultan accepted the 
Austro-Russian terms; however this made things only worse: an article in the program 
called for the redrawing of districts according to ethnic lines once order was restored, 
which brought more nationalistic propaganda and violence as rival Balkan states and 
nationalist bands struggled to create “facts on the ground” in Macedonia.548 
On an international scale, Russian rapprochement with Austria after the 
Mürzsteg talks secured the status quo on the Balkan front, as Russia turned its face 
towards Asia in the very first years of the 20th century. After the Russian defeat at the 
Russo-Japanese War of 1904, Russia redirected its attention back to the Balkans, which 
automatically brought Austria and Russia against each other. In fact, Mürzsteg happened 
to be the last instance of cooperation between Russia and Austria-Hungary in Balkan 
affairs.549 The events that followed the last decade before World War I antagonised 
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Russia’s relations with Austria and Germany, while bringing the former closer first to 
France, and then to Britain.550 
During Shmit’s Selânik expedition, inter-ethnic violence in Macedonia resulted 
in the murder of a Russian diplomat. In a letter to Uspenskii, Shmit expressed his 
sadness about the recent murder of the Russian consul in Manastır (Bitola), Aleksandr 
Arkadievich Rostkovskii, who had always been a supporter of RAIK’s activities in 
Ottoman Macedonia.551 On 8 August 1903, Rostkovskii was shot dead by an Ottoman 
soldier of Albanian origin.552 The Russian government responded strongly: although 
Abdülhamid II and ministers of the Ottoman government sent condolences, Russia sent 
part of its Black Sea fleet to Ottoman territorial waters and demanded a reform program 
for Macedonia. Abdülhamid II accepted Russia’s terms and a more serious diplomatic 
crisis was avoided. In fact, this was not the first time a Russian diplomat was murdered 
in Ottoman Macedonia. Earlier in 1903, the Russian consul in Mitrovitsa, G. Shcherbin 
was also murdered by an Albanian, who protested against the opening of a Russian 
consulate in the city.553 
Shmit reported that as was the case of the previously murdered Russian consul, 
Shcherbin, the murderer of Rostkovskii was sentenced to paying 10.000 roubles to the 
family of the victim.554 Although the Sultan gave condolences to Zinoviev, Shmit 
criticised the decision of the Turkish government to take the murder to a civil court 
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instead of a military court, and commented that the murderers had no reason to fear, 
when they knew they would be pardoned. 
From 1904 to 1908, the breakdown of the Ottoman authority increased 
lawlessness in Macedonia. Not only Macedonian Christians but also Muslims were 
uneasy about great power intervention, and the murder of Russian consuls were only 
two instances reflecting the resentment of the Muslim population at the interference of 
European powers. The violent conflicts between Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian bands in 
Macedonia forced local populations to identify themselves with one of these national 
groups, thereby legitimising the nationalists’ territorial claims for Macedonia’s future 
“liberation.” As Mark Mazower commented, “Ethnicity was as much the consequence 
as the cause of this unrest; revolutionary violence produced national affiliations as well 
as being produced by them.”555 
For a short time, it seemed that at least the Bulgarian and Serbian governments 
could come to an agreement. After the failed Ilinden Uprising, Serbian and Bulgarian 
nationalists realised that the support of European powers, including Russia, was 
inconsistent, unreliable and depended on power politics. The disillusionment with 
imperial powers brought Serbian and Bulgarian nationalists together against foreign 
intervention, although the Serbo-Bulgarian cooperation did not last long.556 The two 
Balkan governments signed two treaties – a treaty of friendship and a treaty of political 
alliance in 1904. Despite this brief rapprochement, the Macedonian Question continued 
to be a bone of contention between the two Balkan countries. In fact, the 1904 
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agreement between Serbia and Bulgaria proved to be short-lived and fell short of sorting 
out differences between the two governments. 
The Macedonian Crisis reached a climax in 1908, when a number of factors 
combined to create a crisis both in the international and in domestic levels. The 1908 
crisis also paved the way for future alliances and antagonisms that eventually led to the 
Balkan Wars and World War I. The 1908 Young Turk Revolution originated in the 
crisis-ridden Macedonia. The Young Turks gave utmost importance to preserving the 
integrity of the Ottoman Empire through centralising the administration. They were 
uncomfortable both about European breach of Ottoman sovereignty and the expansion 
of young nation-states in their vicinity. The Young Turks were more heterogeneous in 
their political outlook than is generally argued and the overall orientation of their 
foreign policy fluctuated over time.557 Until the outbreak of World War I, different 
political figures from the Young Turk government sought alliances with Britain, France, 
Germany, and Austria. Although they generally maintained a suspicious attitude towards 
the Russians for their involvement in Balkan affairs, it would be incorrect to say that the 
Young Turks had a consistently anti-Russian policy line. The eventual alliance with the 
Germans, who had significant economic interests in the Ottoman Empire, was a 
contextual outcome, rather than the result of a systematic policy. 
1908 was stage to other important developments of international scale, as 
immediately after the Young Turk Revolution, Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia, 
Greece annexed Crete, and Bulgaria declared independence. In the meantime, the 
balance of power in European diplomacy changed from the late 19th century to the first 
                                                        
557 William M. Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774 (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 24-26; Hasan 
Ünal, “Young Turk Assessments of International Politics, 1906-9,” in Turkey: Identity, Democracy, 
Politics, ed. Sylvia Kedourie (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 40. 
220 
 
decade of the 20th century. After the Austrian annexation of Bosnia, Russia actively 
worked to create a Serbian-Bulgarian alliance to contain Austro-Hungarian influence in 
the Balkans, although in time it was revealed that Serbia, Bulgaria, and Russia had 
contradicting motivations for entering into this alliance.558 Not surprisingly, Austria-
Hungary was also worried about the expansion of Russian influence in the Balkans and 
the spread of nationalist propaganda within its borders. 
In this political atmosphere, Russia came closer to France and Britain, its former 
rivals over the Eastern Question. Although the traditional British anxiety about Russian 
control of the Straits did not calm down, the nature of Russian-British relations changed 
in the first decade of the 20th century. For one reason, Russia’s agreement with the 
French meant that any conflict with Russia would automatically bring Britain into a 
conflict with France, which was a deterrent factor for the British.559 Moreover, Britain’s 
strengthened position in Egypt and sophisticated naval methods made the Royal Navy 
less concerned about Russia’s position in the Straits than it was in the past.560 At the 
same time, Russian diplomats were aware that protecting the balance of power was 
crucial until Russia was strong enough to capture the Straits. After a series of talks 
between Russian and British diplomats from 1904 to 1907, the two countries ironed out 
their differences and signed the Anglo-Russian Convention in August 1907, which 
brought Russia closer to fulfilling its desires over the Straits Question.561 Eventually, by 
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1908 Austria-Hungary and Germany grouped on one side, while Russia, Britain, and 
France grouped on the other side. 
Although the Austro-Russian reform programme of 1903 was intended to reduce 
violence in Macedonia, in fact the tension never decreased in the province between then 
and the outbreak of the Balkan Wars in 1912. To the already existing conflicts between 
Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs, and the Ottoman government, Albanian discontent was added 
as a new element in the early 20th century, a development that would impact the future 
of Macedonia. Originally, Albanian elites were not interested in total independence from 
Ottoman rule, they rather sought moderate reform. Many educated Albanians, either 
Christian or Muslim, sided with the Young Turk Revolution because they saw a promise 
of liberty in the Young Turk regime.562 However, the relations between Albanians and 
the Young Turks soon got sourer as the new regime pursued a policy of centralisation 
and Turkish nationalism. 
The agitation among Muslim Albanians caused anxiety on the part of the Slav 
population of Macedonia, who feared an independent Albania might be detrimental to 
their interests. On the other hand, the Ottoman government was also uneasy about 
Albanian demands, because increasing political instability meant weakening of effective 
Ottoman rule.563 Albanian demands for autonomy coincided both with the overall 
Macedonian crisis and with a reaction against the Young Turk regime.564 The lands 
demanded by the Albanians were contested both by Greeks and Serbians, and the 
situation only resulted in the further escalation of violence. 
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RAIK’s expedition to Old Serbia in 1908 was carried out under the shadow of 
the Albanian crisis and the above-mentioned political background. The aim of the 
expedition was to investigate the Decani Monastery near the town İpek (Pecs), which 
was built in the 14th century by the Serbian King Stefan Uroš III. The Decani Monastery 
had a significant place in Serbian nationalist imagination, as it was the patriarchal seat 
of the medieval Serbian Kingdom. Uspenskii recalled that in the midst of anarchy, he 
managed to collect valuable ancient materials in Decani that were until then unknown in 
the scientific world. In the expedition report, in addition to making scientific analyses 
about ancient monasteries in Old Serbia, Uspenskii gave information about the socio-
political conditions in the region and the relations between the Albanians, Bulgarians 
and Serbs. He made remarks about the level of welfare of the region’s inhabitants and 
the inappropriate conditions in which he made the expedition. 
The Inspector General of the Three Macedonian Vilayets, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, 
offered help to Uspenskii on his expedition to Decani, provided the Russian 
archaeologists with a military escort, and suggested the least dangerous routes.565 In the 
expedition report, Uspenskii explained that “limitless arbitrariness” ruled over Old 
Serbia and Macedonia: there was intense animosity between Muslims and Christians, 
Albanians and Slavs, and even among different Albanian tribes. The Serbian 
Patriarchate and monasteries were threatened by armed Albanian bands. In Decani, the 
monastery was protected by the Turkish garrison stationed inside the monastery but as 
soon as the Ottoman forces left, the monastery faced destruction.566 Ottoman authority 
was practically non-existent in the region. In their correspondence, the Russian consul in 
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Skopje, Arkadii Aleksandrovich Orlov explained to Uspenskii that the major reason 
behind the conflict was economic but in the absence of an authority to resolve economic 
problems, the question evolved into an ethnic conflict.567 
In the aftermath of the Balkan Wars, shortly before the closure of RAIK, 
Uspenskii made a plea for financial support from the Russian government to undertake a 
second expedition to Old Serbia.568 He pointed out that in the changing political climate 
after the war, the most historically important regions passed into Serbian possession, 
which therefore opened up new scientific opportunities for RAIK. Since the systematic 
study of Serbian antiquities exceeded the financial means of Serbian archaeologists, the 
burden, Uspenskii claimed, fell on Russia’s shoulders. However, the outbreak of World 
War I in 1914 made this plan impossible. 
 
6.1 The Establishment of the Slavic Department within RAIK 
No other project reflected the ideological motivation of RAIK as clearly as the efforts at 
creating a Slavic Department within the institute in 1911. Despite being a failed project, 
the circumstances in which it failed indicates the complexities and limits of Russian 
foreign policy in the Balkans at the turn of the century. In fact, the failure to create a 
Slavic Department in RAIK shows the discrepancy between the political realities of the 
Balkans and the ambiguous Pan-Slav sympathies of Russian diplomats and scholars. 
Russia’s religious and ethnic brethren – edinovertsy i edinoplemenniki – did not 
necessarily define themselves on the grounds of being Slav or Orthodox. The umbrella 
identity of which Russia saw itself as the protector, was already crumbling on the eve of 
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the Balkan Wars. 
Russian foreign policy in the Macedonian crisis – creating Pan-Slavic solidarity 
with mixed messages about Slavdom and Orthodoxy – accorded with RAIK’s academic 
interests. In the practical world of politics, the Russian government viewed itself as the 
“big brother” of the Orthodox Slavs of the Balkan Peninsula. In this regard, the focus of 
RAIK’s studies suited the government’s direction: Russian archaeologists studied the 
history of Byzantium, but emphasised the influence of Slavs on Byzantine institutions, 
and collaborated with Serbian and Bulgarian, rather than Greek scholars. It was 
explained in Chapter II that Russian Byzantine studies was very much linked to Slavic 
studies and many Russian Byzantinists studied the relations between the Byzantine 
Empire and the Slavic world. Ideologically, academic interest in Slavic studies was 
shared by both liberal and conservative intellectuals, as was exemplified by the works of 
Miliukov on the one, and Lamanskii on the other end of the political spectrum. 
From early on, RAIK served as a meeting place for young archaeologists from 
Balkan countries, meaning Bulgaria and Serbia. Russian archaeologists tried to establish 
close contacts with Serbian and Bulgarian archaeologists and museums. Article 13 of 
the RAIK Charter gave the opportunity to foreign scholars to become members and 
conduct research within RAIK facilities. In the course of RAIK’s existence the Serbian 
government sent three students: I. Radonich and S. Stanoevich were commissioned in 
1898-1899 and M. Vukchevich in 1902. In 1899-1900 the Bulgarian government sent G. 
Balaschev to Constantinople to continue his studies under the guidance of Uspenskii.569 
These students completed their studies under the supervision of Uspenskii and returned 
to their countries as experts in their fields. All of them worked on the history of relations 
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between South Slavs and the Byzantine Empire. Even after they left, the cooperation 
between RAIK and these scholars continued. 
RAIK also financed and jointly directed archaeological field trips with Bulgarian 
colleagues. One example was the excavation at Aboba in Bulgaria in 1899-1900, which 
was conducted by Uspenskii and Karel Škorpil.570 As another sign of scientific 
collaboration, the bulletin of RAIK was published in Sofia from 1898 to 1912, the 
remaining issues being published in Odessa. 
In early 1910 Uspenskii submitted a note to the Ministry of Public Education and 
to the Russian ambassador in Constantinople outlining the importance of Balkan history 
for Russia, as well as pointing to important archaeological discoveries made by RAIK in 
this region.571 Uspenskii recalled the discovery of the Tsar Samuil inscription, the 
excavations in Aboba, extensive research in Macedonia and Old Serbia. Comparing 
them to RAIK’s activities in Asia Minor, Syria, and Palestine, Uspenskii concluded that 
the strength of RAIK, especially considering its material capabilities and the 
competence of its staff, lay in the Balkans.However, article 3 of the Charter left the 
Balkans out of RAIK’s geographical scope and did not provide a basis for scientific 
studies in this region. Considering the successful studies carried out in the Balkans, 
Uspenskii proposed the enlargement of RAIK’s programme. He stated that there were 
also demands from Bulgarian and Serbian scholars in this direction. He cited a Serbian 
archaeological journal, Starinar, from 1907, which had an article by Dr. M. Vasich, the 
director of the National Museum in Belgrade, arguing that RAIK should enlarge its 
scope and incorporate pre-historical archaeology to reveal ethnographical and cultural 
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questions. Dr. Vasich proposed to divide RAIK into specialised units with secretariats in 
Serbia, Bulgaria, and southern Russia with its centre being in Constantinople. 
In November 1909 Vasich and Uspenskii discussed the possible enlargement of 
RAIK. Vasich reminded Uspenskii of Russia’s cultural mission among the Slavs and the 
“threatening danger” posed by the West.572 In order to combine the demands of Balkan 
scholars with RAIK’s activities, Uspenskii proposed the following measures:573 
1) A department would be established within RAIK for the study of the pre-
historical archaeology of the Balkans. 
2) A body with representatives from Serbia and Bulgaria would be responsible 
for the administration of the Slavic Department. A committee of six scholars would be 
selected; two from Bulgaria, two from Serbia, and two from Russia, and the committee 
would be chaired by the director of RAIK. 
3) The committee would be responsible for planning and organising the activities 
of the Slavic Department, for securing financial resources, and establishing contacts 
with relevant institutions to carry out projects, especially with regard to pre-historical 
study. 
4) In order to guarantee that the Slavic Department would not be a financial 
burden on the RAIK budget, the costs would be split between Bulgaria, Serbia, and 
Russia; that is, each government would allocate 5000 francs for the Slavic Department. 
5) The publication organ of the Slavic Department would be RAIK’s Izvestiia. 
Articles would be chosen by the above-mentioned committee and would be published 
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either in Slavic languages or in their Russian translation. Excerpts from specialised 
research articles from local journals might also appear in Izvestiia. 
6) Bulgarian, Serbian, and Russian scholars should undertake collaborative 
research in Turkish Thrace and Macedonia. In order to eliminate any pretext for 
suspicion on the part of the Ottoman administration – Uspenskii noted that the Ottomans 
had many reasons to have suspicions about their closest neighbours, Russia – it would 
be helpful to integrate the Ottoman Ministry of Education into the Slavic Department. 
Uspenskii thought that the presence of a Turkish member in the committee might 
facilitate excursion and research permits for politically unstable regions of the Ottoman 
Empire. The Turkish member would not make a financial contribution to the budget of 
the Slavic Department. 
7) In order to guarantee that the Slavic Department would not go against the 
RAIK Charter, it would be sufficient to enlarge the first article, which explained the 
founding principles of RAIK, and to provide it with the features of an international 
scholarly institution. The Slavic Department would be subordinate to RAIK in its 
activities. 
Ambassador N. V. Charykov, totally sharing the opinions outlined in the above 
note, recognised the timeliness and desirability of the project proposed by Uspenskii. 
Upon the ambassador’s approval, the note was sent to the Bulgarian, Serbian, and 
Russian Ministries of Education, with a request of annual 5000 francs allowance from 
the Bulgarian and Serbian Ministries and 3000 roubles for two years from the Russian 
Ministry.574 To develop the project and put it into practice, Uspenskii visited Belgrade 
and Sofia in the summer of 1910, and exchanged opinions with local scholars on the 
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subject. On 11 March 1910, Nicholas II approved the allocation of 3000 roubles from 
the treasury from the 1910 budget to cover the expenses of collaborative archaeological 
research by Russian and South Slavic scholars in the Balkan Peninsula. The Serbian 
Ministry of Education and Church Affairs and the Royal Serbian Academy of Sciences 
also approved the project. The Serbian government allocated 5000 dinars from the 1911 
budget for this end. 
It is no coincidence that the efforts to create a Slavic Department within RAIK 
occurred at a time when Russia was working hard to create a Serbo-Bulgarian military 
and diplomatic alliance, i.e., the later Balkan League. In other words, Russia’s “soft 
power” symbolised by RAIK reflected the political agenda set by the Russian “hard 
power.” Russia’s role in forging alliances between Bulgarians and Serbs was an 
expression of Pan-Slavic sympathies of certain segments of the Russian Foreign Service. 
In addition, with the 1905 Revolution in Russia, the Balkan Question became a public 
concern the Russian government could not neglect.575 No doubt that the Russian 
government used Balkan Christians as foreign policy instruments various times 
throughout the 19th century, but on the other side of the coin, independent Balkan states 
also used Russian military power to their advantage. The Balkan alliance of 1911 was 
articulated by the Balkan nations more than by Russian diplomats. 
In February 1911, Uspenskii invited the representatives of Serbia, Bulgaria, and 
Russia to a meeting to discuss the details of the Slavic Department. The Serbian 
government sent academician A. Stefanovich and the director of the Belgrade National 
Museum, Dr. M. Vasich. The Bulgarian government sent G. Katsarov, a professor at 
Sofia University, the director of National Museum in Sofia, B. Filov, and a former 
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researcher at RAIK and a teacher at Varna Gymnasium, K. Škorpil. From Russia, the 
director of the Kiev Museum of Art and Antiquities, V. V. Hvoyko participated in the 
meeting, in addition to Uspenskii and RAIK secretary F. Shmit. The meeting protocol 
for the discussion of a pre-historical archaeology department was signed on 21 February 
1911 by the Russian and Serbian delegates.576 In this meeting, the status of the Slavic 
Department within RAIK was discussed and a work plan for 1911 was laid down. The 
Bulgarian delegates did not agree with the resolutions and left the meeting because of a 
difference of opinion with the Serbian delegates. In other words, the Slavic Department 
came to life as incomplete from the start. Unfortunately, RAIK’s report from 1911 and 
the reports sent to the Ministry of Public Education did not reveal the nature of the 
quarrel between Bulgarian and Serbian delegates, but it is interesting that the two 
governments could not cooperate in a seemingly less political matter when they could 
enter into a military alliance, although the military alliance was also not free of friction. 
Actually, the territoriality of archaeological scholarship added a political element to it, 
and it is this territorial aspect that can explain the sensitivity of Bulgarian and Serbian 
government representatives, especially on the eve of a war that changed the boundaries 
of the states in question. 
As a result of the meeting, the Russian and Serbian delegates agreed upon 
conducting pre-historical research together, especially in the Vardar and Maritsa 
Valleys. Necessary permits from the Ottoman government would be requested through 
the director of RAIK. Planned expeditions for 1911 were determined as follows: an 
expedition would be carried out in Strandzha, Sakar-Planina and Eastern Rhodopes 
under the guidance of K. Škorpil; and in Eastern Serbia under the guidance of Dr. 
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Vasich.577 Despite the possible obstacles the Bulgarian government could create, the 
Russian and Serbian members of the Slavic Department decided to proceed with the 
studies planned in the protocol. 
On 2 March 1911, the charter of the Slavic Department was authorised by the 
Serbian and Russian delegates.578 The charter laid out the following points: 
1) A department dedicated primarily to the study of the pre-history of the Balkan 
Peninsula would be established with the intention to create a common academic 
platform for Slavic scholars, its chairman being the director of RAIK. 
2) The Slavic Department would be composed of the director and secretaries of 
RAIK and representatives from Slav countries. 
3) Scholars from Balkan nations with an interest in archaeology would first be 
appointed as members of RAIK before becoming members of the Slavic Department. 
4) The director of RAIK would choose two representatives for each country from 
the members mentioned above. 
5) One member from each country would serve as secretary. The secretary would 
be appointed by the relevant government upon preliminary agreement with the director 
of RAIK. 
6) The responsibilities of the secretary would be the organisation of scientific 
capabilities in his country and channelling them in a fashion that would enable the 
Slavic Department to achieve its goals. 
7) Upon the invitation of the director of RAIK, the Slavic Department would 
meet once every year with the intention of: 
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a) Discussing work already undertaken the previous year, 
b) Preparing plans for the next year, 
c) Appointing staff for these projects. 
8) The Slavic Department could recommend new members to RAIK. 
9) The Slavic Department would have financial resources at its disposal allocated 
by the Russian government and the governments of other representatives, the latter 
contributing evenly to the budget. 
10) The Slavic Department would submit annual budget reports to each 
government, signed by the chairman and secretaries in charge. 
11) The results of the studies and annual reports would be published as an 
addendum to Izvestiia. 
12) The Slavic Department would publish its studies primarily in Russian but 
publications in Bulgarian and Serbian were also allowed. 
13) As for excavations, the Slavic Department was bound by the legal 
regulations of the country where the studies were be conducted. 
14) In case of need, the Slavic Department could make additions to these 
provisions. 
15) This charter would come into force after its approval by the relevant 
governments. 
The Serbian government immediately approved these provisions and appointed 
Dr. Vasich, the director of the National Museum in Belgrade, to the Slavic Department 
upon the recommendation of Uspenskii. The work plan for 1911 presented by Vasich 
was approved by Uspenskii. In the summer of 1910, from 21 July to 17 September, 
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Vasich undertook excavation in Vinci in Serbia, on the coast of Danube.579 The 
excavations in this region continued until World War I. 
Because of the interruption of the Balkan Wars and World War I, the Slavic 
Department could not succeed in leading extensive fieldwork. Yet, the establishment of 
such a department suggests the ideological orientation of RAIK. The reluctance of the 
Bulgarian delegates to undertake archaeological studies in collaboration with the Serbs 
hinted at the difficulty of the Russian desire to create a Pan-Slav solidarity. 
Eventually, Russian effort at creating a Balkan alliance not only failed in the 
sphere of archaeology. In fact, Russia’s role in fostering the Balkan League ended up 
being paradoxical in itself. The Russian government encouraged the Balkan alliance as a 
bulwark against Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, not as a step towards anti-Ottoman 
mobilisation, because the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire would bring complications 
Russia did not want to cope with at that point. However, Russian support gave Balkan 
nations, especially Bulgaria, sufficient self-confidence to drive the Ottomans out of the 
European continent.580 At the end of the Balkan Wars, the Ottoman presence in the 
Balkans nearly came to an end. Arguments over the division of the spoils as a result of 
the First Balkan War triggered Greece and Serbia to turn against Bulgaria, which 
initiated the Second Balkan War. Romania and the Ottoman Empire also took advantage 
of the conflict between Serbs, Greeks and Bulgarians, and seized lands acquired by 
Bulgaria in the first war. As a result of the Second Balkan War Bulgaria had to cede 
most of the territories it gained in the first war. 
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Expansionist Bulgarian dreams also contradicted Russian military, economic, 
and political interests in the Balkans. Although Russia was instrumental in the Bulgarian 
independence and had been a supporter of the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance of 1912, the 
economic, military, and political confrontation over the issue of the Straits brought 
Bulgaria and Russia against each other. In 1912, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Sergei D. Sazonov warned the Bulgarian government that Russia would not tolerate any 
Bulgarian pretensions over Constantinople.581 Bulgarian government on its part turned 
against Russia because they believed that the Russian government backed Serbia in the 
Second Balkan War. This was yet another instance where Pan-Slavic and Pan-Orthodox 
ideas came into conflict with pragmatic foreign policy principles. Until the ultimate 
capture of Constantinople by the Russian armies, Russian Foreign Service preferred to 
see the imperial city at the hands of the Turks and were not likely to make concessions 
even to Bulgarians, their Slavic and Orthodox brethren, in this regard. If Byzantium had 
to be re-enacted, it would be Russia who should take the lead, not Bulgaria or any other 
Balkan nation. 
 
6.2 Conclusion 
The archaeological study of Byzantine monuments in the Balkans offered a perfect 
example of the intersection of ancient history with contemporary Russian imperial 
identity and political interests. Between 1895 and 1914, and especially right before the 
Balkan Wars, the areas that attracted RAIK’s scholarly interests were ridden with a 
violent inter-ethnic conflict. In addition to Russian archaeologists, scholars from Balkan 
nations also tried to legitimise the territorial claims of their nations with archaeological 
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evidence. Therefore, archaeological research was more divisive than unifying amongst 
the Orthodox nations of the Balkans. The establishment of the Slavic Department 
coincided with the last time the Russian Empire sponsored an alliance between 
Bulgarians and Serbians, but eventually both the Slavic Department and the Balkan 
Alliance failed, although for different reasons. Despite its failure, the Slavic Department 
was the ultimate showcase of RAIK’s raison d’être: fostering ties between Russia and 
the Balkan Slavs, exactly what ambassador Nelidov and other advocates of RAIK’s 
establishment had in mind in the early 1890s. 
Although in a general sense Russian foreign policy was driven by issues of 
security and national interest, Russian policy-makers often had illusions about Orthodox 
and Slavic solidarity. In fact, the basis of Russian imperial identity, Orthodoxy and 
Slavdom, were out of touch with the political realities of the day. By the time RAIK was 
established in 1894, neither Orthodoxy nor Slavdom were viable political appeals in the 
Balkans, as the inter-communal conflict in Macedonia exemplified. The failed project to 
create a Slavic Department and the Bulgarian reluctance to join it was a reflected the 
limits of Russian foreign policy. 
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Chapter 7 
The Doom of Empires: 
The Fate of the Russian Archaeological Institute After 1914 
 
With the outbreak of World War I, the Russian diplomatic corps in Constantinople left 
the city on 16 October 1914. On the same day RAIK staff joined diplomats and closed 
down their office, leaving the library, antiquities collection, and museum behind, as well 
as the personal property of the director, Fyodor Uspenskii. In a report sent to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Public Education, Uspenskii blamed 
ambassador Mikhail Nikolaevich Girs for the situation.582 Recalling the institute charter 
which placed RAIK under the protection of the Russian Embassy, Uspenskii claimed 
that before the outbreak of hostilities he was in constant communication with 
Ambassador Girs. Although the general atmosphere in the Russian Embassy “left no 
doubt that [we] were on the eve of great events,” Girs recommended Uspenskii not to 
give reason to the Turks to suspect that the Russians were preparing to evacuate the city. 
As a result, the ambassador did not recommend taking precautions for the preservation 
of RAIK’s property. Until October 1914 RAIK functioned as usual, continuing its 
lectures and studies. After the hostilities started, Uspenskii and his wife left 
Constantinople with the Russian diplomats in a hurry, leaving their personal belongings 
behind, taking only the most important things. Uspenskii noted that none of the Russian 
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institutions had taken any precautions regarding the protection of their property in 
Constantinople. 
At first the war gave Uspenskii hope that Russia might indeed capture the capital 
of the Byzantine emperors. In a memorandum from December 1914 entitled “On the 
Arrangements Connected to the Expected Occupation of Constantinople by Russia,” 
Uspenskii wrote that the possible occupation of Constantinople would bestow 
responsibilities upon Russia.583 He repeated the argument that Russian military power 
should be accompanied by moral and cultural influence over Orthodox people. 
Uspenskii deemed Orthodoxy as a very efficient tool to strengthen Russia’s cultural 
influence, therefore he pointed to the appeal of a Russian patriarch for Orthodox Slavs 
once Constantinople was captured. Uspenskii stated that in terms of the wealth of its 
antiquities and its historical importance, Constantinople, the “last Rome,” was one of the 
most important historical cities in the world. Even though ancient Byzantine monuments 
were not directly related to Russian national history, Uspenskii claimed that religious 
and historical ties between Russia and the Byzantine Empire gave a historic mission to 
Russia. In anticipation of a Russian victory at the end of the war, Uspenskii called for 
the establishment of a commission to oversee the systematic investigation and 
preservation of Byzantine monuments in Constantinople to fulfil this mission. He 
particularly suggested the conversion of the Hagia Sophia back into a church after the 
expected Russian victory. Uspenskii hoped that the first service in the historic cathedral 
after the conquest of Constantinople would be held in Russian. 
In fact, a committee was established during the war to survey, record, and 
preserve archaeological monuments in Constantinople and its environs, although it 
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never functioned.584 The mission of the committee was described as studying the 
monuments in Constantinople from a scholarly perspective, taking necessary 
precautions for their preservation, and collecting ancient materials and manuscripts. 
After the monuments and archaeological artefacts were categorised, the committee 
would undertake excavations. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was supposed to 
provide financial support. The chairman of the committee was the President of the 
Imperial Academy of Sciences, Grand Duke Konstantin Konstantinovich. Other 
members included Count S. D. Sheremetyev, Count Aleksey Aleksandrovich 
Bobrinskii, Prince A. A. Shirinskii-Shihmatov, Countess P. S. Uvarova, F. I. Uspenskii, 
N. I. Pokrovskii and two unnamed representatives from the Holy Synod and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Russian preparations for ruling Constantinople after the war were actually 
grounded on a reasonable expectation. The secret Straits Agreement of March 1915 
between Britain, France, and Russia granted Constantinople and the Straits to Russia as 
a war prize.585 Had it not been for the Russian Revolutions of 1917, it was possible that 
Constantinople and the Straits would have been given to Russia at the end of the war.586 
Therefore, Russian plans for reshaping the urban landscape of Constantinople through 
archaeological preservation after the expected victory accorded with the political 
context. 
However, Uspenskii’s hopes were dashed soon when it became obvious that 
Russia was going through a revolutionary period, let alone not capturing Constantinople. 
After the Revolution, Uspenskii decided to devote his attention to the repatriation of the 
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RAIK property that remained in Constantinople. Shortly after leaving Constantinople, 
he wrote a letter to the Ministry of Public Education about the need to reclaim RAIK 
property, to which the Ministry responded positively.587 
By the time RAIK ceased to operate in 1914, it possessed a rich museum and 
library collection, especially noteworthy for the wealth of manuscripts it held. Both the 
library and the antiquities collection were acquired mostly through donations, but also 
through the funds allocated to RAIK by the Russian government. In total, the materials 
in the library had a value of 134,000 roubles by Uspenskii’s estimate, with 22,622 books 
under 8,909 titles, including books, journals, maps, and brochures. The museum 
collection was partly moved to the Russian Embassy and partly brought to Russia during 
evacuation. The museum collection included pieces of Byzantine, Greco-Roman, and 
Slavic art, a large numismatics collection, documents and manuscripts in Greek and 
Slavic languages, church paraphernalia, and other ancient objects. In total, the value of 
RAIK property was estimated to be nearly 200,000 roubles.588 In addition to RAIK 
property, Uspenskii estimated that the value of his personal property that remained in 
Constantinople was about 20,000 roubles.589 The status of RAIK property was 
determined by war conditions and changing governments in both countries, and was 
solved only by agreement between Republican Turkey and the Soviet Union in 1929. 
Already in 1901, part of the collection was moved to the Russian Embassy, both 
for preservation and because there was not enough space at the RAIK building.590 After 
the Russians evacuated Constantinople on 16 October 1914, the Italian Embassy took 
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over the property of the Russian Embassy. Uspenskii entered into direct communication 
with the Italian ambassador, who agreed to take necessary measures for the protection of 
RAIK’s property left at the Embassy building.591 During the war, one of the members of 
RAIK, B. A. Panchenko delivered certain objects of Christian art, coins, seals and 
mostly golden materials from the RAIK building to the Russian Consulate-General in 
Constantinople in early 1915.592 In addition, part of the RAIK archives and materials 
were brought to Odessa after the evacuation.593 
According to the information received by the Russian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs from the Italian Embassy in Constantinople in December 1914, the Turkish 
government sequestered RAIK’s library that remained at the institute building, and sent 
the contents to the Imperial Ottoman Museum.594 Furthermore, two plots of land 
purchased for the construction of a Russian Commercial High School were taken over 
by the Turks and the RAIK building was transformed into a military hospital. In later 
years, RAIK’s remaining property in the Ottoman Museum would constitute a 
diplomatic problem in the relations between the Turkish and Soviet governments. 
The Sèvres Peace Treaty, signed in 1920 between the Ottoman Empire and the 
Allies, stipulated that the Turkish authorities were responsible for the protection of 
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RAIK’s property and must return it to the Allied powers, when requested.595 Halil 
Ethem Bey (1861-1938), who became the director of the Ottoman Museum after Osman 
Hamdi Bey died in 1910, claimed that with the outbreak of World War I, the Russians 
brought the most valuable manuscripts, coin collections and other ancient objects to 
Russia. In a book that was published in 1937, Halil Ethem claimed that the library of 
RAIK, which remained in Constantinople, was on the point of being distributed, when 
the Ottoman Museum intervened and took care of the books and the few remaining 
artefacts with an intention to preserve them.596 
The final expedition of RAIK was made to Trabzon on the south-eastern coast of 
the Black Sea in 1916-1917, when the region was under Russian occupation. In fact, 
RAIK’s Trabzon expedition was only one of the many archaeological and 
ethnographical studies conducted in the Russian-occupied regions in Eastern Turkey. 
There were a number of scholarly expeditions mainly in Van, Erzurum, Trabzon, and 
neighbouring towns. Among them, Nikolai Marr’s expedition to Van and his studies on 
Armenian antiquities stood out.597 There was also a unit responsible for archaeological 
preservation within the Russian military administration of Trabzon.598 Russia’s war-time 
scientific activities fall outside the scope of this project but suffice it to say that the 
Russian occupation of the Ottoman Empire was much more than a military invasion: 
Russian armies were accompanied by ethnographers, geographers, archaeologists and 
architects who devised projects to reconstruct the landscape of the occupied regions. In 
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this context, Russian archaeologists projected themselves as the saviours of antiquities. 
As Austin Jersild pointed out, Russian archaeologists constructed a contrast between the 
sacred antiquity of the Orient and its contemporary deplorable condition. The “original,” 
“authentic,” “glorious” Orient had to be made known by the scholars so that the Russian 
Empire could legitimise its role as the restorer of this once-glorious past.599 
The decree issued by Nikolai Yudenich, the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Caucasian Armies in March 1916 testified to the saviour mission the Russian Empire 
embraced. Yudenich stated, “[W]hile our forces enter deep into Turkey, a rich variety of 
monuments from the earliest times of human culture are coming into our hands, the 
necessity of whose preservation has been brought to my attention several times by 
leading people.”600 The commander regretfully acknowledged that he received 
information about Russian citizens, some of them from the ranks of the army, who 
thoughtlessly caused the destruction of the monuments and even secretly engaged in 
antiquities trade. Yudenich declared that this was totally unacceptable and stated that 
ancient monuments, without exception, were under state protection. Churches, 
monasteries, mosques, both secular and religious buildings, archives, libraries, 
museums, ancient manuscripts, books in any languages, inscriptions were all counted in 
this list. Yudenich commanded that destruction, plundering, sale, purchase, unauthorised 
collection of ancient books, manuscripts, and other ancient objects were strictly 
forbidden in the areas occupied by the Russian army. People who held old manuscripts 
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and books, inscriptions and religious-historical materials were ordered to hand them to 
military superiors in their districts. These objects would be exhibited in the Caucasian 
Museum in Tbilisi. Excavations were allowed only for people with appropriate 
certificates from district headquarters. Archaeological research and excavations were 
strictly forbidden for people who failed to produce necessary documents, even if they 
had legitimate scientific grounds. 
Trabzon had a particular historical significance for Byzantinists. The Empire of 
Trebizond, its centre being modern-day Trabzon, was one of the three successor states to 
the Byzantine throne along with the Nicaean Empire and the Despotate of Epirus after 
the fall of Constantinople to the Latins following the Fourth Crusade in 1202-1204.601 
The Trebizond Empire was founded by Alexios I Comnenos (r. 1204-1214) with the 
help of the Georgian Kingdom in the early 13th century. Culturally, the Trebizond 
Empire brought together various elements – Georgian, Armenian, Greek, Caucasian, and 
Seljukid. It was the longest surviving Byzantine successor-state; Trabzon was captured 
by the Turks only in 1461, 8 years after Constantinople. 
RAIK undertook two expeditions to Trabzon during the war, in the summer of 
1916 and in the summer of 1917 respectively.602 The major aim of the Trabzon 
expedition was, making a detailed architectural and archaeological study of Christian 
monuments, taking necessary precautions for their preservation, as well as the protection 
of Muslim monuments from plundering and destruction. Valuable objects in mosques 
would be brought from the war zone to safer locations, and Greek antiquities would be 
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placed under the protection of the Trabzon Metropolitan.603 The report particularly laid 
emphasis on the preservation of mosques built by the Turks, thereby supporting Russia’s 
self-ascribed role as the saviour of antiquities from different cultures.604 
F. I. Shmit and N. K. Kluge accompanied Uspenskii on the Trabzon expedition. 
Russian archaeologists especially devoted their attention to the monasteries around 
Trabzon, and focused not only on their archaeological study but also their preservation. 
Upon Uspenskii’s petition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made generous donations for 
the benefit of monasteries in the city of Trabzon in 1917.605 In line with Uspenskii’s 
demand, the Ministry sent 6,000 roubles; 2,000 roubles was donated to each of the 
metropolitan seats of Trabzon and Rodopolis (today known as Maçka), and 2,000 
roubles was divided between the monasteries of Sumela, Peristera, and Vazelon.606 
Upon the withdrawal of Russian forces from the region in 1917, Uspenskii made copies 
of manuscripts he found in these monasteries. He published these findings in 1927 with 
V. N. Beneshevich under the title Vazelonskie Akty.607 Uspenskii’s Ocherki iz Istorii 
Trapezuntskoy Imperii (Essays from the History of Trabzon Empire) was also based on 
his research in Trabzon during the war. In addition to Trabzon, Uspenskii made studies 
in the Batum oblast’ as well.608 With the defeat of the Turks in parts of Eastern Turkey, 
there were plans to organise a new expedition to the south of Trabzon in autumn 1917 
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but this plan was not realised given war-time conditions and domestic turmoil in 
Russia.609 
In Trabzon city centre, the most important archaeological studies were made in 
the churches of Hagia Sophia, Panagia Chrysocephalos Church (Ortahisar Mosque) and 
St. Eugene Church (Yeni Cuma Mosque). All three monuments were Byzantine 
churches which were converted into mosques after the Ottoman conquest. In early 1916 
the Commission for the Preservation and Registration of Ancient Monuments, affiliated 
with the Russian military administration, issued a resolution about these monuments. 
The resolution ordered that these mosques, all of which were converted from churches, 
would not hold Muslim services any longer. The fate of the monuments would be 
decided after a comprehensive archaeological study and removal of plasters on their 
walls.610 A decree by the Russian military administration, issued in 30 June 1916, 
extended the scope of archaeological research about converted Byzantine churches in 
the Trabzon area. According to this decree, all churches that were converted into 
mosques by the Ottomans would be first examined by archaeologists and, later, Muslim 
service would be prohibited in these churches. The report counted seven such churches 
in Trabzon. In addition, the decree concluded that all mosques constructed by the Turks 
should continue Muslim services as usual.611 
An interesting conjunction of archaeology, religious practices, and daily life was 
staged with the discovery of the burial ground of the Emperor of Trebizond, Alexios 
Comnenos III (r. 1349-1390). After the discovery, the Russian military administration of 
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Trabzon organised a church service in the Emperor’s honour.612 In this example, the 
Russian administration in Trabzon not only acted as the saviour of antiquities but also 
linked ancient history to daily religious practice. This tribute, paid to a medieval 
Byzantine emperor, projected Russia as the representative of Byzantine emperors in the 
modern world. 
During the war-time expeditions to Trabzon and environs, Uspenskii collected 
over 400 manuscripts from churches, mosques, and private residences. Among them, 
there were several Quran copies and Turkish-Arabic manuscripts. In a report, Uspenskii 
acknowledged that he found these books in houses and mosques abandoned by residents 
during the Russian occupation.613 Particularly valuable Islamic manuscripts were found 
in the Panagia Chrysocephalos Church, or the Ortahisar Mosque. Uspenskii, in 
consultation with the Transcaucasian Committee Interim Administration, decided to 
send these valuable manuscripts to Batum.614 While some manuscripts were kept in 
Batum, others were sent to Petrograd before the end of the war. One reason Uspenskii 
collected the Islamic manuscripts was because he wanted to use these objects as 
leverage against the Turks. He hoped that “in future negotiations with the Turks [the 
books] could be used in exchange for the transfer of the Institute’s books and 
manuscripts.”615 
Not only Turkish-Islamic manuscripts but also Greek antiquities were brought to 
Russia during the occupation. Konstantin Papoulidis brought to light a local Greek view 
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about Russian archaeological activities in Trabzon. In June 1917 a Greek journalist from 
Trabzon, N. A. Leontidis, accused Russian scholars of smuggling four trunks of objects 
with religious and artistic value to Russia.616 The discontent of local Greeks about the 
smuggling of antiquities by Russian archaeologists echoed some previous examples, 
such as the Bulgarian nationalists who blamed Russians for smuggling Bulgarian 
antiquities after the 1877-1878 Russo-Ottoman War. In an age of nationalism, Russian 
appropriation of either Orthodox or Slavic symbols was met with local resistance from 
other groups that shared the same cultural heritage. 
World War I was followed by dramatic regime changes in both the Russian and 
the Ottoman Empires. After the Bolshevik Revolution Byzantine studies lost the 
ideological justification and popularity it enjoyed under the Tsarist regime. At the same 
time, the nature of relations between Russia and Turkey was very different from the pre-
war years. In May 1920, the communist regime officially abolished RAIK and 
established a bureau within the Academy of Material Culture that was responsible for 
overseeing RAIK’s affairs and negotiating with the young Republican regime in Turkey 
for the repatriation of RAIK’s property. Although at first the Academy of Material 
Culture appointed someone else as the chairman of the bureau, in 1924 Uspenskii was 
appointed as the chairman, upon his repeated requests.617 Uspenskii’s appointment to the 
bureau, although it took a few years, suggested that his political views were not regarded 
as seriously threatening by the Soviet regime. 
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In the first years after the Revolution, Fyodor Uspenskii did not give up his hope 
that RAIK would resume its activities after the war. He even submitted a petition to the 
Soviet government in 1918 for the enlargement of RAIK. This petition was the exact 
copy of a proposal that had been submitted to the Ministry of Public Education before 
the outbreak of the war. Despite the radical ideological change in the country, Uspenskii 
used the same arguments as he had used vis-à-vis the Imperial government. He argued 
that a country which “claim[s] to have an important role in history should not refrain 
from taking part in a noble competition in the scientific sphere.”618 He requested 
financial support and an increase in the number of staff, and proposed to create sub-
divisions for Balkan, Asia Minor, Western European, pre-historical, Roman-Byzantine, 
Slavic and Oriental studies within RAIK. Not surprisingly in 1918, this proposal did not 
receive a positive response. 
In the tumultuous years of the Civil War discussion about an archaeological 
institute was too much of a luxury and questions about RAIK were shelved for a few 
years. Nevertheless, Uspenskii never gave up his hope that RAIK might be re-
established once the political situation consolidated. In 1918 the Imperial 
Archaeological Commission was transformed into the Academy for the History of 
Material Culture, which was dedicated to the study of art, archaeology and ethnography 
of ancient cultures. Within this Academy the section of Early Christian and Byzantine 
Archaeology continued research and publication about Byzantine history, art, and 
archaeology, albeit at a slower pace compared to the Imperial period.619 In August 1924 
the Board of the Russian Academy of the History of Material Culture convened to 
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discuss Uspenskii’s request to reopen RAIK.620 The meeting was chaired by Nikolai 
Marr, and attended by Vasilii V. Bartold, S. A. Yasebelev and the former RAIK 
secretary, B. V. Farmakovskii among others. Discussions continued for more than a 
year. In a report to the USSR Academy of Sciences on 21 December 1925, Uspenskii, as 
the chair of the newly established Russian-Byzantine Commission, outlined the 
principles that would shape the regenerated institute:621 
1) The report argued that a research-based institution was necessary for a 
scientific and in-depth study of the Near East and especially the neighbouring Turkey, 
especially in order to cultivate strong cultural relations with the Turkish government. 
Uspenskii’s report especially emphasised the political nature of the proposed institute, 
stating that the institute would serve a “scientifically and politically important task” with 
its studies.622 The proposed institution would have two branches, one being humanities-
oriented and the other with a focus on natural sciences, their centres being in İstanbul 
and Ankara respectively. The humanities branch would be the successor of RAIK and 
would specialise in the literature, history, linguistics, ethnography and archaeology of 
Turkey. The institution would carry out expeditions, excavations and research with the 
permission of Turkish authorities. Both departments were planned to be under the same 
administrative structure. 
2) Considering that RAIK had a library and antiquities collection, which were 
seized by the Turkish government in November 1914 and kept in the Ottoman Museum 
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until the time of the report, the return of this property would be requested from the 
Turkish government. Together with the property of RAIK, Uspenskii’s personal 
property should also be demanded. On his part, Uspenskii reminded that he seized 
Islamic manuscripts during the occupation of Trabzon in 1914-1917 from the Ortahisar 
Mosque, which were kept in Batum and Leningrad. Uspenskii proposed their return to 
Turkish authorities in exchange for RAIK’s property. 
3) If the negotiations between the USSR and Turkey resulted positively, the legal 
basis for the proposed Scientific Research Institute would be laid down. 
Apparently, the reestablishment of RAIK, or rather the establishment of a new 
scientific institute with a new scientific policy looked like a close possibility, as 
information to this effect appeared even in Soviet newspapers. An unidentified 
newspaper from 17 July 1927 announced that the USSR Academy of Sciences would 
establish a scholarly institute in İstanbul.623 The newspaper article stated that upon the 
proposal of the Ankara government, the Academy was also planning to create an 
institute in Ankara to study natural resources around the new capital city of Turkey, for 
which the Soviet Academy of Sciences would provide the necessary scientific support. 
In August 1927 the draft principles of the Research Institute were elaborated once again 
by Uspenskii. The former RAIK director stressed that the establishment of a research-
based institution required a detailed discussion of technical requirements but also careful 
choice of words “so as not to cause foreigners to reach wrong conclusions.”624 
However, Uspenskii’s ardent attempts at the recreation of RAIK or a substitute 
institution in the end failed. In April 1928 the Department of Scientific Institutions 
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within the Council of Peoples Commissars (Sovnarkom) notified the Permanent 
Secretary of the USSR Academy of Sciences that the Department had decided to 
postpone the establishment of the planned Research Institute in Turkey until the 
resolution of the property question. Nevertheless, the basic principles of the institute 
were laid down, in case a future opportunity arose for its creation:625 
1) The institute would be a Turkish-Soviet institution; its staff would be 
made up equally of Turkish and Soviet scholars. 
2) The focus of the institute would be the study of Turkey from a variety of 
academic perspectives. 
3) The institute would only function within the borders of Turkey. 
In response to Sovnarkom’s above-mentioned proposal, the Byzantine 
Commission, including Uspenskii and V. Bartold, wrote a report to the Academy of 
Sciences.626 Contrary to Sovnarkom’s opinion, the Commission raised doubts about the 
first article of the memorandum. Uspenskii and Bartold claimed that even though there 
were some Turkish scholars who produced valuable studies, like the member of the 
USSR Academy of Sciences Köprülüzade Mehmed Fuad, overall, they believed that the 
level of science in Turkey was far from meeting European standards. Therefore, the 
Byzantine Commission advised the establishment of an institute staffed by Soviet 
scholars, rather than a collaborative Turco-Soviet enterprise. 
In the meantime, the question over RAIK property was still being discussed 
between the two governments. A secret resolution from the Main Scientific Directorate 
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(Glavnauk) to the USSR Academy of Sciences, written in 14 July 1927, stated that 
agreement had been reached with the Ankara government about bartering RAIK 
property for Islamic manuscripts from Trabzon.627 Apparently, it was the Ankara 
government that pursued Islamic manuscripts because Glavnauk did not know of the 
Trabzon manuscripts, let alone their whereabouts, and was asking the opinion of the 
USSR Academy of Sciences on the subject. The Academy of Sciences informed 
Glavnauk that the manuscripts were partly in the Batumi Gymnasium and partly in the 
Asiatic Section of the Academy of Sciences Library in Leningrad. After consulting 
Uspenskii, the Academy of Sciences agreed to give them back to the Turkish 
government.628 
Finally on 17 August 1928 the USSR Academy of Sciences formally announced 
that agreement had been reached with the Turkish government over the years-long 
property dispute.629 However, there was no mention of Islamic manuscripts in the 
memorandum sent to Uspenskii. In 1929 the Soviet government officially demanded 
RAIK’s property from the Turkish government through the Soviet Embassy in Turkey. 
That year Turkey returned the remaining property and library of RAIK to the Soviet 
Union. In addition to the materials at the İstanbul Archaeological Museum, – the 
previous Ottoman Imperial Museum – antiquities were found in the attic of the old 
Russian Embassy building.630 Although the first exchange of letters between the two 
governments implied that the RAIK’s property would be exchanged with Islamic 
manuscripts Uspenskii brought from Trabzon, the final agreement did not have a clause 
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about this barter. On his part, the director of the Istanbul Archaeological Museum Halil 
Ethem Bey displayed a stubborn attitude, and insisted that the library of RAIK could be 
returned only on the condition that the historical treasures taken by Uspenskii from 
Turkey were returned, too.631 However, in the end, on 16 July 1929, the library of 
RAIK, consisting of 26,703 books and manuscripts, was handed by the Turkish 
authorities to their Soviet colleagues with an inventory of the objects submitted.632 
The objects and books delivered by the Turkish authorities were shared between 
the Hermitage, the USSR Academy of Sciences, and the Academy of Material Culture, 
after their preliminary analysis by the Academy of Sciences. While manuscripts and 
books were sent to the Academy of Sciences Library in Leningrad, the museum 
collection was sent to the Hermitage in 1930.633 Following the Revolution, in the early 
1920s, smaller museums, palace museums, and private collections were dismembered 
and museums were centralised. In this process the Hermitage was given the lion’s 
share.634 
However, most of the materials that were previously delivered to Russian 
diplomatic posts for preservation were either damaged or lost. Briefly after 1917 the 
building of the former Russian Embassy in Constantinople served as an émigré 
diplomatic mission. According to the 1921 Moscow Agreement between the USSR and 
Turkey both parties agreed not to tolerate each other’s political opponents. In line with 
this, the Turkish authorities displayed an uncooperative attitude towards anti-Bolshevik 
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representatives.635 After 1921 émigré groups had to move from the Embassy building, 
which was taken over by the Americans.636 Most of the materials that remained from 
RAIK were lost in the process. 
The Bolshevik Revolution brought destruction to Russian Byzantinology. The 
publication of scholarly journals and books significantly decreased and many proposed 
multi-volume books produced only their first volumes. Uspenskii’s Istorii Vizantiiskoi 
Imperii (History of the Byzantine Empire) shared the same fate.637 Bolsheviks viewed 
the field of Byzantine studies as an ideological vestige of the old regime, a field 
promoted by the Tsarist regime for political reasons.638 
Uspenskii’s letters to the USSR Academy of Sciences indicated that he was in a 
difficult position under the new regime. For instance, he was not allowed to travel to 
Constantinople to settle the property question with the Turkish government, even though 
he was the most competent person to deal with this issue.639 In a letter from August 
1928, Uspenskii complained to the Permanent Secretary of the Academy of Sciences 
that in addition to the government’s reluctance to send him to Constantinople, he was 
not allowed to participate in the international congress of Byzantinists in Belgrade in 
1927. Uspenskii was concerned that European scholars would assume he was out of 
favour with the Soviet government.640 
After the Revolution, RAIK members scattered to different places, and only 
Uspenskii and Farmakovskii continued their academic career as archaeologists in the 
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Soviet Union.641 The painter N. K. Kluge left for Constantinople in 1920, and lived there 
until the end of his life. B. A. Panchenko died from typhus in 1920 somewhere in 
Ukraine, even the exact place of his death was unknown. R. H. Leper died in Petrograd 
in 1918. F. I. Shmit, Uspenskii’s former colleague and member of RAIK, converted to 
Marxism and identified “institutionalised” Byzantinism of the Tsarist period as the 
extension of an aggressive foreign policy vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire.642 Nevertheless, 
Shmit fell into conflict with the Soviet regime after the 1930s. He was arrested in 1933 
and was executed in 1937. 
Many prominent archaeologists and Byzantinists who collaborated with RAIK 
preferred to leave Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution. Among them, M. I. Rostovtsev 
left for Oxford in 1920, and finally ended up in Yale. From abroad, Rostovtsev wrote 
articles against the new Bolshevik regime. N. P. Kondakov left first for Bulgaria and 
then for Prague, where he continued to give lectures on Byzantine art.643 A. A. Vasiliev, 
one of the most prolific names among émigré Byzantinist scholars, left Russia in 1925 
for the University of Wisconsin, and finally accepted a position at the Dumbarton Oaks 
Byzantine Institute of Harvard University. Therefore, Russian Byzantinism was 
seriously damaged within the USSR but the academic tradition born in the Russian 
Empire continued to thrive elsewhere in Europe and the USA, although at a slower pace. 
Uspenskii’s death in 1928 was followed by the interruption of Byzantine studies 
in the USSR. A relative revival began in 1940s. Vizantiiskii Vremennik reappeared in 
1947 after years of suspension, a department was re-established within the Academy of 
Sciences dedicated to Byzantine studies, and a number of scholarly works on Byzantine 
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history were published.644 Like their predecessors, the Soviet Byzantinists focused on 
social-economic history of the Byzantine Empire and Byzantine-Russian relations, but 
of course within the confines of a Marxist framework. 
On the Turkish side, foreign archaeological activities, conducted mainly by the 
French, British, German and American archaeologists, resumed in the first years of the 
Republic. In Republican Turkey, archaeological policies were determined by the legal 
framework laid out by Osman Hamdi Bey in the 19th century. As in the Ottoman period, 
the main policy was to maintain scholarly cooperation with Western institutions, while 
strictly regulating and overseeing their activities. Antiquities smuggling was seen as a 
breach of sovereignty more than ever. In the Republican period Turkish scholars 
demanded to be seen on an equal footing with their Western counterparts, and this 
demand was much more pronounced than it had been in the Ottoman Empire. As part of 
Republican reforms, academic archaeology was institutionalised in Turkey especially 
after the 1930s. The Turkish Historical Society was established in 1930, a Turkish 
Archaeology Institute was established at Istanbul University in 1934, and the first 
Department of Archaeology was opened at Ankara University in 1936.645 Different from 
archaeologists in the Ottoman period, archaeologists of the Republican Turkey made 
studies on Anatolian civilisations, especially on the Hittites, in an attempt to promote 
Anatolia as the historical Turkish patria. 
In his memoirs, the Italian Ambassador in Ankara, Giulio Cesare Montagna 
(1874-1953), referred to French attempts at creating an institute of Byzantine Studies in 
İstanbul in the first years of the Republic. The project was not realised, according to 
                                                        
644 Obolensky, pp. 70-71. 
645 Tuğba Tanyeri-Erdemir, “Archaeology as a Source of National Pride in the Early Years of the Turkish 
Republic,” Journal of Field Archaeology, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Winter, 2006), pp. 382-383. 
256 
 
Montagna, because “in the face of Turkish hostility towards everything concerning 
research and study which recalls the charm of Byzantium, the French government had to 
change tack.”646 Consequently, the French government decided to transform the project 
into a Turkish Oriental Institute. Montagna suggested the establishment of an Italian 
Research Institute in Turkey considering the political role of foreign scientific institutes 
and the rivalry between European powers in the scientific field.647 
Referring to discussions between the Turkish and Russian authorities about the 
fate of the RAIK library, the Italian ambassador argued that Soviet academic activities 
in Turkey were linked to their desire to create a sphere of influence over the young 
Republican regime. Montagna argued, “It is known that in Moscow studies of the 
Orient, particularly its economics and politics, have for some time experienced a lively 
revival – as another weapon serving the renewed and transformed but still present 
Russian activity in these regions.”648 Especially from 1929 until 1935 Soviet-Turkish 
relations were characterised by strong political, economic and cultural cooperation. The 
first Turkish Five-Year Plan was realised thanks to financial support from the Soviet 
Union, and the two countries shared a common antagonism to the Western political 
order.649 Close economic relations had repercussions in other spheres, most notably in 
culture. Although eventually Soviet plans to establish a research institute in Turkey 
failed due to economic reasons, the proposal to create an institute should be seen in the 
context of Turco-Soviet rapprochement. 
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The final discussion about RAIK in Soviet academia took place in April 1945, 
when the Department of History and Philosophy within the USSR Academy of Sciences 
organised a meeting dedicated to the memory of Uspenskii, for the 100th anniversary of 
his birthday.650 As a result of the meeting, the Department reached a decision about the 
reestablishment of RAIK but like other previous reestablishment efforts, this project also 
ended without a result. 
 
7.1 Conclusion 
The outbreak of World War I and the Revolution in its aftermath was an unexpected 
blow to RAIK. In fact, briefly with the occupation of Trabzon, RAIK found the 
opportunity to apply its academic studies to the practical realm. The symbolic funeral 
service for Emperor Alexios Comnenos III illustrated the image the Russian imperial 
administration evoked with the help of archaeological studies. Moreover, reconversion 
of Byzantine churches, which had been converted by the Ottomans into mosques was a 
step towards reshaping the landscape of the city. In this sense, the occupation of 
Trabzon was a showcase of what RAIK stood for: linking ancient past to present, and 
the Byzantine Empire to Russia. 
The transformation in the nature of relations between Russia and Turkey in the 
aftermath of World War I and the internal transformation of both countries created a 
contrast with the imperial period. The fall of Byzantine studies from favour in the Soviet 
era makes it clearer that RAIK was a political project, and reflected Russian imperial 
identity. There were discussions about the reestablishment of RAIK in the Soviet period 
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but the institute the USSR Academy of Sciences had in mind was quite different than 
RAIK. It was planned as a two-branched institute with a focus on natural sciences, in 
addition to humanities. Even within the humanities branch, Byzantine studies were 
regarded as a minor subfield. With the disintegration of the Russian Empire, the 
conditions that brought RAIK to life disappeared, as therefore did its reason for 
existence. 
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Conclusion 
 
Broadly, this research was motivated by a curiosity about the relationship between 
academic scholarship and politics in the late 19th century and the early 20th century, right 
before World War I. Among other academic fields, archaeology was especially useful in 
linking past to present, and legitimising contemporary political projects with historical 
references. On the one hand, European empires projected themselves as the spiritual 
inheritors of classical civilisations and competed with each other for this role. Imperial 
rivalries were echoed in the museum halls and excavation fields. On the other hand, 
local nationalists contested this imperial vision by claiming ancient heritage for 
themselves. Each actor used archaeology to found their competing visions on a 
supposedly “objective” and scientific basis. 
The political use of ancient objects and monuments proves that cultural heritage 
does not have a fixed meaning, rather, “... heritage should be understood as a process, 
related to human action and agency, and as an instrument of cultural power in whatever 
period of time one chooses to examine.”651 The meaning of cultural heritage is dynamic; 
constructed and reconstructed by individuals, groups, or states. New and sometimes 
contradictory meanings may be attributed to the same monument by different groups 
across time and space. The way cultural heritage is interpreted reflects the social, 
cultural, and political context in which it is created. In the words of Cornelius Holtorf, 
“Cultural memory is hence not about giving testimony of past events, accurately or 
truthful, but about making meaningful statements about the past in a given present. 
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Ancient monuments represent the past in the landscape and cultural memory gives them 
meaning and cultural significance.”652 
In terms of their appreciation of ancient monuments, especially Byzantine 
monuments, the Russian and Ottoman empires embraced competing identities. On the 
one hand, Russian archaeologists emphasised Russia’s cultural and historical links with 
the Byzantine Empire, and deemed themselves responsible for unearthing Byzantine 
history. Through their archaeological studies, Russian scholars created an imaginary link 
between the Byzantine Empire and Russia. They viewed Russia as the protector of 
Orthodoxy and thus the rightful heir to the Byzantine legacy. On the other hand, 
Ottoman archaeologists did not make such historical claims, neither did they embrace 
ancient Byzantine or Greco-Roman monuments as part of their national identity. Apart 
from a handful of intellectuals in the last years of the Empire, most Ottoman 
intellectuals did not integrate Byzantine history into the overall narrative of Ottoman 
history. Different from European empires, the Ottoman Empire failed to present a clear 
ideological basis to legitimise its claim over antiquities. The Islamic identity of the 
Ottomans as interpreted at the time made it hard to mobilise a Hellenistic-Roman past as 
part of its own and claim a European identity. 
Ottoman interest in antiquities and cultural property rights was more linked to 
contemporary concerns than historical sensitivities. The Ottoman Empire was on the 
defensive in its relations with foreign archaeologists not because Ottomans were 
protecting monuments they saw as linking them to their ancestors, but because they 
were sensitive about protecting territories on which these monuments were found. 
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Ottoman intellectuals adopted archaeological methods from Europe only in their 
external form, as a practice of collecting valuable ancient objects, but could not create a 
coherent discourse for integrating ancient monuments into their national identity. While 
Greek, Italian, Iranian, and Egyptian archaeologists – legitimately or not – established 
historical links with their modern nations and ancient heritage on their “historic” lands, 
Ottomans did not even attempt to do so, except for a few intellectuals. Only a handful of 
Ottoman intellectuals claimed an Ottoman identity on the basis of the Roman-Byzantine 
heritage. Clearly, the Byzantine Empire was destroyed by the Ottomans themselves, 
therefore the Ottoman Empire had a complicated relationship with the history of 
territories under its jurisdiction. Under these conditions, Ottoman claims over Byzantine 
and Greco-Roman antiquities remained only territorial – Ottomans claimed ownership 
rights over Byzantine antiquities only because these objects were found within the 
borders of the Ottoman Empire. There was definitely a political dimension behind 
Ottoman archaeological activities, but it was not a nationalist one. In a sense, what 
characterised Ottoman archaeology was a disconnect with ancient past. 
Ottoman archaeology developed primarily as a reaction to foreign scholarly 
activities. Ottoman attitudes to foreign archaeologists was shaped by a mixture of 
mistrust and toleration within legal limits. Actually, Ottomans laid claims over 
antiquities only because Europeans also did so. For Osman Hamdi Bey and the first 
generation of Ottoman archaeologists, archaeology was a means of proving that the 
Ottoman Empire was on the same cultural level with European powers. If making 
archaeological discoveries was a sign of being enlightened, then the Ottoman Empire 
should also be a part of this cultural activity. Archaeological activities and the exhibition 
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of findings in the Ottoman Imperial Museum displayed the European face of the 
Ottoman Empire – European because of the Sultan’s and the Sublime Porte’s official 
support for archaeology, not because of descent from ancient Greek or Roman 
civilisation. Compelling foreign archaeologists to abide by a set of laws implied that the 
Ottoman Empire was capable of inducing foreigners to respect its sovereign rights 
within its borders. In a sense, Ottoman elites tried to protect the sovereignty of the 
Empire by becoming a part of the European world. To achieve this, it was necessary to 
compel foreigners to obey Ottoman laws, instead of being subject to extra-territorial 
rights. 
When RAIK was established, the Ottoman Empire had already developed 
standard methods to monitor and regulate foreign archaeological activities. The 1884 
antiquities regulation laid the groundwork for archaeological policies of the Ottoman 
Empire for the years to come. Similar to other foreign archaeologists, the Ottomans 
approached RAIK members with caution. Scholarly activities were permitted within 
legal limits but also strictly regulated. Considering the political background and RAIK’s 
openly stated mission to extend Russian influence among Russia’s ethnic and religious 
kinsmen, this suspicion was not completely baseless. 
Although at first Ottoman government was reluctant to authorise RAIK and 
raised difficulties for their studies from time to time, it would be wrong to say that 
Ottoman attitudes towards Russian archaeologists were totally obstructive. On the 
contrary, RAIK received permits that no other foreign archaeologists had received until 
then. For instance, Russian excavations in the interior of the Imrahor Mosque was the 
first archaeological excavation in a functioning mosque in Constantinople. When 
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Russian scholars justified their archaeological studies with scientific premises, the 
Ottoman government provided support, on the condition that Russian archaeologists 
respected Ottoman laws. For the Ottoman government, archaeology was a means of 
projecting its image as a modern empire and scholarly cooperation with foreigners was a 
display of modernity. Therefore, the Ottomans did not demonstrate a totally 
uncooperative attitude. At the same time, enforcing Ottoman laws was a message about 
complete Ottoman sovereignty within its borders. 
RAIK was established at a time when there was increasing political tension in 
Europe with regard to the fate of Ottoman territories. Especially the Balkans were the 
boiling cauldron of international politics. It does not come as a surprise that the idea to 
create a scholarly institute in Constantinople was born in Russian diplomatic circles. In 
this political context, Russian diplomats saw RAIK as a means of furthering political 
influence in the Ottoman Empire, especially in the Balkans. Archaeological research 
was regarded as an opportunity to facilitate closer academic and cultural contact 
between Russian and Balkan scholars. This mission was stated very openly and 
frequently in official ceremonies, letters, and RAIK reports. Establishment of a scientific 
institute was regarded as a supplement to political influence. Russian diplomats and 
scholars realised that being a great power required more than military power, and 
emphasised the importance of cultural institutions. They made comparisons with 
European powers, especially with the French and concluded that Russia lagged behind 
European governments as regards extending influence through cultural institutions. 
In fact, Russian scholars and bureaucrats had similar concerns to their Ottoman 
counterparts. Both Russia and the Ottoman Empire adopted museum-building practices 
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and archaeological scholarship from Europe, and for both empires archaeology was a 
means of asserting their place in an all-European competition for status and 
respectability. For Russian archaeologists, bringing historical monuments to Russian 
museums was a victory vis-à-vis Europeans, whereas for the Ottomans, keeping 
monuments at home was a success. The archaeological rivalry between empires started 
first between the British Museum and the Louvre. The Hermitage and the Ottoman 
Imperial Museum made a late, but ambitious start. In this competitive atmosphere, 
falling behind Europe was considered negative for the imperial prestige of both Russia 
and the Ottoman Empire. Sharing similar concerns with the Ottomans, Russians did not 
want to be left outside the scramble for ancient glories. Russian scholars often expressed 
the necessity to catch up with Europe in terms of the quality of scholarship, if Russia 
sought to be respected as a great power. 
RAIK’s scholarly activities centred mostly in the Balkans, Constantinople and 
the Black Sea coast. Partly as a result of the expertise of RAIK staff and partly because 
of the political mission of the institute, the major focus of RAIK’s archaeological 
projects was Slavic and Orthodox monuments. On a side note, RAIK did not undertake 
any systematic study of Armenian antiquities, although there were a number of imperial 
Russian scholars producing valuable studies in this field, most notably Nikolai Marr, 
whose academic career stretched from the imperial to the Soviet period. 
RAIK made detailed research in the monastic libraries around the Ottoman 
Empire, Greece, and the Balkans, and made significant contributions to the study of 
Orthodox theology, liturgy, and history. While undertaking studies on the history of the 
Orthodox Church, RAIK collaborated with the Imperial Orthodox Palestinian Society 
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and the Holy Synod. Russian archaeologists also concentrated on the study of Slavic 
history, and made excavations in cooperation with Bulgarian and Serbian archaeologists. 
These collaborative studies resulted in the establishment of a Slavic Department in 1911 
to enhance cultural and academic cooperation between South Slavs and Russia, although 
the Slavic Department failed to produce important studies because of the outbreak of the 
Balkan Wars and World War I. The convergence of religion, ethnicity, and archaeology 
reflected the motivation behind Russian archaeological activities in the Ottoman 
Empire. 
The fact that the leading Russian scholars collaborated with RAIK, an institute 
supported by the Russian government with political motivations, indicated that the 
relationship between the state and intellectuals was not always conflictual in Tsarist 
Russia, but there were different possibilities of cooperation. RAIK first and foremost 
symbolised Russia’s Pan-Orthodox orientation with its emphasis on the shared 
Byzantine-Orthodox tradition, but RAIK’s activities opened up different possible 
avenues for Russian involvement in the Balkans and Ottoman territories as well. In 
addition to Byzantine studies, RAIK also served as a centre for Slavic studies. 
Miliukov’s cooperation proved that liberal intellectuals, who were not quite likely 
enchanted with the Byzantine civilisation, could be attracted to RAIK for different 
reasons. The Miliukov case further proved that there was a combination of cooperation 
and conflict between the state and intellectuals. Despite different attitudes as regards not 
only domestic policy but also Russia’s Balkan policy, a certain degree of cooperation 
was more likely outside of Russia’s borders. 
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Since RAIK prioritised the study of Byzantine antiquities, RAIK’s activities shed 
light into Russian appropriation of the Byzantine legacy and how this legacy was 
moulded according to contemporary political concerns. The image of Byzantium had a 
very complicated meaning for Russian statesmen, clergy, and intellectuals, ranging from 
admiration and critical reception to total repudiation. However, from Miliukov to 
Nicholas II, there was a shared belief that Russia should be politically active in Balkan 
politics and in other regions that were once Byzantine strongholds, although the sources 
of their inspiration and the conclusions they derived as regards the Balkan and Near East 
affairs were different. RAIK’s activities suggested that both the regime’s and the 
intellectuals’ perceptions of the Eastern Question was very much influenced by religious 
and cultural concerns, in addition to economic and strategic considerations. 
Although the establishment of RAIK was first proposed by a handful of 
diplomats at the Russian Embassy in Constantinople, the idea received support from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Public Education, the Holy Synod, and 
Imperial Academy of Sciences. Nicholas II showed personal interest in RAIK and made 
generous donations for the acquisition of valuable antiquities. The motivations of 
Russian diplomats, bureaucrats at the Ministry of Public Education, the Holy Synod, and 
the Tsar for supporting RAIK’s studies give insight about political priorities of the 
Russian government. 
However, the governmental support did not undermine the value of RAIK’s 
academic studies. Despite the often stated political motivations, scholars affiliated with 
RAIK followed universal academic principles, which made their studies noteworthy 
outside the political context. As a result of its studies, RAIK maintained a respectable 
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reputation in international academic circles, engaged in a scholarly dialogue and 
cooperation with prominent universities, institutions, and societies in Europe and the 
USA. Russian archaeologists also established links with other foreign scholars in the 
Ottoman Empire. 
Looking at the political rivalry between European empires on the one side of the 
coin and international scholarly cooperation on the other, there seems to be two 
opposing dynamics with regard to archaeologists’ academic independence from politics. 
On the one hand, Russian diplomats, bureaucrats, and scholars vocally expressed 
political motivations for the establishment of RAIK. On the other hand, even in this 
highly sensitive political atmosphere, and despite national and imperial rivalries, there 
were also scholarly contacts that transcended imperial and national boundaries. 
Common scientific concerns shared by scholars from different ideological and national 
backgrounds made scholarly collaboration possible. Therefore, what I intended to 
question throughout the dissertation was not whether RAIK’s studies were distorted by 
political considerations or not, but why the Russian government preferred to support an 
archaeological institute with a proclaimed intention to study Byzantine antiquities. 
Director Uspenskii, consecutive Russian ambassadors in Constantinople, and 
bureaucrats who supported the creation of RAIK all hoped that studies on Orthodox and 
Slavic antiquities would facilitate the infiltration of Russian cultural influence in the 
Balkans. Russian imperial identity as expressed in relations with the Ottoman Empire 
rested on shared faith and history with Balkan nations. RAIK reflected both Slavic and 
Orthodox images of Russia, melting them in the same pot. However, by the late 19th 
century, this supra-national identity was contested by rising nationalism in the Balkans 
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and was therefore far from being a unifying factor. On the one hand, the late 19th - early 
20th century was an era of dreams about supra-national ethno-civilisational blocs, such 
as Pan-Germanism, Pan-Slavism and Pan-Turkism. On the other hand, these supra-
national identities were contested by micro-nationalism. For the Russian Empire, 
reaching the Balkan nations with messages about Orthodoxy and Slavdom in the midst 
of the Macedonian crisis was not a very strong weapon. In an age of violent micro-
nationalism, for the Balkan nations ancient monuments did not signify the “historic” 
lands of Orthodox and Slavic peoples, but were manipulated by particular ethnic groups 
– either Bulgarians, Serbs or Greeks – to delineate the territories each perceived to be its 
own legitimate historic land. 
In the first months of World War I, there were dreams about conquering 
Constantinople and regenerating Byzantine monuments in the city. These hopes were 
not unrealistic at all, on the contrary, Russian designs over Constantinople were 
grounded on the secret alliances concluded with the Allies during World War I. 
According to the agreement between the Allies, Constantinople was promised to the 
Russians in case of an Allied victory. Although Russian armies fell short of capturing 
Constantinople, they briefly occupied eastern coasts of the Black Sea. Russian 
archaeological activities in Trabzon give insight about possible practical applications of 
RAIK’s scholarly activities. Immediately after military occupation, Russian 
archaeologists started investigations in the most important Byzantine churches in the 
city, most of which were converted into mosques by the Ottomans. The interim Russian 
military administration of the city issued decrees to reconvert these monuments back 
into churches after archaeological surveys were completed. In a sense, Russian 
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archaeologists’ perceived role as the saviours of Byzantine heritage was taken to a 
practical level. With its archaeological studies and rehabilitation of churches to their 
original purpose, RAIK linked the Byzantine past to the Russian present. 
In his study on monuments and collective memory, Pierre Nora argued that the 
physical transformation of places of memory (lieux de mémoire) during critical 
junctures of history reflects the struggle among different political groups for the 
symbolic capital represented by these sites.653 Therefore, the meanings attributed to such 
objects of memory may change and fluctuate. For the Ottomans in the 15th century, 
transforming the largest cathedral of a conquered city into a mosque signified the 
triumph of Islam over Christianity, and marked a break with the Byzantine past.654 On 
the contrary, for Russians during World War I, reconversion of these churches meant the 
triumph of Orthodoxy, and heralded that Russia would repair the severed links with the 
Byzantine Empire. 
Both Russia and the Ottoman Empire went through radical transformations 
following World War I. In the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution, Byzantine studies 
no longer reflected the identity of the new regime, and consequentially lost official 
support. Throughout the 1920s and later in the 1940s the Soviet government formulated 
several projects for the establishment of a scholarly institute in Turkey. Despite close 
economic and cultural collaboration between Turkey and the Soviet Union in the 1930s, 
this project was never realised. Besides, the institute Soviet government intended to 
create was very different from RAIK. It was designed as a research centre with a focus 
                                                        
653 Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire,” Representations, No. 26, Special 
Issue: Memory and Counter-Memory (Spring 1989), p. 19. 
654 Robert Ousterhout, “Ethnic Identity and Cultural Appropriation in Early Ottoman Architecture,” 
Muqarnas, Vol. 12 (1995), p. 60. 
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on the study of the natural resources of Turkey, reflecting the industrialisation drive that 
characterised the economic policies of both countries. A humanities branch was also 
planned within this institute but Byzantine studies was only regarded as a minor subfield 
among the many interests of this branch. The Bolshevik Revolution severed the 
mythical links between the Byzantine Empire and Russia. Consequently, RAIK 
remained anachronistic and a thing of the past after 1917. 
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